Mongolia and the DPRK at Sixty-Five: Ulaanbaatar's Changing Relations with Pyongyang

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty

IntroductionAmong today's and in history's divided countries, such as China/Taiwan, Yemen, Cyprus, Ireland, and India/Pakistan/Bangladesh, the similarities between Korea and Germany are remarkable: Both countries were divided after World War II and both were divided under the involvement of the United Statesand the USSR. The latter assumed the existence of uniform states which emerged from the declaration of intent of the Potsdam conference in August 1945, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs conference in Moscow in December 1945.1Despite the initial similarities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), their further development on the political side-economically and ideologically-almost disappeared in the further progress. Rudolf Appelt, who published an article in the Socialist Unity Party's (SUP)2 magazine Einheit, was probably the first author to analyze the situation of both countries directly after the war in 1947. He found that already in 1947 the political and economic situation and trend in Soviet-occupied North Korea was very similar to the situation in Soviet-occupied East Appelt discovered similarities between the U.S.-occupied South Korea and the occupied western zones of Only a little time passed after the foundation of the two states until the DPRK recognized the GDR as a state.The special solidarity of the GDR to the DPRK is exhibited in the political, technical and humanitarian support during the Korean War and beyond. In the 1950s the SUP initiated a broad solidarity and donation campaign for North Korea. The Korea committee was founded in June 1951 and started fund-raising in nationally owned enterprises and other associations of the GDR. Until 1957, the Korea committee transferred donations to North Korea at a value of 40 million deutschmarks ( equivalent toabout 20 million euros) in total under the slogan Who helps Korea, helps Germany. The total sum of unpaid postwar assistance to rebuild the country was a multiple higher (see table 1).3Commencement of Diplomatic RelationsAlready in November 1949 the GDR and the DPRK had entered into diplomatic relations, and they exchanged ambassadors immediately. Similar to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and being inspired by the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in terms of their policy towards the North (and the communist states of the Eastern Bloc generally), the DPRK took over elements of the reunification concept of the GDR.After the Korean War, the bilateral relations developed positively and rapidly. Otto Grotewohl, minister president of the GDR, visited Pyongyang in December 1955. Kim Il Sung, during those days chairman of the Minister Cabinet of DPRK, visited East Germany a year later. Already in 1953, both countries had entered into a treaty regulating the financing of noncommercial projects. In January 1955, a second treaty followed, establishing technical and scientific collaboration. In December 1955, two additional treaties were concluded, governing postal services and telecommunications, respectively. The GDR supported the DPRK in terms of reconstruction after the Korean War, in particular the reestablishment of the port of Hamhung on the east coast of North Korea. According to estimations between 1953 and 1962, the unpaid development aid of the GDR to the DPRK amounted to 217-545 million rubles. Hence, East Germany occupied the third rank of the development aid granting states rights after the USSR and the People's Republic of China (see table 1).The mutual visits of Otto Grotewohl and Kim Il Sung, their similar fate, the consent on unification policy and the strong support for postwar reparation of North Korea strengthened the solidarity between the two states. The relationship between Pyongyang and East Berlin experienced its heyday in this first phase, which can be regarded as the years between 1949 and 1961. …

This chapter reviews the evolution in environmental theory and practice within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK-North Korea) from the close of the Korean War in 1953 to the early years of the 21st century. An ideological approach was to be applied to environmental and agricultural practice through a change in the concepts and strategies relating to the technical, cultural and ideological aspects of environmental development. The DPRK's early focus on centralised industrial and developmental planning was very much a product of the influence of the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership. The campaign utilised an approach that proved to be the first of a number demonstrating 'revolutionary urgent' tendencies within the DPRK. Both Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II engaged in what is referred to as 'on the spot guidance'. It is important first, before analysing the development of a strategy of environmental mitigation. Keywords: agricultural practice; Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); Kim II Sung; Kim Jong Il; Korean War; Soviet Union

This chapter focuses on the recent development of both the internet and the telecommunications system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). By identifying and reviewing the reasons and trends involved in this process, it analyses the political, economic and social consequences of the information revolution in one of the world's most isolated countries. The DPRK is not only a focus of the international community through the nuclear debate, but its computer industry also alarms the intelligence services. According to Samsung electronics, development of the internet in North Korea could have a future. North Korean computer and communication technology has a future, if it is cheap and competitive. The regime may use it for its own purposes in order to enhance propaganda. But the more the DPRK is linked to and integrated with the world, the more outside influence will challenge the stability of the regime. Keywords: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); North Korea; Samsung electronics; telecommunications system

