Moral Shocks and (De)mobilization

Research on transformative events shows that blatant acts of violence are often followed by moral shocks that raise such a sense of public outrage that formerly contention-averse audiences take to the streets. Yet, despite abundant research on moral shocks, backlash, and critical junctures, their interconnection remains unexplored. Studies of transformative events overwhelmingly concentrate on the properties of repression to explain backfire dynamics, while the affective and discursive features of events that alter the course of history are largely understudied. This special issue addresses this gap through a range of contributions that shift the focus of attention from the structural features of violent events to the competition over their meaning, their cultural and temporal situatedness, and the subjective and objective conditions of backlash protest.

ABSTRACTWhile the failure of the Palestinian National Movement (PNM) in achieving its stated objectives is widely acknowledged, the causes of this failure are subject to interpretation. The central argument of this article is that the priority accorded by the PNM’s leadership to the statehood ambition over the liberation precondition is a principal factor as it led to transformation of the PNM through the Oslo process. As a consequence, the PNM was stripped of structures, functions, and characteristics typically associated with national liberation movements and therefore categorizing the PNM in its current state as an anti-colonial liberation movement is specious and flawed.

Review

Reviewed by: The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005 Gregory Mahler, Dean and Vice President for Academic Affairs The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005, by Amal Jamal. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005. 229 pp. $22.95. The first thing to say about this book, as will be obvious to any potential reader, is that it is extremely timely. The Palestinian national movement is in the news on almost a daily basis, has proven to be among the top news stories of the last six months, and it is not likely to go away in the near future. The Palestinian National Movement provides a very good and well-documented portrait of a national liberation movement that has faced challenge after challenge, frustration after frustration, and yet has not only survived but has grown stronger over time. Although discussion of more distant historical material is included where needed, the concentration of the book focuses upon the period following the Six Day War in 1967, when the nature of so many Palestinians' lives changed dramatically as Israel became the occupying power in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first chapter of the book focuses upon the historical context of the Palestinian national movement and includes discussion of who the political elite were in Palestine and how the outcomes of the 1967 War affected the lives of Palestinians. The War resulted in an Occupying Power (Israel), and led to a mobilization of the nationalist movement in a way that it had not been mobilized previously, shifting the political process "from nation building to state building" (p. 15). There is much discussion of the changing political structures of the Palestinians under Occupation, and how the Palestinians resisted the Israeli policy of "de-Palestinianization" on a regular basis. The issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a significant one, of course, both because of interactions between the Israelis and the Palestinians and because the philosophy and practice of Israeli settlements had significant consequences for what the Israelis were prepared to let the Palestinians do. This was a large "zero-sum game," and as Israeli settlements grew there were corresponding diminutions of Palestinian communities. Jamal does a very good job of describing the efforts of the PLO leadership as they tried to coordinate Palestinian dissent and resistance to the Israeli occupation. [End Page 194] This resistance often resulted in deportations, destruction of Palestinian property, and limitations on political freedoms of Palestinians. Of great interest is Jamal's discussion of the relationship "between exterior and interior in the Palestinian national movement" (p. 38), in which decisions were often made based upon which audience was being considered—the domestic Palestinian audience, the Occupying Israeli audience, or the more external World audience. Differences between the Fatah/PLO leadership and the Palestinian National Front began to surface in strategic terms, and the Palestinian National Guidance Committee often found itself in a position of having to struggle to make peace among the various groups of Palestinian political elites. The "politics of steadfastness" (p. 63) is the term used by Jamal to discuss the Palestinian strategy for responding to Israeli policy in the occupied territories, and a substantial effort is made in this book to discuss and analyze this complicated and terribly important topic. What can be called the "politics of occupation" has been a major, indeed, the major influence affecting the lives of Palestinians over the last four decades, and the discussion presented here examines the role of the Jordanians in this challenge, the role of domestic para-political structures such as the General Federation of Trade Unions, and the role of international actors in helping to provide financial assistance to keep the Palestinian organizations going. Among the most interesting areas of analysis for this reader was the discussion of Palestinian political leadership that is offered here, and the examination of the interaction between Islamic actors and more secular actors. Jamal tells us that "after founding Hamas and experiencing direct confrontation with the occupation authorities, the religious elite of the occupied territories sought to establish itself as an authentic representative of the Palestinian masses" (p. 110). This...

