Mobilising gratitude: young people’s narratives about the police in museum collections documenting societal responses to the 2017 terrorist attack in Stockholm

Over the course of the past half century, policing in the United States has gone from an institution in deep crisis and a flashpoint in the country’s culture wars to a widely admired example of innovative, bipartisan reform—and then back again. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, police forces were overwhelmingly white, male, and politically reactionary. Liberals saw the police as racist, violent, and ineffective and blamed them, with justification, for the hundreds of riots that convulsed American cities under Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. At the same time, conservatives rallied around the police as symbols of “law and order”—the cause that, more than any other, won Nixon the White House in 1968.1 By the late 1990s, however, the police had become far more diverse and far less insular, and new approaches to law enforcement, especially “community policing” and “problem-oriented policing,” had won remarkably broad respect across lines of race, class, and ideology.2 Enthusiasts of “new governance” regularly pointed to police departments as models of the kind of pragmatic reform other public sectors could profitably emulate.3 The pitched battles over the police in the Johnson and Nixon years, the jeering of officers as “pigs,” and the strident calls to “support your local police” felt increasingly remote.Then all the progress seemed to disappear. President Donald Trump resurrected “law and order” as a partisan rallying cry, championed the most violent and aggressive forms of policing, and allied himself with officers more loudly and divisively than Nixon ever had. In the summer of 2020, when tens of millions of protesters marched across the United States and riots broke out in a series of cities, the motivating grievances were about the police, and especially about the large number of young Black men killed by law enforcement officers. For many on the left, reforming the police no longer seemed possible; they wanted to abolish the police or least to slash their budgets.4 Americans on the right, meanwhile, increasingly saw attacks on law enforcement as attacks on them and on their idea of what the country should be.5 The calls in 2020 to “defund the police” were blamed, in 2021, for rising homicide rates across the United States, for spates of robberies and car thefts in some cities, and—by moderate Democrats—for off-year electoral losses to Republicans.6 Law enforcement is again a political battleground, not just dividing Democrats from Republicans but pitting progressives against moderates, young against old, and marginalized community against marginalized community.7 Once again, the police are in crisis, and once again they seem part of the reason the country is in crisis. The recent history of policing is a tale of reversals and upended expectations.In other ways, as well, the enterprise of policing is marked by contradictions. This is especially true of the deep and complicated connections between policing and equality. Public law enforcement agencies are inherently redistributionist, socializing the use of force, but ever since the birth of modern policing in London in the late nineteenth century, officers have protected the privileged against the “dangerous classes,” and American policing in particular has long and continuing connections with racial subordination. People of color in the United States are more likely than whites to be victims of crime and more likely to be victims of police violence and abuse; they suffer from both police nonfeasance and police malfeasance. Inadequate protection against crime is among the most damaging forms of racial inequality in the United States, but so is the appallingly large number of young people of color, particularly African Americans, killed every year by the police.Charting a new course for public safety thus means confronting paradoxes and trade-offs. It requires accepting necessary compromises while rejecting those that have been tolerated for lack of imagination. It also means confronting two different social divides. The first is the ideological divide, the growing chasm between left and right that today, as half a century ago, has made policing a partisan flashpoint. The second divide is sociological: the gulf separating privileged Americans from the poor people and people of color who disproportionately bear the burdens of both crime and abusive forms of policing. Each of these two divides has implications for police reform. The ideological divide places a premium on proposals that can gain broad, cross-partisan support. The sociological divide provides reason to give special weight to the interests and views of poor people and people of color, especially African Americans.8Although police reform was never as successful as it was said to be in the 1980s and 1990s, neither was it a dead end. There are ways to make policing fairer, more effective, less abusive, and less lethal by building on successes of past reforms while addressing their very real shortcomings. Fortunately, moreover, the proposals most likely to work are supported by Americans on both sides of the ideological divide and by a majority of the groups most affected by crime and by abusive policing.How can American policing be transformed into a more effective and egalitarian system of public safety? We need to start with four key facts. First, crime has devastating, disproportionate impacts on poor people and people of color, especially Black Americans. Second, police violence and other forms of abusive law enforcement also take a tragic and outsize toll on poor people and people of color, and here, too, Black Americans are particularly likely to be victimized. Third, improved policing has helped make crime far less common today than thirty or forty years ago, but some of the progress has been lost in recent years. Fourth, there have been successes over the past several decades in reforming police departments, but the victories have been partial and very often fleeting.Fear of crime is often whipped up for partisan purposes, but the damage that crime inflicts on victims, as well as on their families and communities, is real and massive. Criminal victimization is also regressive, falling most heavily on those who are already disadvantaged. All of this is particularly true of the most extreme forms of violence—homicide, aggravated assault, and rape—which can fairly be called epidemic in the United States and which victimize African Americans, along with their families and neighborhoods, at greatly elevated rates.There are between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand homicides annually in the United States—a rate of about five or six per one hundred thousand people in the country. Among Black Americans, though, the rate is much higher. African Americans die violently at seven times the rate of whites; for men the ratio is nine to one. Homicide is the third-leading cause of death among Americans aged fifteen to thirty-four; it is the leading cause of death among Black males under forty-five and the second-leading cause of death among Latino males under forty-five. Young Black men are fifteen times more likely than their white counterparts to be the victims of homicide. Violence is responsible for more lost years of Black male lives than cancer, stroke, and diabetes combined. Meanwhile more than a million Americans are hospitalized each year from attacks that do not turn out to be fatal, and African Americans are more likely than whites to be the victims of these attacks, too. Black people are also disproportionately represented among the several hundred thousand victims of rape each year in the United States.9The failure to protect African Americans and other marginalized populations from crime is among the starkest and most damaging forms of racial inequality in the United States. No other wealthy country tolerates such extreme racial disparities in the risks of violent victimization.10Moreover, beyond the lives that it cuts short, homicide and other forms of extreme violence can have tragic consequences for the families of victims and for the neighborhoods where it occurs. High rates of violence make fear a constant