Mitigating side channel attacks on FPGA through deep learning and dynamic partial reconfiguration

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This paper introduces a framework that combines Deep Learning (DL) models and Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) in Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) to mitigate Side Channel Attacks (SCA). Traditional static defense mechanisms often fail to fully mitigate SCA because they lack the ability to adapt dynamically to attacks. The proposed approach overcomes this limitation by adaptively reconfiguring the FPGA resources in real-time, disrupting the SCA patterns, and reducing the effectiveness of potential attacks. One of the notable advantages of this approach is its ability to defend against side-channel attacks while the FPGA design is operational. The framework accomplishes this by reconfiguring the FPGA resources to optimize response times, achieving latency levels beyond the reach of traditional static defense mechanisms. In particular, this study concentrates on mitigating power side-channel attacks, highlighting the resilience of the DL-DPR integration. Beyond its demonstrated efficacy against power SCA, the proposed framework can be extended to be adaptable to other types of side-channel attacks, making it a potential solution for hardware security. The integration of DL models allows for sophisticated threat analysis, while DPR provides the flexibility to implement countermeasures dynamically. Experimental results show that the latency from detection to mitigation is within 20 clock cycles. This combination represents a paradigm shift in securing hardware systems, moving from reactive to proactive defense mechanisms. The framework’s real-time adaptability ensures it stays ahead of attackers, continuously evolving to neutralize new threats. The findings presented in this paper underscore the potential of combining Artificial Intelligence (AI) and FPGA technologies to redefine hardware security. By addressing detection and mitigation in a unified framework, the proposed methodology significantly enhances the resilience of FPGA designs and lays the groundwork for future research in adaptive security mechanisms.