Microregionalization across ‘Caribbean America’

IN RECENT YEARS, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT has emerged as a leading proponent of western hemispheric trade liberalization and transatlantic free trade. Its efforts to transform the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and to promote free trade between NAFTA and the European Union (EU), however, have not been successful. Ottawa's ability to lead regional and inter- regional initiatives is constrained because Canada lacks the political and economic weight of the major powers, whose support is critical to bring such projects to completion. Ottawa should continue to promote free trade, but it should focus its efforts on broadening and strengthening its own relations within the hemisphere and with Europe.THE WESTERN HEMISPHEREWhen Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government announced in 1989 that Canada would join the Organization of American States, Canada's role in the region was enhanced. But it was Ottawa's decision the following year to join Mexico and the United States in negotiating NAFTA that gave economic substance to Canadian policy.The NAFTA negotiation was the result of Mexico's decision to seek free trade with the United States. The administration of George Bush incorporated the Mexican initiative into its Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the focus of which was to reinforce economic growth and political reform in Latin America through trade, debt relief, and investment. The key element of the programme was the willingness of the United States to begin to create a hemispheric free trade area 'stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego.'(f.1) Although the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement negotiated three years earlier would become a model for NAFTA, Ottawa was not eager to join the talks. Canada's trade and investment ties with Mexico were limited and the government was not anxious to reopen the divisive domestic debate that had accompanied free trade with the United States. It decided to participate in order to avoid a 'hub and spoke' arrangement that would leave the United States as the only country with privileged access to the others' markets. After the negotiations began, Ottawa's main objective was to protect and improve upon the gains it had achieved in the Canada-United States pact.By the time the bruising United States debate over ratification of NAFTA, which pitted labour and environmental groups against free trade supporters, ended in 1993 American enthusiasm for hemispheric free trade had faded. Deepening divisions in Congress over the place of labour and environmental standards in trade pacts prevented President Bill Clinton's administration from securing renewal of 'fast track' authority to negotiate future agreements that would not be subject to legislative amendment. The result was that the United States was no longer able to play its crucial leadership role in trade matters.(f.2)As the United States commitment to hemispheric free trade weakened, Canada's commitment increased. Jean Chretien's Liberal government, which had been highly critical of NAFTA while in opposition, reversed itself when it came to power and became a leading supporter of the agreement's expansion as a stepping stone to free trade in the hemisphere. A hemispheric accord would allow Ottawa to diversify its trade and to broaden the basis of its interaction with the United States while extending support for the multilateral trade system.The Canadian government, which had been encouraging the Clinton administration to continue its trade liberalization course, was therefore pleased when, at the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, thirty-four countries endorsed the president's proposal to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. In the meantime, Canada, the United States, and Mexico would explore ways to bring other countries into NAFTA. Chretien, Clinton, and the Mexican president, Ernesto Zedillo, announced that negotiations would begin the following month to bring Chile, which was seen as a key link between North and South America, into the agreement by 1 January 1996. …

