Multilateralism turning into Transactionalism: Exploring Türkiye’s Middlepowerness towards the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean

Middle powers are often states that support and follow democratic principles, demonstrating such atonement in the domestic and foreign policies. However, states that want to emerge in modern multipolarity prefer a more centralised approach, adopting an assertive behaviour against powers or international institutions that criticise alleged ?authoritarian governance?. Among these countries, T?rkiye as a middle power has manifested a growing assertive behaviour towards the European Union (EU) after the failed coup of 2016, capitalizing on such antagonism in the referendum of 2017 has allowed the Justice and Development Party, (Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi / AKP) to transform T?rkiye into a Presidential Republic. Nonetheless, such assertive behaviour in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) has not always corresponded to an open antagonism manifested in the domestic rhetoric. In particular, the polarisation of the AKP against the Europeanisation process moved by Turkish presidentialism has shown an inconstant evolution in the security policies. Hence, this article proposes to interpret Turkish presidentialism in its political polarisation and nationalism against the EU in the domestic and foreign policies after the presidential turn. The article contends that Ankara?s leadership, albeit it has evolved the country?s governance into a competitive authoritarian governance, the impact of its security policies towards the EU has not favoured an open assertiveness of Turkish behaviour as a middle power.

This chapter takes stock of “the common” in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Doing so, the chapter analyses the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) both in terms of institutions and substantive policies. Showing how European Union (EU) foreign policies after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty have partially been crafted without the necessary institutional consolidation, it sheds light on the many policy challenges that EU diplomacy is confronted with. Cases that this chapter analyses by way of illustration are policies in reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” and the transnational war in Syria, the EU’s foreign policy performance at the Iran nuclear talks, and the impact of the “Ukraine crisis” on both the EU’s foreign policy manoeuvrability and the perception thereof in other parts of the world. Likewise, the 2015 refugee crisis has become a stress test for common foreign policy responses, and will therefore be assessed in its impact on the perception of EU foreign policy. Finally, the chapter also touches upon the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its intricate interplay between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures and EU autonomous defence instruments. The European Union’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it will be argued, hinges on its ability to both formulate common strategies and policies internally, and to hold such policies up in the face of third parties in order to see such European foreign policies implemented beyond declaratory rhetoric.