presence in people’s lives, affecting the material conditions of their daily existence in countless ways. It turns heat waves more deadly, for example, by making people afraid to leave their homes. Children living in neighborhoods with high rates of violence perform worse in school, reinforcing the cycle of disadvantage that keep families locked in intergenerational poverty. This is not just a matter of correlation: Black schoolchildren do dramatically worse on standardized tests in the days immediately after a local homicide than in the days just before. Exposure to lethal violence makes it hard for them to concentrate, and the effects appear to accumulate with each additional killing. Crime, especially homicide and other serious forms of violence, also depress property values, helping to maintain the gaping disparities between the household wealth of Americans of different races and robbing local governments of tax revenues, which in turn makes it harder for them to confront not only violence but virtually every other challenge they face. For communities as well as for individuals, exposure to criminal victimization, and in particular to homicide and serious assault, is a pillar of American inequality.11Much of the explanation for the racial disparities in rates of criminal victimization in the United States lies outside the criminal justice system: in the pervasive, interlocking disadvantages imposed on people of color, especially on African Americans. Discrimination perpetuates poverty, and poverty breeds crime, making potential offenders more desperate and potential victims more vulnerable.12 But part of the explanation is inadequate policing, and more precisely the long history of police departments protecting white, wealthy neighborhoods more than poor neighborhoods disproportionately populated by people of color.13If poor people and people of color in the United States have long suffered from inadequate protection against crime, they have also suffered from an excess of violence and abuse at the hands of the police. Police officers kill roughly a thousand Americans every year. Somewhere between half and eighty percent of the deaths, probably, are unjustified.14 And the victims of police killings are disproportionately people of color, with young Black people men especially at risk. Black Americans are fourteen percent of the population but more than a quarter of the people shot dead by the police.15 From 1980 through 2019, on an age-adjusted basis, Black people were more than three times as likely to be killed by the police as whites; Latinos were close to twice as likely.16 Between 2015 and 2019, an unarmed Black man was four times as likely to be fatally shot by the police as an unarmed white man.17 For Black and white males between the ages of twenty and twenty-four, the ratio was five to one.18Deaths at the hands of law enforcement officers are the most extreme way, but far from the only way, in which the burdens of policing fall disproportionately on African Americans and other people of color. People of color, especially young Black men, are more likely to be stopped by the police. When they are stopped, they are less likely to be treated with respect, more likely to grabbed or struck, more likely to be searched, and more likely to be arrested.19The harsh, often brutal treatment of African Americans and other people of color by police has ramifications far beyond the deaths, physical injuries, and indignities it inflicts. Stops and arrests are entry points into the carceral system. Excessively aggressive, discriminatory policing helps to sustain jail and prison populations that are bloated and racially lopsided. And the interactions that people have with the police reverberate through their communities, with lasting effects not just on attitudes toward law enforcement but on broader ideas about law, government, and society.20 Unsurprisingly, African Americans consistently report less confidence in the police than whites.21 But mistreatment by the police often leads, also, to an enervating sense of disempowerment—a sense of physical vulnerability, lack of belonging, and alienation—not just in the immediate victim of the mistreatment but in friends, family, and neighbors as well.22The damage that American policing does to people of color and their communities has received more attention over the past three decades for several reasons. Part of the explanation is changes in law enforcement: the expansion of police forces since the 1980s; more aggressive use of stop-and-frisk; crackdowns on low-level, quality-of-life offenses; and the spread of militarized equipment and tactics, including through the proliferation and increased use of SWAT teams.23 Increased public awareness of police violence has also played a role; the key contributors here have been the Black Lives Matter movement and the advent of smartphones and social media.24 But some part of the reason that police violence and its disproportionate use against people of color has loomed larger may also be a success to which law enforcement agencies themselves contributed: the dramatic, transformational decline of crime in the 1990s. As threats of private violence became less omnipresent in poor neighborhoods of color, threats of police violence—which had always been there, in the background—became more jarringly inexcusable.25As devastating a toll as crime now takes in the United States, it did far more damage thirty years ago. Between the early 1990s and the turn of the millennium, the national homicide rate dropped by roughly forty percent, and the decline was even larger in the neighborhoods and demographic groups hardest hit by crime. The rates of other crimes saw similar drops.26 The sociologist Patrick Sharkey notes that for Black men, the homicide drop was the largest public health achievement of the past several decades, shrinking the racial disparity in life expectancy and preserving roughly one thousand years of life for every one hundred thousand Black men. Sharkey has also documented the ways in which the decline of crime changed the fabric of life in poor neighborhoods, allowing public spaces to be reclaimed and alleviating the constant, debilitating fear of violent attack. Combined with changes in law enforcement, the crime decline of the 1990s altered the nature of the physical insecurity experienced in poor communities of color, particularly by young people, “from the threat of violent peers to the threat of abusive police.”27The plummeting crime rates of the 1990s were followed by more modest reductions in homicides and aggravated assaults in the early years of the twenty-first century. Homicide rates began to rise, though, around 2014, and then surged in cities across the country during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 and 2021.28 Some major American cities recorded more homicides in 2021 than in any prior year.29 And just as the crime decline in the 1990s was particularly pronounced in poor neighborhoods and predominantly Black neighborhoods, fatal shootings have risen most dramatically in recent years in those same neighborhoods.30 In Los Angeles, for example, Black Americans are nine percent of the population but constituted thirty-six percent of homicide victims in 2021; in New York City, the figures are twenty-four percent and sixty-five percent, respectively.31 Rates of other violent crimes do not appear to have risen as much as homicides, and the nationwide homicide rate in 2020 and 2021 remained well below its peak in the 1980s. Still, a significant amount of the progress made in reducing fatal attacks in the 1990s and early 2000s seems to have slipped away, at least temporarily and possibly for longer. Just as there was nothing unavoidable about the high crime rates of the 1980s, there is no guarantee those rates will not return.The causes of the crime drop in the 1990s are still debated, and so are the explanations for the rising homicide rates of the past several years. Some of the credit for the crime drop, though, almost certainly should go to improvements in policing: either to the expansion of police forces in the 1990s, or to changes in how the police operated, or most likely to both factors. The evidence is threefold. First, a growing body of research links increased police presence to decreases in crime, especially