Regional trading blocs and bilateral trade agreements have become increasingly important within the western hemisphere. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have all been passed in the last fifteen years. This Article will focus principally on the provisions in NAFTA and CAFTA. (1) Additionally, with the Andean Trade Preference Act set to expire in 2006, the United States initiated negotiations with three Andean countries in May 2004: Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) signed the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement in April 2006, concluded negotiations with Colombia in February 2006, and is participating in ongoing discussions with Ecuador. (2) Furthermore, the Administration announced in 2003 that it intends to launch negotiations for a separate agreement with Panama, and the Senate recently approved a resolution of advice and consent for a United States-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty in September 2006. (3) All of these bilateral and regional agreements represent a building block (4) in the attempt to secure a Free Trade Area of the Americas despite its current dim prospects. (5) Free Trade Areas/Agreements (FTAs) are cross-border arrangements in which the trade barriers--both tariff and non-tariff barriers--among participating nations are reduced, sector-by-sector over time, and often eventually abolished. Unlike a customs union or a common market, each member country of the FTA remains free to determine its own external trade barrier against non-FTA members. For businesses operating within the FTA, the market expands because consumers in member states can purchase their products for a lower price than before the FTA was established, and usually also at a lower price than goods originating outside of the member countries. (6) At the same time, businesses are subjected to increased competition. While rights provisions are now standard in American FTAs, (7) their incorporation has not been without controversy. The movement to incorporate rights into FTAs is driven by a number of interests, including interests in the United States, international rights movements, and human rights activism. The incorporation of rights in FTAs, however, is often resisted on two main grounds: (1) as an attempt to lower the less-developed countries' comparative advantage of lower wages, and/or (2) as an infringement on the less-developed countries' sovereignty. (8) The integration of trade and has been incremental. For example, the original NAFTA agreement did not include protections; instead, the agreement was negotiated separately from, and subsequent to, the passage of NAFTA. (9) More recently, CAFTA explicitly incorporated rights into the core text, indicating acceptance of the idea that rights and trade should be addressed simultaneously. When one compares the two agreements, however, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) used an eleven-part definition of labor laws that included elimination of ..., (10) while CAFTA reduced the definition to five rights, and excluded employment discrimination from its definition of law. (11) In relation to protections, pregnancy is an issue of growing importance in U.S.-Latin America FTAs. Pregnancy is considered a form of sex discrimination, as it is based on a condition unique to women. (12) This issue first emerged in the NAFTA context following the publication of a 1996 Human Rights Watch report that exposed pervasive pregnancy in maquiladoras in Mexico. (13) In 2004, Human Rights Watch released a report confirming that pregnancy-based was pervasive in the Dominican Republic's free trade zone. (14) Women in both of these countries were, and continue to be, routinely required to undergo pregnancy tests or answer intrusive questions regarding their possible pregnant status as a condition of being hired or maintaining employment. …

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect on January 1, 1994. The agreement is designed to reduce trade restrictions and enhance trade among Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The primary objective of this article is to examine and estimate the impact of NAFTA on the trade between Mexico and the United States. The data from 1989 to 1998 were used to estimate the overall trade as well as trade in three important products. The trade statistics were divided into two time periods: 1989-1993, before NAFTA, and 1994-1998, after NAFTA. The regression analysis and statistical t-test were employed to determine whether there were significant differences in the dollar volume of trade between the two time periods. The analysis of the data demonstrates that the trade between the United States and Mexico was significantly larger after NAFTA, which could not be attributed to other factors. However, the effects of other factors were analyzed. The success of the NAFTA model may have future policy implications in forging a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the near future.

The ambitious project to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that once elicited so much enthusiasm among hemispheric governments is now moribund. The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has had a direct impact on the energy sector by extending commitments made in the 1988 Canada-United States (U.S.) During the course of the FTAA negotiations, Caribbean Common Market and Community (CARICOM) emerged as a strong advocate of special and differential treatment to overcome perceived vulnerabilities arising from the particularly small size of the economies of many of its member states and susceptibility to natural disasters. Current regional economic integration projects throughout the Western Hemisphere provide a solid foundation upon which to rest the energy security pillar of the proposed Community of the Americas. The protection offered workers and the environment in most Latin American countries is found at both the national and regional level.Keywords: Caribbean Common Market and Community (CARICOM); economic integration projects; FTAA; North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Western Hemisphere

At the 1994 Summit of the Americas, leaders of democratic nations in the Western Hemisphere committed to establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005. The Declaration of Principles resulting from that Summit called for building on “existing sub-regional and bilateral arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements together.” Although ambitious, this endeavor was undertaken during a decade marked by an unprecedented proliferation of trade agreements. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay agreed to initiate the formation of a common market now known as the MERCOSUR. Then in 1994, Canada, Mexico and the United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement which replaced the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Later that year, nations around the world formalized the existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, creating the World Trade Organization. In 1997, the Andean Community of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela formalized its plans to establish a common market. Members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market also agreed in several protocols to further their economic and social integration. During the 1990's, numerous other trade agreements were negotiated, and their development continues at the same rapid pace today.

