Morality as a cause, not only an effect, of evolution: Thomistic reflections on gene‐culture coevolutionary theory

It is tempting to believe that humans, owing to their technological prowess, have elevated themselves above the laws of biology and escaped natural selection. Indeed, some think that humans have stopped evolving at all. Another view holds that Homo sapiens has not isolated itself from the influences of the physical and biological world but that our species is just a special, extreme case of niche constructors. This view is based on the so‐called Niche Construction Theory, a development within evolutionary biology to describe how humans—and many other organisms—modify their environment—or niche—in a way that alters environmental pressures and therefore natural selection. Thus, rather adapting to a pre‐existing environment, “organisms drive environmental change and organism‐modified environments subsequently select organisms” (https://synergy.st-andrews.ac.uk/niche/niche-construction-and-evolution/) (Box 1). ### Culture‐driven evolution “[All] organisms adapt to their environment, and in humans much of our environment is defined by our culture. Hence, cultural change can actually spur on adaptive evolution in humans”, wrote evolutionary biologist Alan Templeton at Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA. [1]. Following this argument, culture, social learning and technology have not replaced biological adaptation. Rather, human evolution is driven by the environmental conditions we created ourselves through culture, a process that has been accelerating since the beginning of agriculture and urban civilization. In other words, cultural niche construction is a major cause of recent human evolution. However, there are other factors than natural selection, such as genetic drift and gene flow, that influence human evolution [1]. Nonetheless, even the effects of these random, non‐adaptive forces on human genetic variation are somehow altered by cultural trends, namely increased urbanization and greater mobility. As a consequence, drift is diminishing and gene flow is increasing, a process that would eventually culminate into a single “species‐wide” gene pool characterized by high levels of genetic variation. > [C]ulture, …

This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moore’s moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moore's narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moore's claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individual’s mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moore's arguments.

There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory ­considerations. Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. This chapter examines these and related arguments and discusses four kinds of arguments- Harman's Challenge, evolutionary debunking arguments, irrelevant influence arguments, and the Reliability Challenge- understood as arguments against moral realism. To be fair, evolution may have a role to play if the Reliability Challenge is targeted against moral naturalism. According to moral naturalism, moral facts are natural facts. So they can play a role in causing natural phenomena.

The paper considers three possible definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good: (1) that it is overall important to do; (2) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principle; and (3) that it is overall important to do in virtue of a universalisable principle, belonging to a system of such principles, which includes almost all of certain moral fixed points. I defend (3) and show how we can reach such a system, starting from the basic beliefs with which we find ourselves, through the process of reflective equilibrium. Moral realism is then the doctrine that there is such a system of true moral beliefs. My optimistic view is that all human communities could eventually reach the same such system. But, if they cannot, then there will be two (or more) different such systems, and so two (or more) different senses of ‘moral realism’.

Does evolutionary theory have the potential to undermine morality? In his book The Evolution of Morality , Richard Joyce (2006) argues for a positive answer. He contends that an evolutionary account of morality would undermine moral judgements and lend support to moral scepticism. I offer a critique of Joyce’s argument. As it turns out, his case can be read in two different ways. It could be construed as an argument to establish a general scepticism about the justification of moral judgements. Or it could be read as an argument that targets only a particular meta-ethical position, namely moral realism. My claim is that it fails on both interpretations. There is no reason to believe that evolutionary considerations undermine morality.

Although human evolution was primarily driven and inspired by observing nature and natural phenomena, little to no effort was allocated to finding ways in which we can integrate the solutions nature has to offer in the way we organize ourselves as a society and the way we make decisions as individuals or groups. Decision making, as a concrete manifestation of our will, is the fundamental process that allows for meaningful change to happen. Optimizing the way we make decisions and creating correlations between the decisions we make, the actions implied by those decisions and the effects the actions bring on the governed body (individual or group) will allow us to improve both the way we make decisions and the outcome of our decisions, while at the same time help us to identify the primary directives that need to be considered as fundamental parameters when making decisions that affect organic life, with the intention of reaching a consensus, in the form of a universal wise normative that will be unanimously accepted by all humans regardless of gender, nationality, religion etc. For such a consensus to be found we need to identify the natural distinctions that give life its diversity but at the same time acknowledge and understand the existence of the point where everything converges to form a unified and heterogenetic organism. For this scope we will present the solutions nature offers that can be integrated into an actual platform that will fundamentally change the way we govern ourselves as a society and as individuals.