homicides. Some of this research examines the effects of changes in the size of local police forces; others look at the effects of temporary surges in police presence because of, for example, terrorist alerts.32 Second, the crime drop during the 1990s was roughly twice as large in New York City as elsewhere in the country, and the most plausible explanation for the difference is the especially large changes in the quantity of and quality of policing in New York City during that period.33 Third, there is strong evidence for the effectiveness of particular police strategies that became more widespread in the 1990s, especially tactics that focus on areas where a large number of crimes take place and other examples of “problem-oriented policing.”34American law enforcement didn’t just get better at controlling crime in the last decades of the twentieth century. It also improved in other ways, albeit unevenly, and too often transiently. At the beginning of the 1970s, for example, police departments in the United States were overwhelmingly white and overwhelmingly male. Many departments, particularly in big cities, grew more diverse in the 1980s and 1990s, often through hiring plans adopted in response to lawsuits. By the early 2000s, some large police forces were majority minority—this was true, for example, in Los Angeles, Detroit, and Washington, D.C.—and the percentage of female officers had grown as well. Smaller departments made less progress, though. Moreover, as court-ordered hiring plans have expired over the past twenty years, diversification has stalled even in larger departments, and some past gains have been undone.35Diversifying law enforcement agencies is not a panacea—there are no panaceas in police reform—but accumulating research suggests that minority and female officers are less likely to use unjustified force, especially against people of color.36 White male officers partnered with minority or female officers also change their patterns of policing for the better. And diverse departments are less insular, more open to outside ideas, and better connected to the communities they serve, all of which makes them more likely to adopt other reforms.37One particular way in which police diversity has facilitated other reforms is by countering the strident hostility of police unions toward efforts to reduce police violence, increase police and racial in law Police unions are not always of but even today they do more to than to for making law enforcement fairer, more effective, and less reason for that is that the of police unions and than police officers of Black and Latino officers have often championed reforms by police and the presence of officers of color may in some have police unions to moderate their most of those reforms over the past half century have been community policing and policing, both of which spread widely in the 1980s and 1990s, as and just as every police in the country to “community policing,” in part because it became a for At its though, community policing was more than a It was a of law enforcement from a and toward a that on and with the public and with other policing had major some of which will be And because community policing was with of it was hard to It though, because it often greatly increased public with the police and made people fear of crime to real reductions in when people felt they out and and to become with more people most community policing also police departments, and it focus beyond crime allowing them to a of other by the communities they It well with policing, which called on officers to work and on an basis, with other agencies and the public to of particular local but not policing to responsible for a disproportionate amount of but not the were officers. community policing, the focus on to and a body of evidence these with significant crime there are that and other forms of policing have helped some cities the national and reduce homicides in community policing and policing also increased attention to low-level, of such as and the Part of the idea was that when these of were left neighborhoods toward people on the and rates of serious this was the of Police on quality-of-life could be too, and the that these were in effective at reducing serious crime, but not as dramatically as policing and only when the community and particular in particular crackdowns on quality-of-life as community policing and policing, did not reduce the other of the from quality-of-life policing, policing the of in which the police with community groups and other agencies to particular groups of people responsible for a disproportionate of a first and most of which was in the 1980s and called because their most was often threats of consequences at the and groups violence in a particular But the also of social to the same people, and more recent of this more than policing. is growing that these when right, their moreover, community policing and policing their in poor were and not just because they were of from of officers in neighborhoods hit hardest by crime. policing and policing police to adopt what the had called the of law kind of policing in to from the of law enforcement in had called the which and the which when community policing and policing were to against life they on the In community policing and policing officers to for neighborhoods to a of other than law enforcement: and so that they had not up to be social but it out they often were at other agencies to more attention to marginalized several different community policing and policing have lost much of their over the past two The terrorist attacks of to calls for more aggressive forms of law enforcement, and and local in the early 2000s many departments to community policing and policing as forms of these the crackdowns on and in New York City, helped to community against them in many against the of police And it became increasingly that, even at their community policing and policing had some was that these attention to police This was not in the of either of could have with the public and agencies outside law enforcement to reduce police But they Police the of police violence, especially police because they did not the of the This was because the victims were of marginalized groups and or because did not still does on police killings or other forms of police violence, and the advent of body and of these were to It those and the Black Lives Matter movement to give the of police killings the attention it had long lethal police violence against Black Americans and Latinos has over the past half century. for the of the victims, the of killed by a police in the United States during the 1980s, and the drop was particularly Black Americans and The decline in police killings over the course of that to have been to new the use of lethal against In the three decades, in the age-adjusted rate of police killings of Black Americans and Latinos remained roughly constant while the rate for white Americans as a the age-adjusted for Americans also In some though, rates to From through 2019, police killings in areas and but by thirty percent in the thirty largest American cities, because of new on use of violence in some cities has dropped especially In Los Angeles, for example, significant of by the police appear to have been in half between and 2019, and police shootings appear to have by forty by officers increased in 2021 but remained far than in past In on the other of by the police have dropped by percent over the past fifteen years, but the rate of police shootings has not a similar Police shootings in between and in and again in and and then dropped over the several years, by to roughly the Los and have been of efforts at police reform over the past two decades, so the of by police in these cities over the past are in some reductions in of in both cities and significant reductions in police shootings in Los but in others progress on police shootings in also the in patterns of police violence, as in crime across the United States. The Police by the and the number of of per thousand arrests for hundreds of American police departments from to the from fifteen to the United States as a had New York rate of police almost Americans have been killed by the police in had New York homicide people have violently that same Police can and have but the victories have been and often

