Abstract
This article, which focuses on the macro-dynamic branches of defense economics, aims at showing that the mainstream literature – the neoclassical school or the methodologies closely related to it – devoted to the effects of military spending stumbles over worrying difficulties, by throwing light on its insuperable theoretical and empirical limitations. The authors’ criticism applies to: demand-side and supply-side models (first part); formalizations with technological spin-off effects, externalities or public goods (second part); and simulation models, including the most recent ones with endogenous technical progress growth models (third part).JEL Codes: H56, O31, O32, O47, P43
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