International trade agreements are reshaping economies around the world by allowing freer flow of investments, goods and services. Energy and electricity products have the particular characteristic of ranging over both good and service classifications. How is electricity, in particular, treated within these trade agreements, which clearly distinguish between goods and service sectors? How can the electricity sector be affected by new agreements? We answer these questions with a specific focus on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). We start in section 2 by setting the international trade context and then study, in section 3, how electricity is considered in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in the FTAA. An analysis on the possible consequences of the FTAA on the electricity sector is made in section 4.

This book examines the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an ambitious venture in regional market integration which builds on the principles of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It assesses the long-term corporate and public policy measures to cope with the increased monetary, fiscal and structural interdependence that will be required if the benefits of the FTAA are to be realized.

En este ensayo se analiza el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) como modelo de integración para el proceso negociador del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA). Mediante un examen de la evolución de la propuesta de integración hemisférica, se considera el proyecto estadounidense de ampliar el modelo de integración que inspiró la creación del TLCAN, al resto de América Latina y el Caribe. De igual manera, se analiza la reacción de los países del Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), que bajo el liderazgo de Brasil han rechazado la pretensión de Estados Unidos de imponer el modelo TLCAN. En una primera parte del artículo, se estudian los diferentes modelos comerciales e intervencionistas de integración regional, en particular la Unión Europea y el regionalismo abierto de la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL). En la segunda parte, se evalúa el TLCAN como un nuevo modelo que tiene aspiraciones más ambiciosas que los tradicionales modelos comerciales. Se considera luego el debate sobre los modelos en el contexto de las negociaciones del ALCA y la respuesta del Mercosur. Finalmente, se concluye con algunas reflexiones sobre el destino del ALCA y la necesidad de que Estados Unidos reconozca la existencia de propuestas distintas al modelo TLCAN, requisito para una satisfactoria conclusión del proceso negociador.

El Tratado de Libre Comercio de Norte América (ALCA) parece haber logrado sus objetivos sin planes adicionales para continuar negociando otras provisiones para el tratado. Sin embargo, con la intención de seguir avanzando el comercio de Norte América, el nuevo Tratado de Libre Comercio para las Américas o FTAA por sus siglas en ingles, es un acuerdo comercial sumamente ambicioso que entrelaza una amplia cantidad de economías diversas en tamaño, desarrollo, desempeño y filosofía. Esto aumenta su complejidad y también la probabilidad de que fracase. Este documento señala las áreas donde se espera que haya dificultades en las negociaciones y provee sugerencias basadas en lo que se ha aprendido de la experiencia con el ALCA que será relevante para el FTAA.

It is now more than 30 years since the launch of the bilateral:anada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), predecessor to the multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the (now abandoned) Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). For a generation, these "free trade" initiatives provided an important part of the framework in which political movements developed in Canada, engendering debates and controversies which continue to this day. When a new moment of trade politics emerged with Donald Trump's challenge to NAFTA, some veterans from those earlier anti-free trade battles were unable to see the new, white nationalist terrain upon which Trump was operating. This article - organized principally around the author's own engagement with the anti-free trade movements of the 1980s - suggests that this inability to see clearly the new context of anti-free trade politics was rooted in the incomplete and contradictory left-nationalist theory which underpinned most anti-free trade politics of that earlier era. The article suggests that while there are national questions in Canada - in particular those associated with Indigenous peoples and with Quebec - the attempt to articulate a parallel "national question" in Canada as a whole has proven to be impossible.