This study investigates the perspectives of African, Caribbean, and Black (ACB) youth living in Windsor, Ontario regarding their interactions with police. Twelve ACB youth were recruited using various methods through the Promoting and Owning Empowerment and Resilience among African, Caribbean, and Black Youth in Windsor (POWER) project to take part in focus group interviews. Interview transcripts were analyzed using a thematic analysis in NVIVO 10 software. Themes included a belief that police have positive effects on society, and that only a certain minority of officers are responsible for misconduct; many interactions with youth are not the fault of the officer(s) involved and that police institutions play an important role in society. However, youth also expressed reasons for their displeasure with these institutions, such as: the lack of diversity within the police force, and that police sometimes abuse power and can be aggressive. Moreover, police have obstructed justice, profiled, and treated ACB people differently, according to participants. These results come at a time when community advocacy groups, such as Black Lives Matter, are mobilizing to improve the experiences of African diasporic people in Canadian society. تور استانبول تور استانبول تور آنتالیا تور آنتالیا تور پوکت ساخت اپلیکیشن صندلی اداری آگهی رایگان آموزش وردپرس آموزش وردپرس

In Australia, most young people who offend and have contact with police are diverted from formal processing via a formal police caution or referred to a restorative justice conference (hereafter referred to as a ‘youth justice conference’). The focus on diversion is based on the perceived criminogenic effects that formal court processing may have on young people. Labelling theory provides the primary theoretical basis for diverting young people from formal processing, by predicting that being labelled ‘deviant’ by the courts can have a detrimental effect on the individual’s self-image and the label that others attach to them. Stigmatisation caused by this negative labelling makes it increasingly likely for the young person to gravitate towards other negatively labelled young people and engage in subsequent offending behaviour. Thus, if the predictions of labelling theory are true, those diverted from court should be less likely to re-offend, all other factors being equal. This thesis provides an examination of how effective the police diversionary strategies of formal police cautioning and youth justice conferencing are for reducing recidivism by young people in comparison to a finalised youth court appearance. However, the decision by police about whether to divert or formally process alleged young offenders is not due to random allocation, but is based on a complex interplay between various legal and extra-legal factors. Thus, a comparison between these two groups of young people on outcome measures may be impacted by selection bias, or reflect pre-existing differences between the groups on outcome measures. Propensity score matching (PSM) provides the ability to deal with the problem of selection bias by matching groups on a number of covariates to achieve statistical balance, and therefore approximate experimental conditions.

