Middle power minilateralism: unpacking India’s Indo-Pacific strategy

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.

This chapter summarizes the volume’s findings concerning US–China bilateral relations and its varying impacts on various regions of the world, amidst crisis-ridden world politics. This chapter highlights several conclusions. First, the need to accumulate capital and crucial resources for continued economic growth are crucial factors in shaping the trajectory of the rivalry, although the precise conditions of such a need depends on where this economic conflict occurs. Second, intersubjective interpretations about physical geography and social relations play an important role in the trajectory of great power relations. Third, understanding how intersubjective meanings about physical geography change over time provides important insights in the analysis of US–China rivalry. Fourth, the manifestations of how physical geography emerges as the locus of contestation between great power could be investigated through the developments in institutional structures. Fifth, the formations and transformations of US–China rivalry ultimately depend on one’s positionality in a highly interdependent global order: across various world-regions, temporal conditions, and socioeconomic backgrounds.

Hedging is a collection of tactics that includes bandwagoning, limited resistance and involvement. Put another way, it is an insurance position between the two simple tactics of balancing and bandwagoning. Many states, including India, have adopted hedging as a favoured approach since the end of the Cold War. In light of the US–China rivalry and shifting great power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, India continues to pursue a ‘hedging the bets’ strategy, despite the country and the United States enjoying stronger strategic ties—particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This article argues that as a rising power with its own ambitions to carve out a strategic space, India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific seeks to retain a free, open and inclusive regional order. In the short and medium terms, this means forming soft-balancing coalitions and limited hard-balancing relationships with the United States. Strategic hedging still dominates Indian strategy in a broad sense. Forming an alliance with Washington will alienate China and Russia, the two great powers India is attempting not to dissociate completely. India’s somewhat neutral position on the Russian war on Ukraine and reluctance to join active military alliances in the Indo-Pacific indicates that hedging has value for maintaining India’s strategic autonomy and aspirations for great power status in the twenty-first century. India’s continued engagement through institutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and G20 as well as increased trade with China and Russia suggest the pursuit of a hedging strategy in its relations with other great powers.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the nexus of the US rebalance strategy to Asia and the US–China rivalry in the South China Sea (SCS) from the perspective of the offensive realism theory.Design/methodology/approachThe study depends on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. Also, the study uses the qualitative method to analyze the primary sources concerning the rebalance.FindingsThe study has found four results: first, the rebalance strategy to Asia is a comprehensive strategy to contain China’s rise. Second, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS since 2008 has been the main driver of launching the rebalance. Third, offensive realism presents a convenient analysis to understand the rebalance, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS, and the US–China rivalry in the SCS. Forth, SCS is one of the most important venues of the US–China rivalry for global hegemony.Research limitations/implicationsLimited to the period from 2009 to 2016. The Obama Era.Originality/valueThis study highlights the centrality of the SCS in the US–China global rivalry that has not been yet well researched.

Can lesser powers still effectively balance between the United States and China? This question has gained significant attention from policymakers and scholars as US–China rivalry intensifies. This article explores Vietnam's delicate balancing act amidst great power rivalry, arguing that the diplomatic flexibility available to traditional hedgers like Vietnam is shrinking. As ambiguity in various spheres diminishes, Vietnam increasingly finds itself compelled to clarify its stance on key issues. While Vietnam continues to hedge whenever possible, it sometimes resorts to strategic alignment to safeguard its national interests. In navigating the US–China rivalry, Hanoi consistently reassures both powers of its benign intentions while maintaining autonomy in policymaking. Vietnam's stance on issues tied to its core national interests is carefully calibrated to protect its legitimate concerns. Notably, when balancing its relations with the two superpowers, Hanoi tends to adopt a “China first, America later” approach, primarily driven by ideological affinity and threat perceptions.

The introduction sets the stage of US–China rivalry and introduces the concept of the infrastructure state. As the chapters in this volume show, the infrastructure state pursues spatial objectives which have necessitated institutional reform or extensive state restructuring. The infrastructure state exhibits significant variation from place to place but, in all cases, it seeks to address longstanding developmental challenges through the enhancement of connectivity. The concept of the infrastructure state, thus, shines a light on the effects of US–China rivalry at multiple scales while it also underscores that decisions by actors in the Global South are influenced by local infrastructural histories and political economic dynamics. Simply, local-level politics are shaped by and shape geopolitical competition.

