Abstract

This paper studies the pricing problem in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers who whether sell their substitutable products to an independent retailer or sell them directly to consumers through their own Internet channels. Channel and brand competition is considered for each product whose demand function is stochastic and linear. The objective function is to maximize the manufacturers and the retailer profits. Three decentralized pricing policy are developed and the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions are obtained using the game-theoretic approach for Nash and Stackelberg games. Numerical examples are presented to study the effectiveness of each policy. The results indicate that brand loyalty enhancement is profitable for both the manufacturers and the retailer. Furthermore, a limited increase in service value may decrease the threat of the direct Internet channel for the retailer while increasing the manufacturers’ profit.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.