Abstract
A relatively perfect organizational system of extreme floods emergency management has been established in China. However, no-timely response and procrastination still exist in practical actions of grassroots organizations. In this paper, evolutionary game (EG) theory is applied to extreme floods emergency management, and to analyze replicator dynamics and its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) between different level hierarchical governments. Evolution results are simulated by system dynamics (SD). Some conclusions are inferred that: (1) the evolutionary game between a higher-level government and a lower-level government has no ESS; (2) the evolution results of EG between a higher-level government and a lower-level government show a trend of cycle. In order to break the cycle, the higher-level government has to strengthen supervision to the lower-level government.
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