Geopolitical rivalry has intensified to a degree not seen since the Cold War. The US and China have embraced interventionist state-capitalist practices in competing attempts to gain control over the transnational networks that underpin globalization. As a result, multinational corporations (MNCs) are exposed to unprecedented levels of geopolitical risk. Most MNCs are responding in one of two ways. Some hedge and try to remain aloof from the US–China rivalry, while others align with the geostrategic objective of states in order to secure patronage (e.g. subsidies and public contracts). If MNCs maintain global production networks bridging the US–China divide they will attenuate the fragmentation of the global economy. Alternatively, if MNCs align with states’ geostrategic objectives, they will accelerate economic fragmentation. We conclude that this emergent meta-context and MNC risk mitigation strategies are shaping what we refer to as geostrategic globalization.

The twenty-first-century global arena is profoundly shaped by the intensifying US–China rivalry. While theories in the US, such as the Thucydides’ Trap and the Clash of Civilizations, forecast a prospective ‘Cold War II,’ many experts in China propound a ‘divided peace,’ advocating for the stable coexistence of dual powerhouses. Introducing a nuanced lens, the ‘Security in Context’ (SiC) approach argues for a more interconnected and multi-dimensional understanding of great power dynamics. This study dives into the practicalities of a SiC approach, examining key strategies including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As we venture into the era of economic and technological decoupling, epitomized by measures like the Chip Act and Restrict Act, the paper suggests that the SiC framework remains central to deciphering the evolving US–China narrative, even in the face of burgeoning uncertainties.

In France, the launch of the so-called “Quad Plus” in March 2020 raised little attention. The general impression was that this new grouping was quite heterogeneous and maybe not the most relevant to tackle the challenge it ambitioned to address: the COVID-19 crisis. The examination of France’s various engagements in the Indo-Pacific can provide some clues regarding the synergies or divergences with the “Quad Plus” initiative. In 2018, Paris unveiled its own Indo-Pacific strategy that reflects a strategic reassessment of its interests. At the same time, there is now a recognition that China’s rise is increasingly challenging French interests in the region. France can thus more adequately protect its sovereign interests while promoting and advancing its own vision for a balanced, multipolar, inclusive Indo-Pacific regional order, upheld by key liberal principles and multilateral schemes. The French Indo-Pacific vision relies on key strategic partnerships with all the members of the Quad. However, a concern to keep its strategic autonomy in the context of a worsening US–China rivalry and the strong interest to coordinate with European partners in the Indo-Pacific explain why Paris has been to join the “Quad Plus” in 2020. While Joe Biden’s election could facilitate a rapprochement between France and the Quad, Paris will certainly continue to give priority to flexible, ad hoc, issue-based coalitions in which it would maintain its autonomy, alongside a deepening of the bilateral relations with the members of the Quad Plus.

This article argues that although the US–China rivalry has not presented with some essential elements of the US–Soviet Cold War, the emerging bipolarity has led to misplaced ideological hostility and repeated failling attempts of building alliance systems. Delicate power balance between the two countries has further complicated the rivalry by giving each side the false conviction to prevail.

Tensions between the US and China have escalated as both powers seek to draw countries into their respective political and economic orbits by financing and constructing infrastructure. Wide-ranging and even-handed, this book offers a fresh interpretation of the territorial logic of US–China rivalry, and explores what it means for countries across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. The chapters demonstrate that many countries navigate the global infrastructure boom by articulating novel spatial objectives and implementing political and economic reforms. By focusing on people and places worldwide, this book broadens perspectives on the US–China rivalry beyond bipolarity, and it is an essential guide to 21st century politics.

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has made strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States a key part of his foreign policy positions. At the same time, South Korea continues to maintain a decent relationship with China, pursuing a precarious position to decide its role in the context of the growing US–China rivalry. The US has made the trilateral cooperation and close coordination among the US, South Korea, and Japan the centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while South Korea and Japan have maintained their contentious relationship. The articles in this special issue address the challenges that South Korea faces today, focusing on two major themes in the contemporary era: first, how the US–China rivalry and power competition affect South Korea’s security and economic foreign policies, and second, how the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security and alliance capabilities.

In this study, we examine South Korea's foreign policy strategy in the context of the increasing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. We ask why South Korea is relatively hesitant to actively balance against China, especially compared to other US allies like Japan. We present a theory that examines how the lack of territorial and maritime disputes between a US ally and China affects an ally's foreign policy strategy in the US–China rivalry, to explain the case of South Korea. In general, when a US ally is engaged in an ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, we expect the US ally to more actively help the US balance against China. Because bilateral relations between the US ally and China are already tense, the US ally can afford to side with the US without being as vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. On the other hand, when a US ally has no ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, the US ally is expected to be more cautious in siding with the US against China because doing so can provoke China to retaliate in ways more costly than if they already had ongoing disputes. We find that without ongoing, active disputes with China, South Korea is more vulnerable to retaliation by China through critical issues like North Korea and trade. As a result, it is difficult for South Korea to side with the US in actively balancing against China.

"India Turns East: International Engagement and US–China Rivalry." The Round Table, 107(1), pp. 113–114