Abstract
This paper explores the application of mission command in binational and multinational units within the NATO context. It explores differences in understanding and application of mission command, amongst NATO members, and identifies the negative impact that these can have on the behaviour of tactical leaders, and on mission accomplishment, within a multinational context. The paper demonstrates that the understanding and therefore the application of mission command differs between the NATO members; that this influences the leadership style of superiors and their willingness to transfer trust and responsibility, and to assume risk; and, that differences in language, understanding and meaning of terms, and different contents of intents result in a negative influence, all of which are exacerbated by political influence. On the other hand, modern technology in binational or multinational units supports and promotes the application of mission command. The paper concludes with recommendations to mitigate these problems and to create the conditions where mission command can be employed successfully.
Highlights
Fourth, the currently available and deployed modern technology and information systems have not had the negative effects on mission command as outlined in the literature review
A key finding of the research is that a different understanding of this C2 philosophy is still valid in NATO nations and with that a correspondingly different leadership style is practised
Mission command with its described tenets is the C2 philosophy which provides the tools for military leaders to take appropriate decisions
Summary
For a successful framing of this analysis it is important to define the term mission command. This objective, the traditional regimental system and the understanding of officers led to the application of centralised C2 As result of these historical developments Anglo-American forces and most of the NATO nations prefered a C2 concept which had centralised decision-making, with schematic and explicit orders and plans from above, and a strict obedience by subordinates, requiring limited decision-making and initiative on their part. This C2 concept was “business management rather than the Moltkean style of command” “detailed political guidance is seen as the guarantee to success, with the result that the military has a limited field of action” (Widder, 2002, p. 6)
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