The article considers the international legal status of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea), its preconditions, and consequences. It was emphasized that the DMZ provides for the liquidation of military facilities and if that is not possible, a ban on their use for military purposes may be introduced at the stage of post-war relations between states or during the armistice. It is established that the creation of the demilitarized zone began in 1945 when two "allies" (the United States and the Soviet Union) shared control of the Korean Peninsula. It is emphasized that by 1948 the Soviet leadership had established a communist regime in the area north of the 38th parallel, and a US-backed military government had been formed in the south. The article notes that although the Korean War (1950-1953), aimed at resolving the question of "which regime represented the 'real' Korea," is still not over (North and South Korea are still formally at war, as the peace treaty after the de facto the end of the Korean War in 1953 was never signed), the conditional end of the conflict was the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The main content of the study is the analysis of the DMZ between North Korea and South Korea, the legal status of which is governed by the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The analysis of the agreement in the article is prohibited within the DMZ (Article 1, paragraph 6). The Military Ceasefire Commission and the Neutral Observation Commission, which were established under the 1953 Ceasefire Agreement, are mentioned. provided by this agreement, it is responsible for the implementation of a certain part. Discussion issues are being raised regarding the creation of the World Peace Park in the DMZ. The article examines the problems of the Joint Security Area (JSA), which is located in the border village of Panmunjom and is a meeting area for representatives of the North and South. It is noted that despite the presence of the DMZ and numerous attempts to establish relations between the two countries, there are still constant risks of escalation of the conflict between North Korea and South Korea, which causes constant tension for citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the international community.

NLL and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is a disputed maritime extralegal boundary in the Yellow (West) Sea, dividing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), commonly referred to as South Korea. Initially imposed in 1953 as a temporary measure in response to concerns about ROK President Syngman Rhee threatening the Armistice (AA),2 it was also a restraint on the DPRK. original purpose of the NLL remains: it is a mechanism to separate the two Koreas. was necessary because the Armistice Agreement, although granting military control of the islands to the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), did not give a clear position on the territorial waters surrounding the islands. Thus, the dispute includes both the legitimacy of the NLL itself and conflicting territorial claims to the waters surrounding the five islands. five islands are U-do, Sochong-do, Taechongdo, Paengnyong-do and Yeonpyeong-do.From a legal perspective, there are two major regimes that apply to the NLL dispute: the Armistice (AA) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). full text of Article 15 of the AA is as follows: This Armistice shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.3The DPRK is bound under the AA to respect waters contiguous to the islands as ROK waters, but the international norm of the time, 3 nautical miles, has since become 12 nautical miles. Regardless, the NLL reserves for the ROK waters that go beyond the definition of contiguous, using either the 3-or 12-nautical-mile norms.The right of the DPRK to dispute the NLL has been disputed. Roehrig argues that the DPRK did not lodge a formal protest until 1973, and cites the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.4 Article 11 of the agreement stipulates: The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.5Article 11 of the 1991 North-South Joint Declaration does not necessarily mean that the DPRK has lost the legal right to dispute the NLL. DPRK could plausibly argue, due to the ambiguity of the Article 15 of the AA, that it has been prevented from exercising its full jurisdiction over its own territorial waters. From 1953 to 1973, however, the DPRK failed to take clear action where the NLL was concerned. may not have been from acquiescence to the state of affairs as they were so much as acknowledgment of its weaker position in the aftermath of the Korean War. renewed aggression in 1973 was instigated in the hope of achieving a peace agreement with the U.S.,6 encouraged by the withdrawal from Vietnam.7 objective may also have driven the 1999 and 2002 clashes, with the DPRK applying pressure while simultaneously proposing negotiations with the U.S.8 differing positions of the U.S. and ROK on the NLL render it a useful area that the DPRK can exploit in an attempt to weaken their diplomatic relations.9It has been customary for the ROK and supporters of the NLL to argue that its compliance with the median line principle, commonly used in settling disputed maritime areas, makes it legal. Experts in the law however, have written that the NLL breaches a number of UNCLOS articles. Van Dyke, Valencia and Garmendia, using case studies, demonstrate that the median line principle does not mean the NLL complies with UNCLOS. Most striking is Article 76, which proclaims that states can't use straight baselines to cut offthe territorial seas of other states. …