Dans cet article, l'A se penche sur les mesures ideologiques et ultra-repressives des autorites argentines au debut des annees 60 concernant les jeunes et leurs libertes sexuelles et sociales. L'A analyse ici la campagne de moralite qui debuta a Buenos Aires, relayee par les autorites policieres et les institutions catholiques de l'epoque

ObjectivesThe aim of this project was to explore how young Black people use arts-based therapies to manage their mental well-being. Black people share a collective experience of racism. These racial...

Simple SummaryDeveloping cancer during adolescence or young adulthood adds extra challenges to an already difficult period of development. This can cause a ‘biographical disruption,’ in the sense that people miss out on key milestones they might reasonably have expected to achieve during the period, and this can affect their emotional wellbeing. While research shows that young people may experience various degrees of emotional distress, less is known about the emotional experiences and barriers young people experience when accessing help and support. We interviewed two groups of young people who were within 6 months of diagnosis and 3–5 years after treatment. We found three themes that described emotional health experiences: the emotional impact of cancer; personal barriers to support; and support to improve mental health. Differences were identified across the treatment journey, in which we were able to propose therapies and interventions that could be used to help improve psychological outcomes.The biographical disruption that occurs in adolescents and young adults following a cancer diagnosis can affect various important psychosocial domains including relationships with family and friends, sexual development, vocational and educational trajectories, and physical and emotional wellbeing. While there is evidence of the physical impact of cancer during this period, less is known about the impact on emotional wellbeing and especially on the barriers for young people accessing help and support. We aimed to obtain a more in-depth understanding of young people’s experiences of their diagnosis, treatment, psychological impact, and range of resources they could or wanted to access for their mental health. We conducted an in-depth qualitative study using semi-structured interviews with 43 young people who had developed cancer aged 16 to 39 years and were either within 6 months of diagnosis or 3–5 years after treatment had ended. Framework analysis identified three themes: the emotional impact of cancer (expressed through anxiety, anger, and fear of recurrence); personal barriers to support through avoidance; and support to improve mental health through mental health services or adolescent and young adult treatment teams. We showed the barriers young people have to access care, particularly participant avoidance of support. Interrupting this process to better support young people and provide them with flexible, adaptable, consistent, long-term psychological support has the potential to improve their quality of life and wellbeing.

