Abstract
AbstractParty favoritism in the distribution of grants is a well‐known mechanism fueling pork‐barrel politics and clientelism. In this paper, we analyze partisan bias in the distribution of the Polish Government Fund for Local Investments (RFIL) and demonstrate implications of party favoritism for the re‐centralization strategy adopted by the right‐wing populist government. We find robust evidence for a substantial bias that favors municipal authorities aligned with the national government. The proportion of the municipalities receiving any funding in two analyzed waves of the RFIL program increased by more than 45 percentage points and the amount of funding granted by more than 175 PLN per capita as a result of electing a mayor affiliated with the ruling party. We demonstrate that the partisan bias also affects municipalities ruled by local independents. It proliferates party polarization from the national level to the local politics and, in the longer run, may lead to its greater nationalization.
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