Modality as dialogue: a Bakhtinian reanalysis of epistemic stance

Abstract

This paper offers a dialogic reinterpretation of meanings which have traditionally been labelled instances of ‘epistemic modality’—for example, modal auxiliaries such as may, will and must, modal adverbs such as possibly, probably, certainly and mental state projections such as I think and I believe. It argues that the primary function of such meanings is dialogic rather than epistemic. That is to say, such meanings first and foremost act to position the speaker with respect to actual or potential respondents to the current proposition. Any effects in terms of the speaker/writer's commitment to the truth value of the proposition are secondary and do not apply in all instances. In advancing this reinterpretation, the paper develops an argument against those theoretical traditions for which the fundamental reality of the language act is a psychological and self-expressive one and in favour of those traditions for which the fundamental reality is a socially interactive one in which all utterances involve speakers/writers positioning themselves with respect to other voices and other value positions.