With the rising numbers of prisoners in Australia and the recognition of prisoners as parents across policy and academic domains, an increased interest in children affected by parental incarceration has emerged. Such interest focuses on three areas of inquiry: psychological impacts of parental incarceration on children and young people; links to intergenerational crime; and current responses to children and young people with a parent in prison. Much of this research about children has been undertaken with adults; it is often unclear whether researchers spoke with children and young people about the issues they reported on. Where children and young people have participated in research, it generally focused on data collection from surveys and other measurement tools. Research that explored children and young people’s experiences of parental incarceration, as perceived by them, is limited. A small number of international studies, predominantly from the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (US), have spoken with children directly about this issue; however, there is a considerable gap in research that considers the Australian context, particularly the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). This study aimed to fill this gap. It explores the self-reported experiences of children and young people living in the ACT who have or have had a parent in prison. All participants experienced paternal incarceration; three experienced maternal incarceration. This thesis analyses the results of qualitative interviews with children aged 8–18. Employing a childhood studies framework, this research highlights the voices of children and young people, emphasising their own perspectives and meaning-making. A reference group comprising five young people provided guidance at the commencement of the study. Sixteen children and young people participated in semi-structured interviews. Participants were recruited from a range of services across Canberra, including prison, statutory child protection services, youth work services and other non-government services. Data were analysed using an interpretative phenomenological analysis approach. This approach illuminated the complexity of the meanings children and young people placed upon their experience of parental incarceration. This analytical method also ensured that children and young people stayed at the forefront of the findings. The findings highlight that, when a parent commits a crime, the adult criminal justice system institutes a process in which the children of prisoners may, or may not, actively participate. From the point of arrest to the release of their parent, children and young people describe how their everyday lives were influenced by the criminal justice system and how they in turn managed and responded to the challenges that arose. Children and young people spoke about a diverse range of experiences at different points across the criminal justice process, which lasted for different periods of time. Children and young people described how the adult criminal justice system frequently created or exacerbated experiences of instability and uncertainty across specific life domains. They reported challenges with family relationships, housing, caring responsibilities, finances and education. They also described distinct differences in the types of relationships they had with their parent before, during and after incarceration. Consistent with childhood studies, children and young people described how they would meet these challenges and work to change them. Children and young people also experienced a range of emotions. Feelings of loss, stress, disconnection, shame and stigma were present for many participants. The feelings they described were not necessarily associated with the level of involvement they had with their incarcerated parent. In exploring children and young people’s understanding of parental incarceration, this research adds to the emerging body of work about children of prisoners in the Australian context. Children and young people’s participation has allowed their experiences of parental incarceration to be considered beyond the criminological and developmental psychology perspectives that have traditionally dominated much of the research in this field. This thesis provides a theoretical contribution by considering the tensions that exist in how children enact agency and the way they influence and are influenced by the social process and structures around them. In better understanding the experiences of children and young people, this thesis makes an important contribution to the development of sensitive and appropriate policy and practice within social work and more broadly so that children with a parent in prison may be better responded to.

To date there has been no systematic research on the experience of police cautioning from the viewpoint of the young people and their families. In a welfarist rhetoric, young people are given a police caution — a second chance — rather than being sucked into the formal court system. The notion of progress in pre-court diversion is often underlined by its claim to remove children from the criminalizing ethos of the court and the potentially damaging effects of stigmatization and labelling. Furthermore, there is an implicit assumption that the informal handling of delinquents (as in the Scottish Children Hearings System) may promote parental involvement and a sense of partnership between the state and the parents of offending children (National Youth Agency, 1991; NACRO, 1994). In practice, does police cautioning really represent an alternative to court? Or has it simply altered the place and meaning of punishment in the criminal justice system? Do young people and their parents regard police cautioning as a ‘soft option’, as critics in favour of giving cautioning ‘some teeth’ often claim? Do they accept the service role of the police in preventing young people from getting into trouble? This chapter seeks to address these questions by drawing on observations of police cautioning sessions and a series of interviews with the police, and those juveniles and their parents who received a caution at the station.

In February 2005, riots involving local youth against police erupted in Macquarie Fields following the deaths of two local young men who were in a stolen vehicle being pursued by police. The riots at the time were dismissed by the serving Government, the Opposition, NSWP police management and sections of the media, as merely a handful of young thugs behaving poorly. However, subsequent media coverage, political debate recorded in Hansard, academic literature and the findings of the Standing Committee on Social Issues (2006) revealed discontent amongst some residents concerning the behavior, attitudes and inconsistent actions of Macquarie Fields police. This study, through interviews conducted with government and non-government service providers servicing the Macquarie Fields community and interviews/observations conducted with Macquarie Fields police participants, examined perceptions held by Macquarie Fields police concerning their accountability and partnership with the community. It sought to discover whether police-community programs implemented following the 2005 riots impacted upon police perceptions of accountability to the community and led to improved relations between police and community. Findings indicated that despite the attempts of Government and police management to improve relations between Macquarie Fields police and community, the relationship remained problematic. Police participants were found to hold variable notions of accountability and partnership towards the community. This combined negatively with the primary crime reduction strategy of ‘stopping searching and moving on’ local youth socializing in public places, which was reported by community service respondents as being conducted by younger inexperienced police in an adversarial manner.

