Military Power and Capitalist Globalization

Abstract

The reduction in military prerogatives in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia runs contrary to the expectation of civil-military scholars who posit that domestic security threats to state authority should worsen the ability of civilian authorities to establish political control over the armed forces and reduce military prerogatives. Yet different Colombian governments have faced multiple guerrilla armies and drug cartels since the early 1980s and proceeded to expand civilian authority over the armed forces in the early 1990s and maintain their political authority over the military to the present day. In the case of Peru, different civilian-led governments confronted the Shining Path guerrilla movement during the 1980s and 1990s, a movement that achieved a level of military influence that at one point undermined state authority and control in Lima; however, significant reductions in the institutional prerogatives of the armed forces were achieved during the late 1980s through the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, Bolivia during the 1980s and 1990s waged a U.S.-driven counternarcotics struggle against coca growers requiring the militarization of regions of the country, yet governments reduced military prerogatives over budgets, the defense ministry, and security strategy. Governments in Venezuela and Ecuador have not faced armed guerrilla insurgencies, nor have they engaged in highly militarized campaigns to repress antigovernmental social movements, but their militaries have challenged civilian political control while maintaining or expanding military prerogatives.