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

<p>This thesis is an in-depth study into the New Zealand-Australian relationship and the two nations' divergence in International Relations, with particular reference to the disparate foreign and security policies implemented under the Howard and Clark Governments from 1996/1999 respectively until the present time in 2007. The purpose of this study is to provide an accurate and up-to-date overview of the New Zealand-Australian relationship as it stands today, and to define the main areas of difference between the two countries which are driving trans-Tasman divergence in the international sphere. In pursuit of this goal, the subject-area is explored in the following ways. Chapter One provides a general overview of the trans-Tasman relationship, reflecting specifically on three abiding dynamics which together have contributed to the 'strangeness' of the trans-Tasman rapport from the mid-1800s until today. Chapter Two, defines in fuller detail the greatest areas of divergence between the two countries in their foreign and security policies, and then additionally outlines three important issues in the international sphere on which the Tasman pair have diverged most strikingly in recent years. Chapters Three to Five explore three areas of fundamental difference between the Tasman pair in their International Relations, considered here to be driving factors behind the trans-Tasman divide - namely, different beliefs and approaches towards multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States. Finally, Chapters Six and Seven explore three contemporary theories attempting to explain New Zealand and Australia's divergence in International Relations today. There are three main arguments throughout this thesis: first, that New Zealand and Australia are becoming increasingly divergent in their foreign affairs; second, that this divergence is primarily due to the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different in their views and approaches towards three crucial areas within international politics - multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States; and thirdly, that these differences in view and approach, and the divergent policies they produce, in turn arise chiefly from completely disparate senses of national identity in the two Tasman countries, which motivate differing - and sometimes conflicting - foreign policy behaviour. These three arguments are explored and expounded in the following ways. With regard to the first argument, Chapter Two provides an in-depth overview of the most important areas of divergence between New Zealand and Australia since 1999. As to the second argument, Chapters Three to Five employ a case study based on discourse analysis into New Zealand and Australian governmental speeches on the 2002-2003 Iraq Crisis - an issue that inherently involved these three fundamental areas of difference - in order to specify how precisely New Zealand and Australia diverge in their view and approach to these three matters based on the two Governments' own self-proffered statements and explanations. These disparate beliefs are then shown to translate into divergent actions and foreign policy behaviour on the world stage, by substantiating such rhetorical statements with evidence taken from the Howard and Clark Governments' foreign policy record, as documented in governmental documents as well as in political and academic literature. Finally, with regard to third argument, Chapters Six and Seven involve a discussion and critique of two rather convincing orthodox explanations for trans-Tasman divergence, Hugh White's 'Strategic Perception' and David McCraw's 'Divergent Political Ideologies', as well as a summary and broad application of one new theoretical explanation called 'Identity Theory' to New Zealand and Australia's foreign policy record, in order to show that it is indeed identity-based explanations, when combined with other strategic and political factors, that in fact provide the most accurate, comprehensive and insightful explanation for New Zealand and Australia's divergent behaviour in the international sphere from the time of Federation in 1901 until today in 2007. This thesis makes the following conclusions: first, that it is fundamentally different beliefs in regard to multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States which are driving the 'continental drift' between New Zealand and Australia, through motivating disparate policies and conflicting behaviour by the Tasman pair in their international affairs, as shown during the 2003 Iraq Crisis; secondly, that these dissimilar beliefs regarding the three matters stem in turn from deeply-rooted foreign policy traditions within New Zealand and Australia's own core national identity, namely traditions of independence, idealism and multilateralism in New Zealand, and independence, realism and alliances in Australia; and thirdly, that it is in fact national identity - encompassing national beliefs, traditions and ideas of what the nation stands for and is destined to become - that can best explain nation-state behaviour and action on the world stage today. In my own view, I believe that it is identity theory, when combined with aspects of disparate strategic perception and predominant governmental political ideology advocated by White and McCraw, which together present the best and most wide-ranging means of understanding the complex realities of International Relations today. It is hoped that the research undertaken in this thesis will not only contribute to the new wave of academic literature attempting to describe and explain the differences between New Zealand and Australia in our foreign affairs today in 2007, but also add to the growing consensus in the constructvist academic world that identity-based explanations are crucial for understanding foreign affairs.</p>

What is a “middle power,” and what foreign policy is associated with it? Scholars and diplomats in Canada, Australia, and a more or less stable collection of northern countries—and increasingly scholars from the Global South—have proposed that the term denotes a particular international position, rights, and responsibilities. Canada has been especially associated with claims that it deserved unique representation in the halls of international power by virtue of its secondary or middle contributions to World War II and the post-war peace. Middle powers, it was proposed, were countries who both made significant contributions to that global order and were more likely than the self-interested great powers to protect the values of that order. However, the term “middle power” never has had a clear meaning or definition, and the so-called middle powers have largely been self-electing (whether the self-election was by scholars or practitioners). Scholarly efforts to bring more rigor to the concept have failed to agree on its basic definition and membership list. This failure results largely from a fundamental disagreement over whether the “middle power” is defined by its functional capabilities, characterized by its strong moral imperative as a “good international citizen,” designated by its position in the international hierarchy, or revealed in its foreign policy behaviors. In time, the behavioral notion that middle powers engaged in “middle power diplomacy” held sway in the scholarship such that any country that pursued multilateral compromises, engaged in acts of “good international citizenship,” and promoted coalition building was labeled a middle power. This subsequently led to a growing scholarship on which states were “middle powers” based on their foreign policy behaviors. In particular, countries from the Global South who embraced multilateralism were included in the ranks of the middle powers. The inclusion of countries from the Global South created a fundamental problem for the term, since middle power advocates portrayed them as strong supporters of the international order. Southern middle powers, on the other hand, were champions or leaders of states who stood against that order because of historical and present injustices in it. However, even those countries said to be Southern or emerging middle powers seem more interested in establishing their own status within the existing order rather than asserting a common vision on behalf of a revised order. Ultimately, the lack of agreement about what “middle power” means leaves scholars and practitioners uncertain about whether the term is a useful guide for any particular country’s foreign policy.