The Palestinian nationalist movement is a liberation movement that aims to obtain the right of self‐determination for Palestinians, and to liberate the Palestinian homeland (Mandatory Palestine or part of it) from the colonial powers (the Zionist forces). Like any other national movement, the Palestinian nationalist movement emerged in response to many historical transformations. Therefore, it is difficult to give a specific definition of this movement. Nevertheless, this entry covers the crystallization of the Palestinian nationalist movement and its objectives, relating to four central historical events that contributed decisively to its formulation: (i) the sequence of events in Palestine due to World War I; (ii) the Palestinian Nakba of 1948; (iii) the Arab Naksa of 1967; and (iv) the Oslo peace agreement of 1993.

During the “long” 19th century, people were not only becoming more mobile through new means of communication, but they were also becoming more “mobile” in their attitudes and views. “Political mobilization” refers to a process found in (emerging) modern mass societies that considers the population as a resource to support its own goals. Political and social mass mobilization can be understood as a driving force in the processes of social and political modernization within societies: Increasing political mobilization becomes a power-political challenge and a threat to the ruling elites, who in turn try to rouse the population in support of their concerns – hence, mobility could be understood as a motivating power for threat scenarios and perceptions, through which mobility itself becomes an object of security-related politics. Hence, we find securitizing and counter-securitizing practices and discourses: Mobility concerns social/societal security (internal security) as well as – with regard to nationalization processes – the question of ethno-cultural security, too. Within this frame, the chapter examines political mobilization at the local level in multi-ethnic and at the same time imperial contexts against the backdrop of nationalization and socio-political modernization processes: It assumes that mobilization for one’s own nation with the goal of political integration and legitimization of political goals is dependent on processes of security in contrast to other nationalities. The “other nation” is perceived as a threat to the status of one’s own nation, so that corresponding hermeneutics and repertoires of securitizing political mobilization develop out of it. In this chapter, the nexus between (political-national) mobilization and securitization is reconstructed.

Researching a broad array of protest forms offers valuable insights into social change. One such unusual form includes protests against tax law rulings made by the Australian Tax Office (ATO). Across Australia thousands of taxpayers invested in ‘tax effective schemes’ in the late 1990s. However, by 2000 each owed on average AUS$75,000 as a result of these schemes being ruled illegal. Rather than pay the money owed many have refused, publicly protesting through formal administrative and political mechanisms, and through public debate. At first glance, this appears an issue of individual economic self‐interest. However, qualitative research methods provide a more detailed and contextual picture of why protestors feel justified in their actions. Focusing on the hard‐hit Goldfields region of Western Australia, protests are argued as being about real and imagined identities; concerns over roles and status in Australian society; and the failings of institutional and political frameworks that should support, not penalize, citizens. The offence and ‘moral shock’ of being publicly labelled as ‘tax cheats’ facilitated protestors' view of themselves as workers trying to do the ‘right thing’ by their families and country. And as such, the normally private issue of individual tax affairs became a public debate and a site of cultural politics wherein the ATO's official discourse of rationality and regulation compliance is received by protestors as symbolic of their beleaguered position in Australian society. Here, citizenship struggles have not been eclipsed by post‐material or ‘new social movement’ concerns. Rather, sites of cultural politics, such as struggles over tax and identity, are constantly redrawn in light of new social practices and relations.