The theoretical puzzle that moral realism must crack is that of why a rising state is able to displace a dominating hegemon even though it is inferior to the latter in terms of economic base, technical invention, education system, military strength, and political system. Moral realism attributes political leadership to the rise or decline of great powers and categorizes political leadership, according to morality, as inactive, conservative, proactive, or aggressive types at national level, and as tyranny, hegemony, and humane authority at international level. Moral realism is a binary theory which suggests that a state’s strength determine strategic interests while types of political leadership determine strategies for achieving those interests. According to moral realist theory it will be possible for China to change the international system in the 21 century if it practices the moral principles of fairness, justice, and civility both at home and abroad. The shift of world power has been a durable topic in the theoretical study of international relations (IR). The most popular research on this issue is arguably that by Paul Kennedy who attribute imperial overstretch to the decline of a hegemon by arguing that the global obligations defined by policymakers are far greater than their country’s strength to defend. Unlike most research on why a hegemon declines, moral realist theory focuses on why and how a rising state is able to displace a dominating hegemon. Its answer is that the rising 1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 515. 2 In 2012, Zhang Feng, Research Fellow at Australian National University, coined the term ‘moral realism’ for an approach that combines the political determinism of Chinese traditional philosophy with modern realist theory of international relations. See Zhang Feng, ‘The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2012), pp. 95–96. VC The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2016, 1–26 doi: 10.1093/cjip/pow002

Evolutionary ethics debunks moral realism – or value realism in general (Street S, Philos Studi 127:109–166, 2006) – but this is not the same as debunking the authority of moral claims, for moral realism is not the only possible explanation of the source of moral authority. However, a few influential evolutionary philosophers do believe that evolution debunks not just moral realism, but morality, period (Joyce R, The evolution of morality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006; Ruse M, Taking Darwin seriously. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986). My main purpose in this paper is to highlight the difference between these two versions of debunking, and to extricate evolutionary theory from being publicly associated with debunking morality, period. Briefly summarized, the latter view is linked to the claim that unless one believes (however falsely) in the objectivity of moral injunctions, the experience of their peculiar authority will not be available. This claim is an unexpected survival of a basic tenet of moral realism, namely, that moral norms derive their authority from objective realities. It is unfortunate to see this claim survive in evolutionary ethicists. They should rather embrace the view that the universal authority of moral norms is vindicated via a set of evolved, socially conditioned, psychological constraints on self-interest, none of which include a belief in the mind-independent objectivity of value.

This study examines the intersection of 20th-century moral philosophies and contemporary K-12 educative leadership theories, focusing on six frameworks: transformational, instructional, distributed, adaptive, ethical, and culturally responsive leadership. Using a multi-method approach, including literature review and thematic analysis, the research identifies key philosophical influences – moral realism, evolutionary ethics, virtue ethics, and postmodernism – and explores their alignment with modern leadership models. Findings show that moral philosophies like virtue ethics and postmodernism support leadership models focused on social justice, collaboration, and ethical decision-making. However, tensions arise between universal ethical principles and context-sensitive leadership, such as moral realism’s fixed principles versus adaptive leadership’s flexibility. The study suggests a nuanced understanding of how these philosophies shape leadership practices and proposes practical strategies for aligning leadership with specific moral principles to create inclusive, ethical environments. It also calls for future research into the impact of moral philosophies on leadership outcomes, particularly in multicultural contexts, and the balance between universal ethics and context-sensitive decisions. In conclusion, the research highlights the importance of integrating moral philosophy into leadership for promoting social justice and improving educative leadership effectiveness.

If human biological evolution is part of our worldview, then how do commonplace notions of ethics fit in? To ask the question, “what does evolution imply about ethics?” we must first be clear about what we mean by evolution. Evolution and the Foundations of Ethics discusses four models of evolution, represented by Darwin, Dawkins, Gould, and Haught. We must also be clear about what we mean by ethics. Do we mean metaethics? If so, which variety? With metaethical theories (such as Error Theory, Expressivism, Moral Relativism, and Moral Realism), theorists are attempting to explain the general nature, status, and origins of ethics. In the first four chapters of this book (Part I), John Mizzoni examines how metaethical theories fit with evolution. Next, in asking about the implications of evolution for ethics,do we mean normative ethics? Theorists who work with normative ethical theories—such as Virtue Ethics, Natural Law Ethics, Social Contract Ethics, Utilitarian Ethics, Deontological Ethics, and Ethics of Care)—articulate and defend a normative ethics that people can and do use in a practical way when deliberating about specific actions, rules, and policies. The next six chapters (Part II) look at how normative ethical theories fit with evolution. A full reckoning of ethics and evolution demands that we consider the range of ethical elements, both metaethical and normative. Thus, this book looks at what several different models of evolution imply about four metaethical theories and six normative ethical theories. This book will be of interest to scholars interested in the intersection of evolutionary theory and ethical theory.

William Irwin defends a form of moral anti-realism, according to which there are no objective moral facts. He contends that moral realism is objectionable because of its being more complex or not as simple as anti-realism; moral realism is in conflict with science; moral realism is also challenged by the fact that our moral judgements would differ if we were subject to a different biology or evolutionary past. Irwin also argues that insofar as moral realism is supportable evidentially by experience this would lead to the absurdity of thinking theism may be supported evidentially by religious experience. In response, it is argued that there are many truths (about logic and mathematics) and practices (such as science itself) that are not intelligible if there are no objective, normative truths and that objective moral truths are no more dispensable or odd than epistemic norms. It is further argued that Irwin's account of the evolution of morality is not able to escape presupposing objective moral facts (about harm and benefaction). Finally, the appeal to moral and religious experience is defended in making the case for moral realism and theism.

