Abstract

Sequential Response Models use techniques based on ordinal noncooperative game theory to analyze decisions in which participants may sequentially respond to the actions of their opponents. Sequential Response Models, which include Departure Games, allow a decision maker to use foresight in determining the best move. This article presents the first model to adequately describe general sequential response decision situations. The Double Departure Game model allows a broader application of foresight than was previously possible. This model applies these principles in a 2×2 game context, providing a basis for extension of these ideas to more general games. The model is used to demonstrate the possibility of cooperation without communication, and to examine this phenomenon in several business contexts.

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