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from nontraditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.

Drawing on the new DEMIG VISA database which covers global bilateral travel regulations from 1973 to 2013, this paper explores patterns and trends in international travel visa regimes. The analysis challenge the idea of a growing global mobility divide between ‘North’ and ‘South’, yielding a more complex image reflecting the multi-polar and multi-layered nature of international relations. While predominantly European and North American OECD countries have maintained relatively high levels of entry visa restrictiveness for Africa and Asia, the latter regions have the highest levels of entry restrictions themselves. While citizens of wealthy (mainly OECD) countries generally enjoy greatest visa-free travel opportunities, this primarily reflects their freedom to travel to other OECD countries. Visa-free travel is mostly realised between geographically proximate countries of integrated regional blocs such as ECOWAS, the EU, GCC and MERCOSUR. Analyses of global dynamics in visa reciprocity show that 21 per cent of the country dyads have asymmetrical visa rules, but also show that levels of reciprocity have increased since the mid-1990s. Our analysis shows that visas are not ‘just’ instruments regulating entry of visitors and exit of citizens, but are manifestations of broader political economic trends and inequalities in international power relations.

Throughout the past decades the international relations studies were mostly dedicated to the analysis of the superpower’s and great power’s role in the world order. Less powerful states, namely small and middle powers, were widely considered as objects that are not able to have an impact on the international political processes. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the bipolar system, new approaches have emerged and were applied to the analysis of the existing balance of power in the international relations. One of them is widely known as the concept of middle powers. The conceptual understanding of middle power’s foreign policy behavior has become signifi cantly more complicated in comparison with the bipolar period. On the other hand, there is still no clear defi nition of the term ‘middle power’. In light of this lack of a clear defi nition, various authors use different methods to identify middle powers. Researchers usually defi ne middle powers based on such criteria as large population, natural recourses, economic strength, military force, political stability, its formal recognition by other actors in international relations as a signifi cant international actor, and its active involvement in solving regional and international issues. The aim of this article is to review the concept of middle powers, its historical perspective and key theoretical approaches namely positional, behavioral and constructivist. Based on the analysis of these three approaches the article argues that a holistic understanding of the middle power concept is possible only based on a comprehensive approach. The article also addresses historic periods of concept’s development and provides a distinction between emerging and traditional middle powers. The concept of middle powers and its popularity indicates the gradual formation of a new world order where the international momentum is determined not only by great powers but also by not less powerful small and middle powers.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

The emergence of European Union in global politics, addressing pressing issues throughout the world while also championing causes like social justice, individual liberties, and the rule of law. This paper analyses how the European Union’s foreign policy stance affects international relations. Discussions focus on the EEAS and the potential for EU peace missions to grow. The research paper aims to highlight the efforts of EU to protect the peace and stresses the EU's unyielding dedication to preserving calm, preventing conflict, and responding to disasters. This article examines the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy in great detail, including the many missions and initiatives the EU has taken to show its proactive engagement in international problems. In this article, we take a look at the European Union's (EU) efforts to improve international norms and safeguard human rights via programs including humanitarian assistance, diplomatic initiatives, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union's (EU) dedication to promoting and protecting human rights internationally has been proved via its funding of considerable humanitarian aid, participation in United Nations (UN) programs, and punishment of human rights abusers. It is also notable that EU’s involvement with countries in the Pacific, Africa, and the Caribbean are based on EU's dedication to trade-based development in those regions. The paper also analyses European Union (EU) foreign policy, contrasting the EU's normative stance with the realism paradigm supported by the United States government. It looks at the European Union's role as a regional power on the global arena and how it may work with the United States and other big states to accomplish its own foreign policy goals. Using the European Union's (EU) engagement in the Israel-Palestine conflict as a case study, this paper aims to show how the EU handles complex geopolitical difficulties while remaining true to its core values and promoting the idea of two nations. In the end, the European Union is engaged in a wide variety of global political endeavors, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and the promotion of progressive principles. Its standing in the international world has improved thanks to its work in international organizations and efforts to address global problems.

