Mill's Theory of Morality

Abstract

Many have assumed that utilitarianism requires one always to utility, regarding any other way of acting as wrong. This Act Utilitarian doctrine has been criticized for imagining duties where none exist while ignoring special obligations that we bear towards other persons. In recent years, however, theories have said we should judge acts by reference to useful rules, which might account for special obligations and not require one to maximize utility. These developments have influenced our understanding of the classical utilitarians. J. 0. Urmson ([15] ), for example, reminds us that moral rules and obligations play a prominent role in Mill's Utilitarianism. But his rule utilitarian reading of Mill has not gained wide acceptance, for the evidence he cites seems inconclusive and balanced by further considerations. (See Brown [2], Cupples [3], Mabbott [7], Mandelbaum [8], Quinton [12], and Sosa [14] ; compare Dryer [4] and Ryan [13] .) I do not expect this paper to settle, once and for all, the interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism. But it rests upon a passage that is clearly meant to be definitive, and therefore one on which considerable weight must be placed. The passage may help us better understand Bentham's influence on Mill. It suggests a utilitarianism more concerned with ends than with specific ways (such as acts and social rules) of achieving those ends. This paper is also intended to lay the groundwork for an examination of Mill's distinctive theory of justice.