Abstract
In the article I intend to reconstruct Witkacy’s standpoint in relation to Russell’s philosophy; it will not concern the whole philosophy of the British analyst, but only the area which was a subject of Witkacy’s study. These studies have not got a finished, completed form because they were either printed out of manuscripts devastated during World War II or they constitute fragmentary reflexions. I present Witkiewicz’s critical attitude toward the following ideas: the idea of a philosophical analysis, the idea of the psyche and brain identity and the idea of neutral monism. As far as the issue of universals is concerned, I distinguish Witkiewicz’s immanent realism from Russell’s transcendent realism. I indicate a similar attitude of the two thinkers to the ontology of mathematics.
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