The core questions addressed by Noland (2019) are how, and whether, engagement could foster market-orientation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and reduce direct state control over the country's economy. Noland presumes that the DPRK regime's objective is to obtain revenue with minimum changes to its internal practices and associated risks to political stability, and argues that the nature of engagement is important in inducing desired changes in the country. Noland highlights the modality of economic exchange in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and analyzes whether the KCI model could serve as a means of transformative engagement. Through his analysis, Noland demonstrates that the labor practices in the KIC appear to be both exploitative and limit the extent the DPRK workers are exposed to new ways of organizing work, and concludes that it is unlikely to generate the desired changes. In order to encourage real institutional change, Noland concludes that the DPRK's partners must emphasize “more transformative approaches,” especially by means of introducing international norms and voluntary codes into the country. Otherwise, Noland assesses that the economic growth would merely enable the DPRK to achieve its status of “a de facto nuclear state.” In order to promote “effective transformative engagement,” Noland focuses on the means to expose DPRK workers to “new ways of organizing work.” To advance this argument further, it is also necessary to address the broad question of how the empowerment of workers could lead to real institutional changes in the country. As Babson (2019) notes, for the DPRK's economic growth, the regime would need to reform the economic system by embracing the role of markets, stimulating private initiative, and transforming international relations. The reformative measures include (but are not limited to) building institutions for legal and financial systems, trade and macroeconomic management; state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform; and shaping the economic leadership and core agencies as well as the role of the international financial institutions. Additionally, it should be noted that “animal spirits” among the empowered workers and entrepreneurs are an essential ingredient for any market growth. What options are available for external partners to affect such a reformative process? How can these countries help the empowered DPRK workers challenge state control over the economy and promote a desired realignment of the incumbent domestic coalition? These broader questions may deserve scrutiny as well. In this regard, experts are debating the extent to which the SOE reform since 2014 and the increasing level of private business activities could affect the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its external partners. Sakai (2018) argues that the DPRK regime does not intend to pursue a Chinese-style of economic reform and continues to oblige all DPRK citizens and entities to obey absolutely the “leadership,” while emphasizing the importance of “self-development spirit,” as opposed to international cooperation. Sakai offers a cautious view with regard to the opportunities for external partners to affect the DPRK's reformative process. To the contrary, Mimura (2017) highlights a possible window of opportunity to affect the DPRK's thinking about foreign partnership by focusing on the internal debate surrounding the new economic strategy since January 2018. Mimura observes that SOE autonomy is a key subject in the debate and focuses on the increasing autonomy for SOE managers, as opposed to the state planners, in making decisions on issues related to human resource management and production and sales of excess commodities. Babson (2019) also points to an increasingly blurred boundary between SOE and private business activities, referring to the emergence of successful entrepreneurs in both SOEs and private ventures. Babson recommends to explore options for enterprise organization models that would best support the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its partners. Such endeavor would complement Noland's proposal on the empowerment of DPRK workers. The DPRK's new line of economic policy is surely intended to secure the survival of the regime which would reject any external pressure if it felt threatened. The transformative engagement approach could succeed so long as the DPRK leadership became confident of its merits, which would likely require a prolonged period of adjustment, at a minimum. The DPRK's future decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, if it ever happens, would be affected by the regime's confidence in the security environment in which the economy is a crucial, but not necessarily the sole, factor. Political rapprochement is also another essential element in undertaking effective transformative engagement.

