Moral Economy Reconsidered: Value, Money, and Usury in Gerald Odonis and John Buridan

This chapter focuses reception history of Nicomachean Ethics . It surveys some features of the scholastic interpretation of the three intellectual virtues of science, understanding and wisdom. The chapter deals with the nature of wisdom as compilation of science and understanding. It examines Thomas Aquinas's definition of the three virtues in Summa theologiae and compares it with two later commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics , namely those by Gerald Odonis and John Buridan. The scholastic authors were well aware of Aristotle's view of wisdom as metaphysics and theology. In addition, they continued other classical, Hellenistic, biblical and Augustinian traditions of interpreting the many-sided phenomenon of wisdom. In an Aristotelian manner, Thomas begins his response by stating that the speculative intellect can reach the truth in two ways: in the case of principles, the intellect perceives their truth immediately. It is evident that Odonis employs Aquinas and that Buridan employs both Aquinas and Odonis. Keywords: Aristotle's view of wisdom; Gerald Odonis; intellectual virtues; John Buridan; Nicomachean Ethics ; Summa theologiae ; Thomas Aquinas

This essay presents a critical review of recent literature on evil in medieval philosophy, as understood by thinkers from Anselm of Canterbury onward. "Evil" is taken to include not only serious, deliberate wrongdoing, but also everyday sins done from ignorance or passion. Special attention is paid to Aquinas's De Malo, Giles of Rome and the aftermath of the 1277 Condemnation, scholarly disputes about Scotus's teachings, and commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Walter Burley, Gerald Odonis, and John Buridan.

The discussion of the virtue of virginity in medieval commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics provides a significant example of the kind of challenges Aristotle?s work posed to the beliefs and values of its medieval readers. Thomas Aquinas, the first commentator to take up the challenge, argued that virginity is different from the vice of insensibility because it involves abstinence not from all, but only from sexual pleasures. Radulphus?s discussion of virginity is almost entirely centred on a philosophical refutation of the Aristotelian challenge. While Henry?s assessment of virginity in the sentential closely follows Aquinas?s Sententia libri Ethicorum , his quaestio on insensibility is heavily indebted to Giles of Orleans, the Erlangen and Erfurt commentaries, and John of Tytynsale. The Carmelite friar Guido Terreni composed his commentary on Aristotle?s Ethics in the early fourteenth century. New perspectives were opened in the commentaries of Gerald of Odo and John Buridan. Keywords: Aristotelian challenge; Gerald of Odo; Giles of Orleans; Henry of Friemar; John Buridan; medieval commentary; Nicomachean Ethics ; Radulphus Brito; Thomas Aquinas; virtue of virginity

There is an important controversy regarding how Aristotle comprehends the highest good. On one hand, in the first books of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle seems to designate with the noun “eudaimonia” a second order end. On the other hand though, in the last book of the same work, he seems to restrict the meaning of eudaimonia to a single first-order end, namely theoretical contemplation. The so-called inclusive vs. dominant debate over Aristotle’s eudaimonia was not overlooked in commentaries written during the Later Middle Ages, and one relevant discussion on the issue was recorded in John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This is the text I discuss in my paper, with the intention of reconstructing Buridan’s attitude towards the inclusive vs. dominant debate. Specifically, I focus on the last book of the work, and I explore some key theses which guide Buridan’s position on the issue, i.e. (i) that happiness may be understood either in the way of composition or in the way of resolution, (ii) that happiness is to be regarded as an appellative or connotative term, and (iii) that the happiness of the a whole human being should be distinguished from the happiness of his parts. Through reconstructing the connections among these theses I aim to present and to evaluate Buridan’s view on that debate.

This chapter examines the role of the cardinal virtues in medieval commentaries on Aristotle?s Ethics written until the mid-fourteenth century. It argues that the efforts of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas to retain the scheme failed to convince the majority of commentators active around 1300, and that Gerald of Odo and especially John Buridan provided more successful solutions. Commentaries on the first, incomplete translations of the Nicomachean Ethics were written from the early thirteenth century. Although Kilwardby apparently thinks the cardinal virtues compatible with Aristotle?s system, he admits in his commentary on Peter Lombard?s Sententiae that Aristotle had a much narrower understanding of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance than is implied by their conception as cardinal virtues. Buridan extends Aristotle?s definitions of the specific cardinal virtues in such a way as to include aspects of morality that are fundamental from a medieval Christian perspective. Keywords: Albert the Great; Aristotle; cardinal virtue; Gerald of Odo; John Buridan; medieval commentary; Nicomachean Ethics ; Sententiae ; Thomas Aquinas

