Abstract
Annual forest loss in the Brazilian Amazon had in 2012 declined to less than 5,000 sqkm, from over 27,000 in 2004. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that changes in Brazilian law enforcement strategy and the related governance system may account for a large share of the overall success in curbing deforestation rates. At the same time, Brazil is experimenting with alternative approaches to compensate farmers for conservation actions through economic incentives, such as payments for environmental services, at various administrative levels. We develop a spatially explicit simulation model for deforestation decisions in response to policy incentives and disincentives. The model builds on elements of optimal enforcement theory and introduces the notion of imperfect payment contract enforcement in the context of avoided deforestation. We implement the simulations using official deforestation statistics and data collected from field-based forest law enforcement operations in the Amazon region. We show that a large-scale integration of payments with the existing regulatory enforcement strategy involves a tradeoff between the cost-effectiveness of forest conservation and landholder incomes. Introducing payments as a complementary policy measure increases policy implementation cost, reduces income losses for those hit hardest by law enforcement, and can provide additional income to some land users. The magnitude of the tradeoff varies in space, depending on deforestation patterns, conservation opportunity and enforcement costs. Enforcement effectiveness becomes a key determinant of efficiency in the overall policy mix.
Highlights
While globally, tropical forest cover loss may have increased over the past decade [1], in Brazil annual forest conversion has dropped substantially
We have developed an economically motivated probabilistic spatial simulation model to assess the likely outcomes of various anti-deforestation policy mixes involving C&C and payments for environmental services (PES) components: Amazon land users are still subject to fines when they illegally deforest, but the bar is raised for them in the sense that they can receive PES, which they risk losing when being caught in illegal deforestation
To design an adequate policy mix for the management of land-use and land-cover change in tropical forest landscapes, policy makers have to simultaneously maneuver several policy design parameters
Summary
Tropical forest cover loss may have increased over the past decade [1], in Brazil annual forest conversion has dropped substantially. According to the Brazilian Space Research Center (INPE), Amazon deforestation in 2012 was 13,750 km lower than the historical average and roughly 700 km below the ambitious national policy target for the 2011–2015 period [2]. Evaluation studies suggest that changes in the enforcement strategy of the Brazilian Forest. Carrots and Sticks for Forest Conservation in the Brazilian Amazon number: DCI-ENV/2011/269520), and Forest, Trees, and Agroforestry Program (http:// foreststreesagroforestry.org/). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript
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