Young people's emotional geographies of citizenship participation: Spatial and relational insights

This paper investigated the headway distribution of platooning vehicles in work zones with and without automated Speed Photo Enforcement (SPE). Data from two work zones were collected and analyzed. The portion of vehicles traveling with a very short headway (less than 0.7 sec) was also examined. In addition, the behavior of vehicles near the law enforcement vehicles was analyzed in terms of applying brakes and changing lane in one of the work zones. The results indicated that the mean headway of cars in the median lane significantly increased in both work zones when the SPE van was present compared to the base condition. For trucks, the mean headway increase was significant only in the shoulder lane when the SPE was present. This is a beneficial effect and indicates that drivers had a longer time to react to the lead vehicles. It was also found that the proportion of cars traveling with a very short headway in the median lane significantly decreased when a SPE van was present at one work zone (I-64). In the shoulder lane, no very short headway was observed when SPE was implemented. The difference in braking behavior was not significant when SPE was compared to police car presence. However, lane changing behavior was significantly different for cars traveling in the median lane and also for trucks traveling in the shoulder lane. The proportion of cars changing lanes was 5 percent with a police car present and increased to 8 percent when the SPE van was present. A significant number of trucks changed lanes from the shoulder to the median when the police car was present to comply with state law.

New research has found that the annual cost of health and justice services for homeless youth in Australia is $626 million. Family violence is a major issue and a major driver of young people becoming homeless.

Experiences and outcomes of prevention and early intervention programs for young people of parents with a mental illness

