Moral Theorizing and the Limits of Coherence

Abstract

Abstract Is there any more compelling way to critique a moral theory than to point out that it cannot offer a fully coherent account of moral agency? This essay suggests that we should be wary of the assumption underlying such critiques. Coherence is an ideal, and there is good reason to think that it does not trump all other ideals. In particular, given the heterogeneity of the virtues, we have good reason to endorse a conception of moral agency according to which an ideal moral agent is vulnerable to conflicting requirements. Once we appreciate this fact, we are faced with the task of distinguishing the unacceptable forms of incoherence from the forms we have reason to endorse. The essay’s second half argues that coherence constraints rule out the possibility of supererogatory action as it is generally understood. But it concludes with the tentative suggestion that moral agents may be justified in cultivating a stance toward their own actions which is incoherent in the relevant respect. This gives us one more reason to doubt that we can dismiss a moral theory simply because it implies that the moral point of view is not a fully coherent point of view.