Abstract
Abstract Sellars addresses the “Mind-Body problem,” specifically whether intentional concepts can be reduced to nonintentional ones. Sellars outlines two notions of reducibility. According to logical reducibility, intentional concepts are definable in terms of nonintentional descriptions of bodily states. Casual reducibility involves only material equivalences (not identity statements) between intentional expressions and extensional descriptions of bodily states. Both naturalists and nonnaturalists, according to Sellars, hold that causal reducibility entails logical reducibility, but Sellars disagrees, arguing that intentional vocabulary is causally reducible but logically irreducible. An analogous solution can be offered concerning the reducibility of “ought” to “is,” although a different version of causal reducibility is involved with normative vocabulary as opposed to intentional vocabulary.
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