El Movimiento Nacional Palestino (MNP) del periodo de entreguerras es revisitado a la luz de una perspectiva comparada con los actores de su entorno y externos que, junto a las aportaciones de nuevos estudios, muestra sus debilidades y limitaciones estructurales para superar los desafíos coloniales a los que se enfrentó. Originado al unísono del nacionalismo árabe en los dominios otomanos en Oriente Próximo entre finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX, el MNP se enfrentó al reto material y existencial del proyecto colonial sionista avalado por Gran Bretaña, la potencia mandataria en Palestina. Sin consolidarse del todo, con una estructura fragmentada y un liderazgo débil, el MNP se opuso a dichos planes mediante una resistencia predominantemente pacífica durante cerca de dos décadas hasta la frustración de sus expectativas, con la gradual transformación demográfica y política de Palestina, que propició la radicalización de sus bases sociales y una de la más tempranas rebeliones anticoloniales del siglo XX. La represión y el desmantelamiento del MNP en 1939 dejó a la sociedad palestina exhausta y huérfana de un movimiento na- cional y dirección política en un momento crucial de su historia, cuando su territorio fue sometido a la partición.

What is the effect of international involvement on national liberation movements? In the last few decades, movements transforming into states have increasingly operated in a globalized context and have had to contend with international pressures. However, the effects of international involvement on the internal dynamics of these movements should be more centrally considered. This paper thus examines the role of international involvement in the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Palestinian national liberation movement within the Palestinian territories. Specifically, I look at the role of the United States as the most powerful actor in the Middle East region. This paper argues that international involvement leads to authoritarian conditions within these state-building projects as well as paralyzes the efficacy and coherence of these movements. Specifically, international involvement creates polarization among political elites and a divergence between elite and public preferences, which creates authoritarian conditions.

THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMYʼS «GREEN BOOK»: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION

Actors turn to negotiating or spoiling as a means of contesting not only what a proposed peace settlement entails but also who has the power to decide the terms. Conflicts are more likely to witness negotiating and spoiling for purposes of internal contestation to the degree that one or both of the warring parties lack an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. Whether internal contestation leads a group to act as a peace maker or as a peace breaker is conditioned by its position in the internal balance of power. Two eras in the Palestinian national movement—the Palestine Liberation Organization's bid to join the Geneva peace conference in 1973–74 and its engagement in the Oslo peace process from 1993 to 2000—illustrate these propositions. Leaders of national movements and rebel groups, no less than leaders of states, are systematically influenced by domestic politics. As such, sponsors of peace processes should expect spoiler problems unless a movement heals rifts within its ranks.

The last half-century in the United States has been marked by two highly consequential and starkly contrasting social movements: the civil rights movement and the conservative tax revolt. Together, they help illustrate the two principal claims of this book. First, tax bargains set at the time of state consolidation tend to become ‘taken for granted’ arrangements that inscribe the scope and roles of the state and the boundaries of the political community entitled to protection and services from the state. The tax bargain entrenches the political and economic power of dominant actors at the time the bargain is set, and those advantages gain momentum and widen the gap between them and others not privileged by the tax bargain and the social contract it supported. Second, when those understandings are challenged at ‘critical junctures’ by social or political mobilization that seeks to expand the role of the state and the political community, the tax bargain serves as a rally point and a concrete policy tool to support an agenda of resistance to change. This chapter describes the conservative tax revolt, and specifically the tax and expenditure limitations it championed, as a tool of resistance to an expanded social contract.