The European Union and International Law.- Legal Personality of the European Union - International and Institutional Aspects.- Suspension of Rights by International Organisations: The European Union, The European Communities and Other International Organisations.- The European union and International Human Rights Instruments.- The Relationship Between The European Convention on Human Rights and The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.- The European Communities and the International Legal Order.- Thirty Years of Case-Law by the European Court of Justice on International Law: A Pragmatic Approach Towards Its Integration.- Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements and the Community Legal Order.- Individual Third Countries, Member States, the European Community and the World at Large: How Do They Fit Together?.- How Safe Is Safe? The EU, The USA and the WTO Codex Alimentarius Debate on Food Safety Issues.- Regulating Scientific Expertise with Regard to Risks Deriving from Genetically Modified Organisms: Procedural Rules on Risk Assessment Committees under European Community and International Law.- The International Government Procurement Agreement and the EC Legal Order.- The European Community, the WTO - Trips Agreement and the WIPO Conventions.- EC Liability for Non-Implementation of Adopted WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports.- Extraterritoriality and International Cooperation: The State of Play in EC-USA Relations in Competition Matters.- International and Community Obligations of the Member States in the Field of Social Security Schemes: Which Impact for Migrant Workers?.- A Hurdled Admission: The Integration of the Candidate Countries Into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.- Common Foreign and Security Policy and the International Legal Order.- The Conclusion of International Agreements Under Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union.- Common Foreign and Security Policy: International Law Aspects of The Association of Third States with the Common Positions of The Council of the European Union.- The European Union as an Actor within the United Nations General Assembly.- The EU as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to Give Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy.- Inter-Pillar Approaches to the European Security and Defence Policy: The Economic Aspects of Security.- European Union Practice in the Field of International Humanitarian Law: An Overview.- Justice and Home Affairs, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters and the International Legal Order.- The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the European Union.- A Treaty Labyrinth of Legal Co-Operation in Criminal Matters: Can Europe Find Ariadne's Thread?.- International Conventions and EU Law on the Illegal Trafficking of Cultural Goods: Complementarity and Conflicts.- Legal and Technical Aspects of Co-Operation Between Europol, Third States, and Interpol.

This study aims to comprehensively address the foreign policy cooperation processes shaped at the European Union (EU) level, especially in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through the concept of Europeanization. In-depth analysis of the effects of the EU's integration and cooperation processes in the field of foreign policy on the national foreign policies of the member states is of great importance in understanding how this interaction is shaped both at the European and national levels. In this framework, it will be analyzed in detail how the EU's common foreign policy practices, which have been developed to increase its global influence, have harmonized with national interests and how they have sometimes come into conflict with these interests. Thus, it will be revealed how the EU's foreign policy strategies and national foreign policy dynamics interact. In this context, this study aims to examine the challenges faced by the EU in the foreign policy-making process and the historical, theoretical and practical obstacles in solving these challenges within the framework of the concept of Europeanization. It aims to analyze the development of foreign policy cooperation within the EU, especially in the period starting with the Maastricht Treaty, and the balance between the member states' desire to protect their national sovereignty and their efforts to establish a common foreign policy. In doing so, the scope and dimensions of the Europeanization process of national foreign policies in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be discussed and the formation process of the EU foreign policy and the important turning points in this process will be analyzed.

