Abstract

Extending the motivational assumptions of the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), the authors hypothesized that a discrepancy between desired and actual judgmental confidence raises processing effort only if the expectancy that processing will increase confidence is high. In Experiment 1, university students expected to review information for upcoming social judgments. Desired confidence was varied through low versus high task importance. To manipulate expectancy, low versus high perceived processing efficacy was induced via feedback. As predicted, high- (as compared to low-) importance participants expressed greater interest in receiving information and selected more information when perceived efficacy was high, and this effect was mediated via a heightened discrepancy between desired and actual confidence. These effects were not obtained under low perceived efficacy. In Experiment 2, students processed a persuasive message. Only high importance conditions were studied; processing efficacy and argument strength were manipulated. As predicted, high- (but not low-) efficacy participants processed the message systematically, as indicated by a different impact of argument strength and by mediational path analyses. It is argued that the precision of social judgment models would benefit from an explicit consideration of processing- and outcome-related expectancy variables. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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