This paper aims to present the features of the Balkan cooperation of the left political forces during the years of World War II, respectively the project of the Balkan Headquarters, in the view of the Albanian communists. The idea of Balkan co-operation spread to all communist movements in the Balkan countries, the most active was the Yugoslav Communist Party, which aimed to create a "Balkan Headquarter" under the conditions of war and a "Balkan Federation" after its end. At the end of 1942, the Yugoslav Communist leadership established contacts with the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Greece and Albania to coordinate actions in the fight against Nazi fascist forces. Taking in consideration that the Albanian communists had the orientation compass in those years the Yugoslavs, under their influence, tried to achieve the objectives of this project as far as possible. Thus within the anti-fascist alliance but also under the Yugoslav directives, especially during the German occupation, the links and cooperation between the Albanian national liberation movement and the liberation movements of Yugoslavia and Greece intensified, especially in the border areas. With the EAM and the National Liberation Army of Greece (ELAS), an important area of cooperation was the Konispol region and generally Cameria. Pursuant to the agreement reached between the General Council of the Albanian National Liberation Army and the Greek National Liberation Front, they were sent to these representative areas on both sides to propagate the common war goals in the population and to mobilize them in the mutual partisan formations. But it should be noted that the Albanian National Liberation Army combative co-operation with ELAS was limited. Within the framework of cooperation with the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, several joint operations have been undertaken, especially in border areas. The fact that Kosovo Albanians are engaged in the national liberation movement, which has contributed to the increase of cooperation in these areas, should be considered. Cooperation between the two liberation movements has been more visible in Macedonia's area.This paper aims to present the features of the Balkan cooperation of the left political forces during the years of World War II, respectively the project of the Balkan Headquarters, in the view of the Albanian communists. The idea of Balkan co-operation spread to all communist movements in the Balkan countries, the most active was the Yugoslav Communist Party, which aimed to create a "Balkan Headquarter" under the conditions of war and a "Balkan Federation" after its end. At the end of 1942, the Yugoslav Communist leadership established contacts with the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Greece and Albania to coordinate actions in the fight against Nazi fascist forces. Taking in consideration that the Albanian communists had the orientation compass in those years the Yugoslavs, under their influence, tried to achieve the objectives of this project as far as possible. Thus within the anti-fascist alliance but also under the Yugoslav directives, especially during the German occupation, the links and cooperation between the Albanian national liberation movement and the liberation movements of Yugoslavia and Greece intensified, especially in the border areas. With the EAM and the National Liberation Army of Greece (ELAS), an important area of cooperation was the Konispol region and generally Cameria. Pursuant to the agreement reached between the General Council of the Albanian National Liberation Army and the Greek National Liberation Front, they were sent to these representative areas on both sides to propagate the common war goals in the population and to mobilize them in the mutual partisan formations. But it should be noted that the Albanian National Liberation Army combative co-operation with ELAS was limited. Within the framework of cooperation with the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, several joint operations have been undertaken, especially in border areas. The fact that Kosovo Albanians are engaged in the national liberation movement, which has contributed to the increase of cooperation in these areas, should be considered. Cooperation between the two liberation movements has been more visible in Macedonia's area.As would be seen from the subsequent actions of the Yugoslav leadership, during the Nazi-occupation period it prepared the ground for the post-war devastation of Albania within the Yugoslav Federal Republics, despite their failure to achieve this objective. During the research work of this case study, the qualitative method was generally applied by conducting a research: collecting, descriptive and explanatory, based mostly on historical facts and literature analysis.

Why do some national movements use violent protest and others nonviolent protest? Wendy Pearlman shows that much of the answer lies inside movements themselves. Nonviolent protest requires coordination and restraint, which only a cohesive movement can provide. When, by contrast, a movement is fragmented, factional competition generates new incentives for violence and authority structures are too weak to constrain escalation. Pearlman reveals these patterns across one hundred years in the Palestinian national movement, with comparisons to South Africa and Northern Ireland. To those who ask why there is no Palestinian Gandhi, Pearlman demonstrates that nonviolence is not simply a matter of leadership. Nor is violence attributable only to religion, emotions or stark instrumentality. Instead, a movement's organizational structure mediates the strategies that it employs. By taking readers on a journey from civil disobedience to suicide bombings, this book offers fresh insight into the dynamics of conflict and mobilization.

This chapter on the Palestinian national movement examines the impact of hierarchy on group behavior. It uses a variety of tight within-case comparisons, in which the shifting of variables at different times allows for powerful assessments of why groups such as Fatah, the PFLP, and the Jordanian Communist Party used or restrained violence at different periods in their history. The chapter also illustrates “the tragedy of national movements”: Palestinian groups knew they needed hegemony to succeed, but their desire for power kept them largely fragmented. Regardless of changes in time or space, the Palestinian national movement met with strategic failure when the movement was fragmented (1965–1973, 1975–1985, and 2001–2016); limited success when it was united (1974); and its greatest success when the movement was hegemonic (1986–1993 and 1995–2000).