Two approaches to the teaching of ethics Renaissance humanists are known for the interest they took in ethics and moral philosophy. Many of them may have found it hard to practice virtues such as modesty and friendship, but countless letters, treatises, and dialogues (penned by authors such as Petrarch, Leonardo Bruni, and Erasmus) testify to their preoccupation with ethical issues. It is significant that the studia humanitatis (the cycle of humanist studies that included literature and history) had as their goal the formation of the perfect man, prominent for his virtue as much as for his eloquence ( vir bonus dicendi peritus ). It would be a mistake, however, to regard the humanists as having revived the study of ethics after centuries of neglect. Scholastic writers had already given special attention to this subject, which they studied within the broader context ofmoral philosophy. Albert the Great (1200-80), one of the thirteenth-century architects of a renewed interest in Aristotelian thought, wrote two works on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and infected his student, Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), with a similar enthusiasm for the Stagirite’s moral treatises. Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253),Giles of Rome (1245-1316), Walter Burley ( c . 1275-1344/5), and John Buridan ( c . 1300 - after 1358) were only a few of the scholars who provided influential interpretations of Aristotelian moral philosophy in the late Middle Ages. Also, far from retreating into their supposed bunkers of logic and natural philosophy, scholastics of the Renaissance period wrote on moral philosophy even more prolifically than before. John Argyropoulos ( c . 1415-87), a Greek emigre, provided a translation of the Ethics that was better received than Leonardo Bruni’s. In the sixteenth century, John Mair (1467/8-1550), Crisostomo Javelli ( c . 1470/2-1538), and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) wrote important works on ethics and politics. Several times, Averroes’ middle commentary on the Ethics was reprinted.

Question 11 in Book 2 of John Buridan’s Questions on the Ten Books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, concerns whether the good can be well divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Aristotle, according to Buridan, claims that it can. But should we follow Aristotle in this respect? Buridan argues that we should not. In his view, the good is extensionally equivalent with the honorable, as well as with the useful and the with the pleasurable. But the relevant division is still important for our understanding of goodness, according to Buridan. He proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (or would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that arguably does not follow from the more fundamental account of the nature of the good, according to Buridan.

John Buridan devotes so much of his commentary on the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics to questions about the unity of prudence. The aim of this chapter is to present some interpretations of the Aristotelian passage that in different ways helped to shape the commentary tradition. Albert the Great, in his first commentary on the Ethics , alludes to Eustratius?s interpretation several times, but chooses a different one. One can easily see that Aquinas follows Eustratius in explaining the main difference between prudence and politics, although he applies the distinction between the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the politician to a sub-species of prudentia politica . It is remarkable that Buridan, as Henry of Friemar before him, defends the unity of prudence against an argument which had been used also to argue in favour of a specific difference between prudentia monastica and prudentia politica . Keywords: Albert the Great; Aristotle; Eustratius; Henry of Friemar; John Buridan; medieval commentary tradition; Nicomachean Ethics ; prudentia politica ; Thomas Aquinas

Luther’s companion lectures on the Nicomachean Ethics from the early 1530s to 1560. In this work, Aristotle’s iustitia remains the focus of his attention. While Melanchthon’s early writings follow Luther, a certain reorientation becomes visible in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. In this work, Aristotle’s view of justice is upgraded and the realm of the law is evaluated more positively than in Luther’s theology. In his mature years, Melanchthon considers ‘legal justice’ to have a positive meaning, such as obedience to the law and the magistrates. While this consideration also follows models available in John Buridan and Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, it differs from Luther’s consistent criticism of legal justice. However, Melanchthon’s teaching of iustitia Dei and imputation remains faithful to Luther. As Melanchthon also includes Platonism and pedagogical Humanism in his discussion, his view is somewhat eclectic.

Chapter IV develops a distinction introduced in Chapter II between legal and political authority. Legal authority is the authority to make, interpret, administer and enforce law. This authority to establish legal order (as opposed to some other kind of order) arises from the state-subject fiduciary relationship. Political authority presupposes legal authority, but has other elements as well, such as the authority to determine the content of ordinary law through legislation. Political authority also encompasses issues of political representation. States are more or less democratic depending on how these issues are resolved. I also set out the necessary and sufficient conditions that give rise to fiduciary relations, and explain how the state-subject relationship satisfies them. I conclude that legal authority rests on the state-subject fiduciary relationship and a presumption that the state must exercise power on the basis of public trust, whereas democratic political authority rests on consent.

