Abstract
Abstract This chapter argues that for the normatively competent agent, ambivalence in the face of practical conflict is regularly called for. To do this, it considers how ambivalence-meriting conflicts arise given the axiological and normative commitments of several leading moral theories: pluralism, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. It then extends this general argument to the conditions that make our lives meaningful. Building on ideas due to Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz, the chapter argues that a meaningful life will regularly involve a plurality of commitments and projects that come into conflict in ambivalence-meriting ways. Well-functioning agents therefore have reason to be open to ambivalence.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