IntroductionNew digital technologies hold promise for equalising access to information and communication for the Deaf community. SMS technology, for example, has helped to equalise deaf peoples’ access to information and made it easier to communicate with both deaf and hearing people (Tane Akamatsu et al.; Power and Power; Power, Power, and Horstmanshof; Valentine and Skelton, "Changing", "Umbilical"; Harper). A wealth of anecdotal evidence and some recent academic work suggests that new media technology is also reshaping deaf peoples’ sense of local and global community (Breivik "Deaf"; Breivik, Deaf; Brueggeman). One focus of research on new media technologies has been on technologies used for point to point communication, including communication (and interpretation) via video (Tane Akamatsu et al.; Power and Power; Power, Power, and Horstmanshof). Another has been the use of multimedia technologies in formal educational setting for pedagogical purposes, particularly English language literacy (e.g. Marshall Gentry et al.; Tane Akamatsu et al.; Vogel et al.). An emphasis on the role of multimedia in deaf education is understandable, considering the on-going highly politicised contest over whether to educate young deaf people in a bilingual environment using a signed language (Swanwick & Gregory). However, the increasing significance of social and participatory media in the leisure time of Westerners suggests that such uses of Web 2.0 are also worth exploring. There have begun to be some academic accounts of the enthusiastic adoption of vlogging by sign language users (e.g. Leigh; Cavander and Ladner) and this paper seeks to add to this important work. Web 2.0 has been defined by its ability to, in Denise Woods’ word, “harness collective intelligence” (19.2) by providing opportunities for users to make, adapt, “mash up” and share text, photos and video. As well as its well-documented participatory possibilities (Bruns), its re-emphasis on visual (as opposed to textual) communication is of particular interest for Deaf communities. It has been suggested that deaf people are a ‘visual variety of the human race’ (Bahan), and the visually rich presents new opportunities for visually rich forms of communication, most importantly via signed languages. The central importance of signed languages for Deaf identity suggests that the visual aspects of interactive multimedia might offer possibilities of maintenance, enhancement and shifts in those identities (Hyde, Power and Lloyd). At the same time, the visual aspects of the Web 2.0 are often audio-visual, such that the increasingly rich resources of the net offer potential barriers as well as routes to inclusion and community (see Woods; Ellis; Cavander and Ladner). In particular, lack of captioning or use of Auslan in video resources emerges as a key limit to the accessibility of the visual Web to deaf users (Cahill and Hollier). In this paper we ask to what extent contemporary digital media might create moments of permeability in what Krentz has called “the hearing line, that invisible boundary separating deaf and hearing people”( 2)”. To provide tentative answers to these questions, this paper will explore the use of participatory digital media by a group of young Deaf people taking part in a small-scale digital moviemaking project in Sydney in 2009. The ProjectAs a starting point, the interdisciplinary research team conducted a video-making course for young deaf sign language users within the Department of Media, Music and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. The research team was comprised of one deaf and four hearing researchers, with expertise in media and cultural studies, information technology, sign language linguistics/ deaf studies, and signed language interpreting. The course was advertised through the newsletter of partner organization the NSW Deaf Society, via a Sydney bilingual deaf school and through the dense electronic networks of Australian deaf people. The course attracted fourteen participants from NSW, Western Australia and Queensland ranging in age from 10 to 18. Twelve of the participants were male, and two female. While there was no aspiration to gather a representative group of young people, it is worth noting there was some diversity within the group: for example, one participant was a wheelchair user while another had in recent years moved to Sydney from Africa and had learned Auslan relatively recently. Students were taught a variety of storytelling techniques and video-making skills, and set loose in groups to devise, shoot and edit a number of short films. The results were shared amongst the class, posted on a private YouTube channel and made into a DVD which was distributed to participants.The classes were largely taught in Auslan by a deaf teacher, although two sessions were taught by (non-deaf) members of Macquarie faculty, including an AFI award winning director. Those sessions were interpreted into Auslan by a sign language interpreter. Participants were then allowed free creative time to shoot video in locations of their choice on campus, or to edit their footage in the computer lab. Formal teaching sessions lasted half of each day – in the afternoons, participants were free to use the facilities or participate in a range of structured activities. Participants were also interviewed in groups, and individually, and their participation in the project was observed by researchers. Our research interest was in what deaf young people would choose to do with Web 2.0 technologies, and most particularly the visually rich elements of participatory and social media, in a relatively unstructured environment. Importantly, our focus was not on evaluating the effectiveness of multimedia for teaching deaf young people, or the level of literacy deployed by deaf young people in using the applications. Rather we were interested to discover the kinds of stories participants chose to tell, the ways they used Web 2.0 applications and the modalities of communication they chose to use. Given that Auslan was the language of instruction of the course, would participants draw on the tradition of deaf jokes and storytelling and narrate stories to camera in Auslan? Would they use the format of the “mash-up”, drawing on found footage or photographs? Would they make more filmic movies using Auslan dialogue? How would they use captions and text in their movies: as subtitles for Auslan dialogue? As an alternative to signing? Or not at all? Our observations from the project point to the great significance of the visual dimensions of Web 2.0 for the deaf young people who participated in the project. Initially, this was evident in the kind of movies students chose to make. Only one group – three young people in their late teens which included both of the young women in the class - chose to make a dialogue heavy movie, a spoof of Charlie’s Angels, entitled Deaf Angels. This movie included long scenes of the Angels using Auslan to chat together, receiving instruction from “Charlie” in sign language via videophone and recruiting “extras”, again using Auslan, to sign a petition for Auslan to be made an official Australian language. In follow up interviews, one of the students involved in making this film commented “my clip is about making a political statement, while the other [students in the class] made theirs just for fun”. The next group of (three) films, all with the involvement of the youngest class member, included signed storytelling of a sort readily recognisable from signed videos on-line: direct address to camera, with the teller narrating but also taking on the roles of characters and presenting their dialogue directly via the sign language convention of “role shift” - also referred to as constructed action and constructed dialogue (Metzger). One of these movies was an interesting hybrid. The first half of the four minute film had two young actors staging a hold-up at a vending machine, with a subsequent chase and fight scene. Like most of the films made by participants in the class, it included only one line of signed dialogue, with the rest of the narrative told visually through action. However, at the end of the action sequence, with the victim safely dead, the narrative was then retold by one of the performers within a signed story, using conventions typically observed in signed storytelling - such as role shift, characterisation and spatial mapping (Mather & Winston; Rayman; Wilson).The remaining films similarly drew on action and horror genres with copious use of chase and fight scenes and melodramatic and sometimes quite beautiful climactic death tableaux. The movies included a story about revenging the death of a brother; a story about escaping from jail; a short story about a hippo eating a vet; a similar short comprised of stills showing a sequence of executions in the computer lab; and a ghost story. Notably, most of these movies contained very little dialogue – with only one or two lines of signed dialogue in each four to five minute video (with the exception of the gun handshape used in context to represent the object liberally throughout most films). The kinds of movies made by this limited group of people on this one occasion are suggestive. While participants drew on a number of genres and communication strategies in their film making, the researchers were surprised at how few of the movies drew on traditions of signed storytelling or jokes– particularly since the course was targeted at deaf sign language users and promoted as presented in Auslan. Consequently, our group of students were largely drawn from the small number of deaf schools in which Auslan is the main language of instruction – an exceptional circumstance in an Australian setting in which most deaf young people attend mainstream schools (Byrnes et al.; Power and Hyde). Looking across the Hearing LineWe can make sense of the creative cho

This thesis draws upon in-depth qualitative interviews with 33 young people in Melbourne, Australia, to examine the impact of homelessness, violence and policing on their sense of self, place and belonging. Specifically, this research highlights the pervasive presence of violence and policing in homeless young people’s lives, and argues that these experiences exclude young people from public and private spaces that are important to them, undermine their sense of belonging as citizens, and violate their own constructions of self and place in the world. By engaging with scholarship from human geography, youth studies, sociology and critical criminology, this thesis builds upon the existing criminological literature on marginalised young people’s experiences of criminalisation and victimisation, and offers a nuanced understanding of the impact of these processes from young people’s perspective. In doing so, it seeks not only to extend the criminological literature, but also to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of youth homelessness that can inform policy and practice responses, and to broader discussions regarding marginalised young people’s place in society.