As understood here, pluralist jurisprudence is the study of the legal principles and doctrines that govern disputes about the division of authoritative labor between legal systems. So construed, pluralist jurisprudence speaks to a wide range of issues, including the existence and scope of the legal authority that international customs and international legal institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, the WTO, the U.N. Security Council, have over state-actors. Here, I explicate and contrast two conceptions of pluralist jurisprudence. The first is a positivist conception that distinguishes between legal and political authority, thereby drawing a clear line between pluralist jurisprudence and pluralist political philosophy. The second is a non-positivist conception that reduces questions about the legal authority of international institutions and customs to questions about whether such institutions and customs possess a distinctive form of authority — namely, political authority as characterized by the generic collectivist conception explicated below. The core objective of this paper is to clarify what I take to be the most formidable and well-supported non-positivist and positivist conceptions of pluralist jurisprudence and to highlight three key points of contrast. First, whereas the non-positivist conception incorporates deliberations about the legitimacy and scope of political authority into legal reasoning, the positivist conception excludes such considerations. Thus, these two conceptions provide officials with very different frames for their legal reasoning about rival claims to legal authority, and accordingly, these conceptions support significantly different legal conclusions. Second, the differences between these conceptions of pluralist jurisprudence are in large part driven by a more fundamental disagreement about the nature of political community and political authority. Third, given this fundamental disagreement, these two conceptions of pluralist jurisprudence do not merely entail different approaches to legal reasoning about the existence and scope of legal authorities; they also entail different frames for legal officials’ politico-moral reasoning about the legitimacy and scope of political authority.

Home is a basic human need other than clothing and food. As one of the basic needs of man, it has variety of functions, for example, as a place to protect and develop themselves occupants, also as an asset that have economic and non-economic value. Houses that have economic value can be utilized as capital to earn a living by using part of room as a working space, named as productive house. Batik products become the focus of observation with the consideration that batik is a unique Indonesian cultural richness that has been recognized internationally. Pekalongan and Lasem is a coastal city located on the north coast of Java Island, where both cities become the benchmark of batik products located in the coastal area. Kampung Batik in Pekalongan and Lasem is the location used as an object of observation for comparative pattern of productive house layout with qualitative method. The data obtained in primary and secondary, in the form of visual recordings, maps and sketches of productive layout pattern of batik houses. The comparative result shows many similarities in the pattern of productive layout of batik houses in Pekalongan and Lasem; Differences exist in existing occupants. The existing equations are due to the activities undertaken and the differences that exist are due to the growing culture in both locations of observation.

This chapter defends the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment by addressing two further challenges. According to the first challenge, recent revisions to the standard conception of political and legal authority lead to the conclusion that there is no general obligation to obey the law. On this standard account, to have political or legal authority is to have a right to rule, and those subject to authority have an obligation to obey the directives of those who have the right to rule. If this account is faulty, then the connection between political authority and political obligation is neither as straightforward nor as strong as the standard account assumes. According to the second challenge, the problem is not with authority but with what citizens owe to their polities. That is, citizens do have duties with regard to the law, but the weaker duties of respect or deference rather than an obligation to obey. This chapter responds to the first challenge by demonstrating the superiority of the standard account to the so-called service conception of authority and to the second by showing how appeals to respect or deference rely on a belief in political obligation.

INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT (1769–1859). A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 250 YEARS ON

PurposePersonalization and the non‐territorial office seem to be contradicting concepts. It is generally accepted that it is not possible to personalize workplaces in environments where no fixed individual workplaces are allocated. However, people seem to have a human need of personalization. Personalization can be done in different ways and for different reasons. Based on a literature review and a qualitative case study at a Dutch governmental organization, the purpose of this paper is to explain why and how personalization occurs in environments where non‐territorial office concepts are introduced.Design/methodology/approachQualitative interpretative research design, in which literature study, document analysis, observations and talking, and interviews are combined, to understand the actor's perspective and behavior in the non‐territorial office of organization X.FindingsConclusions of the study indicate personalization to be a relevant factor for consideration when implementing a non‐territorial office design: when objects are prohibited to personalize your work environment, people seek several additional ways to make the environment familiar and comfortable for them and to mark their identity in the organization.Research limitations/implicationsAccess to organization X went via top management, which makes it possible that the position of the independent researcher was not clear to people. The research took place in three months, but not full time. Missing important behaviors is amongst possible consequences for the findings. Since this is one case study, further research is recommended.Practical implicationsBalanced decisions and rules between organizational policy and human needs help the acceptance of own workplace lost in non‐territorial offices.Originality/valuePersonalization is a well‐researched subject; as applied in non‐territorial offices, it is not well researched yet. This research paper suggests that aspects of emotion and psychological need should be considered as well in the development of a non‐territorial office.