Since the early 1990s, North Americans have participated in a large political-economic experiment in a regional trade bloc called the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). With NAFTA now over 10 years old, the non-NAFTA countries have been debating the merits and shortcomings of creating an expanded version of the trade agreement that would encompass virtually every state in the Americas. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would encompass 34 western hemisphere countries, over 800 million consumers, and a total economy of over $12 trillion. The debate over the FTAA raises a long list of important practical questions for each of the potential member states and their citizens. The debate also raises a host of pedagogical questions for students of the entire region and beyond. This paper describes a student-based simulation that taps into those practical and pedagogical questions. As in other simulations, such as the Model United Nations, students role-play while vicariously experiencing the opportunities and constraints facing each country as they negotiate for policy preferences.

OVERVIEW In the wake of the global economic turmoil of 1997–98, the Clinton administration aggressively pursued the use of international financial institutions as a means of stabilizing the turmoil and preventing its recurrence. By contrast, the Bush administration initially downplayed the use of international financial institutions as a means of effectively addressing global economic crises. Both administrations, however, maintained a firm commitment to the development of international trade law and its enforcement. With respect to bilateral trade, the United States sought to tear down foreign trade barriers through a combination of negotiating new bilateral trade agreements and the imposition of economic sanctions, and began the first steps of lifting certain longstanding sanctions against Cuba and Iran. At the same time, the United States pressed forward with the development of its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) program, signing—and in many instances ratifying—BITs with several countries during 1999–2001. With respect to regional trade, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) remained a powerful source of rules governing trade and investment among the three NAFTA states. During 1999–2001, NAFTA survived constitutional challenges in U.S. courts and spawned various decisions clarifying NAFTA rules and standards, particularly as they related to investor–state disputes. In light of NAFTA's success, the United States promoted the idea of a “free trade area of the Americas” in the hope that an agreement could be reached by 2005.

Foreword Preface 1. Potential for Hemispheric Regional Cooperation 2. The Political Economy of Development in Latin America 3. Structural Partnering Potential of the US Economy 4. Economic Integration in North America: Implications for the Americas 5. What Institutional Design for North America? 6. The Future of MERCOSUR 7. The European Experience of Economic Integration 8. Hemispheric Monetary Cooperation 9. Western Hemisphere Energy Development: The Continuing Search for Security 10. Hemispheric Alliance Capitalism and Structural Partnering 11. Developmental Issues Posed by the FTAA 12. The Hemisphere in the International Political Economy Index

As a key actor in two intersecting regional integration projects, Canada's position can arguably reveal much about the complex dynamics of economic integration in the Americas. Canada has undergone a fundamental shift in its economic and foreign policy priorities since the late 1980s that has brought it closer to the hemisphere. After a long history of rejection of a comprehensive free trade relationship with the United States, the Canadian government first sought, and later signed, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which entered into effect in 1989 (against much popular opposition). Canada was a less willing participant in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after Mexico decided to imitate Canada's success in gaining preferential access to the U.S. economy, but the Canadian state has since become a proud NAFTA booster. As well, after belatedly entering into inter-American politics by joining the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, Canada has become one of the most active and prominent countries in promoting a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As discussed elsewhere in this volume, the prominent role of the United States is one of the most controversial aspects of the ongoing process of regional economic integration in the Americas. Can Canada present a "kindler, gentler" face to the economic integration project?KeywordsForeign Direct InvestmentFree TradeTrade AgreementRegional IntegrationEconomic IntegrationThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The political rhythms of pro-free trade coalitions in North and South America seem to be out of sync. After the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, free traders looked like they were on a roll towards expansion throughout the hemisphere. Chile was poised to follow Mexico into NAFTA. Mercosur began to take off. For much of the post-NAFTA period, however, most Latin American governments were more prepared to sign a hemispheric free-trade agreement than the United States was. NAFTA’s persistent domestic political costs blocked President Clinton’s effort to renew fast-track negotiating au-thority. By the time President George W. Bush scraped together a slim congressional majority to regain presidential trade-negotiating author-ity, the political winds in South America had shifted and were empow-ering skeptics in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. By early 2003 negotiations towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas had reached their late middle phase, a timely moment to review research on the political economy of North American economic integration.