IntroductionThe North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government happened during a period of six years from 1977 to 1983. Although only 16 (eight men and eight women) are officially recognized by the JapaThe nese government, there may have been as many as 70 to 80 Japanese abducted. Analysts believe that some victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools, while other victims were also abducted with the intent of stealing their identities.The abduction of Japanese citizens by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, can be distinguished from other foreign policy issues that Japan faces for the following two reasons. First, this is a rare-probably the only- major diplomatic issue in which Japan is a victim of an egregious act committed by an external entity. For the first time, Japan is conducting diplomacy in order to recover the original status and receive due compensation. As is usual for a novice, unfortunately, Japan has not scored well. The Japanese government says that the abduction issue is the highest priority among the issues between Japan and DPRK and has been putting forth a remarkable effort.1 Yet the goal Japan set might have been too ambitious and might have left too little room for negotiation.The second reason for the uniqueness of the abduction issue is the remarkable convergence of basic policy lines across the Japanese political spectrum. Very few members of the Japanese Diet are openly opposed to pressuring the DPRK on this issue. According to a survey by the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,2 dubbed Sukuukai in Japanese, 82 percent of the Diet members supported the idea of additional economic sanctions in the event that the DPRK does not show the results of reinvestigation that will lead to the repatriation of all victims.3Public Outrage and Stalemate4The abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the time, very little was known about the location or fate of the missing people. When a newspaper article reported in 1980 that the missing people might have been kidnapped by a foreign agent, it did not attract much attention from the politicians and was dismissed as mere speculation by the police. This started to change after two incidents. The first was the arrest, in 1985, of a North Korean agent who was carrying the passport of Tadaaki Hara, who disappeared from a beach in Miyazaki Prefecture in June 1980. Then, in 1987, an arrested North Korean agent named Kim Hyong-hee, who perpetrated the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29 of that year, told the police that she learned the Japanese language from an abducted Japanese person whose name was Yaeko Taguchi. Taguchi had disappeared from the same beach as Hara did, but in 1978. The circumstantial evidence seemed to suggest that North Korea was somehow involved in the missing persons incidents.In early 1988, following Kim Hyon Hee's confession, the abduction issue was raised in the Diet of Japan for the first time. In March, answering a question in the Diet, Seiroku Kajiyama of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced that missing persons incidents in the 1970s and the 1980s might have been the result of abductions by North Korea. However, Kajiyama's statement did not lead to substantial action by the foreign ministry. The ministry told the family members of the missing people, to their dismay, that without formal diplomatic relations with North Korea or concrete evidence of North Korea's responsibility, the Japanese government could do little about the issue.Following the end of the Cold War and improved relations between North and South Korea, Japan sought to engage with North Korea in a more friendly manner. In 1990, a Japanese delegation led by Shin Kanemaru, a heavyweight of the LDP, and Makoto Tanabe, a senior member of the Socialist Party, visited North Korea in order to facilitate the negotiations on diplomatic normalization. …

This article shows that despite geographic and demographic obstacles, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had achieved a considerable degree of self-reliance in economic development by the late 1970s and was nearly self-sufficient in food grain production until the mid-1980s. However, the DPRK's economy became highly strained and increasingly vulnerable to external shocks due to its failure to make a changeover from extensive to intensive sources for its economic development, its rigid central planning system and huge defense expenditures as DPRK-Soviet and DPRK-China relations deteriorated in the post-1960 period. Moreover, this article shows that the structure of the DPRK's economy compounds its economic plight. Pursuing a self-reliant development strategy, the DPRK regime has promoted a comprehensive and integrated national economy in which each sector of the economy is closely interlinked while the foreign trade sector has been reduced to a minimum. The insular nature of the DPRK's economy makes it prone to negative ripple effects and vicious cycles of economic downturns whenever a shock, whether internal or external, is introduced into the system. Seen in this light, the weather-related natural disasters of the mid-1990s were not the major cause of acute food shortages. Rather the cause of hunger lies in the deeply rooted structural problems of the DPRK's economy.

International energy assistance needs and options for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The change of president in the Republic of Korea (ROK) brought a new approach towards some foreign policy matters. President Lee Myung-bak set out to restore what he claimed were damaged relations with the United States (US) and Japan, while hoping to avoid offending other countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Negotiations with the European Union on a free trade agreement (FTA) continued, with little result. Throughout the year, the PRC continued to play a leading role in keeping the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) engaged on the nuclear issue. The abduction issue dominate DPRK-Japan relations. Russia continued to call for moderation in dealing with the DPRK, and to play its part in supplying fuel oil. It also gave some food aid and signed agreements relating to railway rehabilitation in the Rajin area, the site of the DPRK's first special economic zone. Keywords: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); DPRK-Japan relation; foreign policy matters; free trade agreement (FTA); Republic of China (PRC); Republic of Korea (ROK)