In the post-cold war era, with the creation of the European Union(EU) that included the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) as "second pillar", the European security order furnished the basis that led to the development its own foundation. Based on this, the EU started striving for independent military capability, while establishing cooperative relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), establishing a political role in addition to a military role.<BR> With these points in mind, this paper researches the development of the CFSP that the EU executed, and analyzes the external relations and defense capabilities that the EU seeks to strengthen through the Treaty of Lisbon which came into effect recently.<BR> For this purpose, this paper examines the background and refinement process of the EU"s developing the CFSP in the new European security environment, and discusses aspects of promoting cooperation with NATO and striving to establish European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) and independent military capability.<BR> Also, because the EU switched from ESDP to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty of Lisbon to strengthen the European security strategy and established the European External Action Service(EEAS), this paper treats the contents of the CSDP that the EU strengthened within the category of CFSP through the Treaty of Lisbon, and makes a close inquiry into the main role of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affaires and Security Policy(HR/VP)” in describing the structure of EEAS.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) in a classical sense entails focusing on agents (individuals or groups of individuals). In the case of the European Union (EU), FPA becomes more problematic. Firstly, the question arises of what a foreign policy of the EU really means. This article defines EU foreign policy in a wider sense, namely along the lines of what is known as EU's external action. It focuses however on the security aspect of the EU's external action – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its defence dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, a problem of identifying agents arises in the EU setting in large part because of the complex institutional setup of the CFSP/CSDP. Although final decisions are made at the level of the Council, the policy itself is drafted and prepared at lower levels of policy-making (working parties, committees and agencies) based in Brussels. This article proposes a discursive institutionalist model of analysis, applicable to any organization of the policy process. After presenting the model's ontological and epistemological positions, as well as theoretical underpinnings, the article elaborates on the different levels of information processing and meaning construction by actors and their role in setting the overall foreign policy discourse by shaping the coordinative discourses1 during this early phase of the policy-making process.

THE ASPIRATION AMONG WEST EUROPEAN governments to co-operate not just on economic and trade policies but also on security and defence goes back to the years immediately after World War II.(f.1) The Brussels Treaty Organization (1948) and the subsequent Western European Union (1954) were essentially defensive alliances, while the European Defence Community (established in 1952 and abandoned in 1954) included the notion of a common defence policy and a pooled military capacity governed by a European defence and foreign policy council. Although none of these initiatives provided Europe with the concrete military protection it needed to navigate through the cold war, they are evidence of the fact that European governments have consistently sought channels of co-operation among themselves in addition to participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).European Political Co-operation allowed European Community members to formulate common foreign policy objectives in the 1970s and 1980s. Its successor when the cold war ended, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), added to the policy pronouncements a capacity for modest joint actions. The Balkan wars of the early 1990s underscored for many Europeans the need to develop both political and military capacity in the only European military organization they had - the Western European Union (WEU) - to manage crises that did not really threaten the territorial security of any member of NATO.(f.2) Of course, the same crises also reinvigorated the Atlantic Alliance, ultimately modernizing its command structure and broadening its mission. As a result, the EU and NATO have begun to look like competitors in the crisis management area on the EU's borders.By mid-1996, NATO and the EU appeared to agree on a formula that would allow European initiatives within NATO. The EU would even be able to borrow expensive NATO assets, such as command and control, to undertake European-led, low intensity crisis management operations - the Petersberg tasks - through the WEU.(f.3) In 1997, at its summit in Amsterdam, the EU took over from the WEU both the responsibility for and the management of the Petersberg tasks.This model of constructive co-operation between the aspirations of the European Union and the military capacity of the Atlantic Alliance came to be known as the European Security and Defence Identity or ESDI-in-NATO. There was agreement in principle that NATO and the WEU would prepare for Combined Joint Task Force operations. Yet, the details of this arrangement were never satisfactorily worked out because the aspiration for European independence proved just as strong as the determination of NATO (and especially the Americans) to maintain control over the Alliance's mandate, operations, and assets.(f.4)In an historical meeting at St Malo in December 1998, the French and British governments agreed that the EU should create a 'capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces.'(f.5) Building on this bilateral accord and fuelled by the Kosovo crisis, in December 1999 the EU announced a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which includes the so-called Headline Goal, that is, the capacity to maintain a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops with all the military requirements to launch sustainable crisis operations in the European area by 2003.(f.6)The surprising pace with which the EU developed new decision-making structures for ESDP and its apparent progress in assembling military forces for the rapid reaction force, all amidst the controversy over NATO's role in the air war against Serbia, has led to many defensive and 'turf-protecting' debates on both sides of the north Atlantic. The debate is about who decides - NATO or the European Union - when or where to intervene. Moreover, who will do the military planning and operational preparations for such potential interventions? Who can participate if the EU undertakes the action alone? …