This dissertation examines the content of ordinary moral judgments. A fundamental question in moral theory is whether any moral judgments could be true. Moral Realism holds that moral judgments are capable of truth, and some are true. The Error Theory, by contrast, holds that moral judgments are always false, because all such judgments are predicated upon a metaphysical superstition. Any metaethical view must provide an account of the content of moral judgments in order to ground its claim about the possible truth or universal falsity of those judgments. This dissertation argues that the Moral Galilean Intuition is correct: the content of moral judgments is naively realistic.Chapter One first presents the varieties of Moral Realism: Non-Natural Moral Realism, Quietism, Ethical Naturalism, and Constructivism. It then argues that the canonical version of the Error Theory fails to recognize the possibility of the latter three of these Moral Realisms, and therefore fails to establish that all moral judgments are false. The Chapter concludes by pointing the way forward for a successful Error Theory: to take the Semantic Path by arguing that the content of moral judgments is naively realistic.Chapter Two begins by presenting the Error Theory of Color, which provides a framework for the dialectic as well as two methodological lessons. It then addresses a fundamental methodological objection levied by the externalist about mental content: that sometimes we cannot know the contents of our moral judgments via introspection. The Chapter concludes by presenting the structure of the argument to come in the final Chapter: to oppose the Moral Galilean Intuition with the Principle of Charity.Chapter Three executes this argument. Because the semantics suggested by the Moral Galilean Intuition – Non-Natural Moral Realism – might condemn moral judgments to systematic falsity, the Principle of Charity holds that we should accept that semantics only if the alternatives cannot be correct. The Chapter argues that the semantics offered by the alternative Moral Realisms – Ethical Naturalism, Constructivism, and Quietism – each fail. Because these alternatives are not viable, we have no choice but to accept the semantics of Non-Natural Moral Realism. Accordingly, the Moral Galilean Intuition prevails.

In the late twentieth century, moral realists began to resurrect a type of argument that emerged during the Enlightenment. These realists appealed to moral progress as evidence for moral facts, and their arguments took the form of inferences to the best explanation. Recently, the argument style has emerged again. This time, the inference to the best explanation is being used by empirically-informed sentimentalists to argue that their theories can provide accounts of moral evolution that have greater explanatory and predictive power than the accounts offered by the moral realists. This thesis examines the arguments to the best explanation of such moral realists as Nicholas Sturgeon, Michael Slote, Michael Smith, Peter Singer, and Thomas Nagel. The views of these moral realists are confronted with the substantial empirical evidence provided by Shaun Nichols to bolster his Sentimental Rules account, which is a variety of sentimentalism. Nichols attempts to expand epidemiological approaches to cognitive anthropology to accommodate his research on affect-backed norms. I elucidate Nichols’ research and his own inference to the best explanation of the data he examines as well as his attack on the accounts provided by the moral realists. After examining this substantive piece of the debate over what actually counts as the best explanation of moral evolution, I argue that the inference to the best explanation is actually being employed in two distinct uses by these theorists. The first use presupposes a metaethical thesis regarding the nature of moral facts and renders the inference circular. The majority of the moral realists examined employ the inference in this fashion. The second use is not circular, but leaves the theorist with a very restricted ability to fill out the content of moral beliefs and moral facts.

Ethical theory is employed in this study to assess news coverage of genetic testing, a topic with widely acknowledged ethical implications for professions and society. Ethical language and themes were examined in thirty-one broadcast and print stories by major news organizations in 1995 and 1996. Concerns about consequences, especially avoidance of harm, were prominent in most stories; ethical duties received less attention. Ethical themes, sometimes emerging as direct questions to readers or viewers, underlined choices facing individuals and society. Some stories powerfully brought home ethical issues without directly mentioning ethics.

The gloomy political experiences, require ethics to get through of it. Simon Critchley argues that ethics is able to trigger the subject’s moral dimension to respond or reject the political system that pushes them into a state of depoliticization. Critchley's ethical theory is related to the formation of subjectivity, which includes the process of binding the self with concepts that are considered as good. Moral action or commitment depends on self-interaction with ideas of goodness received in the subject's ethical experience. Ethical experience is the space where motivation arises, where the self has agreed to be bound by the concepts of goodness, as an important arena for ethical subjectivity. Critchley's ethical experience and subjectivity are important concepts for his theory of the political subject. A subject that capable of demanding change when gloomy political experiences have become a common problem. Reflecting on Critchley's theory, this article attempts to map out the challenges to the ethical subject posited. Departing from Mark Fisher's exploration of reflexive impotence, this article then turns to how the subjectivity of the young generation in Indonesia has been regulated or imposed by institutions within the existing power structure. The state's need for ideal young citizens plays a role in the rejection of any ethical experience, thus hindering the process of ethical subjectivity.