In recent years, the massive trades between China and its neighboring countries have promoted the development of forestry and economic reforms in many countries, but have also posed a certain threat to forest health, which brought further attention to forest health in the border. This paper takes the cross-border between China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)and Russia as the research object. Based on multi-source remote sensing data, we collected forest resource survey data in 2000, 2010, and 2020, and use a combination of analytic hierarchy process and entropy method to determine the index weight and evaluate forest health status. As a result, most of the forest health is in the sub-healthy and moderate health range. The extremely unhealthy forests show a downward trend year by year, and most of them are in the areas of human activity. Except for extremely unhealthy and healthy levels, all grades showed a slow upward trend, which also led to a decrease in the proportion of healthy forests year by year. On a national scale, 50%-60% of the regional forest health in China is in a moderately healthy and sub-healthy state, while unhealthy forest areas account for 18%-21%, and are rising constantly year by year at 18.99%, 19.45%, and 20.76% respectively. The healthy and sub-healthy forest areas in Democratic People's Republic of Korea are on a downward trend in 2010. The sub-healthy forest areas have declined significantly compared with 2000 (25.4%, 7.54%). By 2020, the healthy and sub-healthy forests have continued to decrease by 2.47%. The extremely unhealthy and healthy regional forests in Russia's developed slowly. As a whole, the forest health has declined slightly (0.35%) from 2000 to 2020. In the cross-border region between China, DPRK and Russia, the forest health rank of the three countries is Russia>China>DPRK. This result can be promoted for local development and targeted construction. Through sustainable management and protection, it can provide an effective basis for the healthy development of local or regional forests, and can better protect and manage forest resources.

A nationwide nutrition survey began when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) requested assistance from international relief organizations in 1997 due to flooding in 1995-1996, followed by the worsening food shortage peak in 1997. According to reported data for the 15 years since the active intervention and assistance from international societies, the malnutrition and mortality rates of children in the DPRK have improved. However, the prevalence of the stunting reported in the latest 2012 report is 27.9%, which is still a moderate-severe level, and worrisome in terms of international standards. In particular, the prevalence in Ryangangdo, which is regarded as the worst region in the DPRK, is 39.6%, which is a very high level of stunting. To alleviate such regional deviation will be a major task for future assistance. In addition, one cannot emphasize too highly the importance of early nutritional assistance for pregnant women and infants, considering that the recovery from stunted growth is low after two years of age, and the aftereffects would continue for the rest of their lives.

The Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea) found it possible to work with the new United States (US) administration and with a new government in Japan, despite initial apprehension about both. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) did not. More mundane economic worries include such issues as contaminated foodstuffs from China and patent infringements, which surface from time to time. Relations with Japan continued along the relatively smoother path of 2008, with President Lee and Japanese Prime Minister Asō Tarō, who met twice during the year in Seoul, finding common ground on approaches to the DPRK and the need for a strong relationship with the US. The nuclear issue remained the dominant theme in the DPRK's international relations. The last months of the Bush administration saw an impasse in the Six Party Talks that remained unresolved as the Obama administration came into office in January 2009. Keywords:China; Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); international relation; Japan; nuclear issue; Republic of Korea (ROK); Six Party Talks; United States (US)

In 2009, relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK - South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK - North Korea) continued to be frosty. The Lee administration reaffirmed that it would uphold its policy position based on denuclearisation, reform and human rights, while emphasising that it would be flexible in persuading the North to accept these goals. Hopes that the pragmatic and result-oriented policy of the Lee administration would lead to a shift in the DPRK's position on denuclearisation quickly faded away. In addition to strong rhetoric denouncing the South Korean leadership, military provocations by the DPRK continued. Problems at the last remaining joint inter-Korean economic project, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), intensified in the first half of 2009 but were eventually resolved, at least for the time being. Among the rare positive developments was the 17th round of family reunions held at Mt Kumgang during the Ch'usok holidays. Keywords:Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); denuclearization; Kaesŏng Industrial Complex (KIC); Korea; Lee Myung-bak; military provocations; Republic of Korea (ROK)