Abstract

From 1946–1963, MI5 operated a South-East Asian regional headquarters in Singapore: Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE). This article responds to growing interest in theatre-level intelligence organisation and the importance of intelligence to Britain’s Cold War and decolonisation by examining the performance of SIFE. On the organisational level, SIFE was strongest when it remained wedded to its charter functions and closely adhered to the priorities of its principal consumer: the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia. Its assessments were influential in shaping decision-makers’ understandings of key regional developments, although this did not always translate into public policy. Lastly, SIFE enjoyed success in developing lasting liaison relationships to cement British influence, but failed to utilise these to improve its intake of raw intelligence.

Highlights

  • In 1946, the British Security Service (MI5) created a regional outpost in Singapore: Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE)

  • In SIFE, Morton was replaced by Courtenay Young, a Cambridge Chinese graduate and long-standing MI5 officer who had served as the first Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) with one of SIFE’s key intelligence partners, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

  • After the difficulties arising from the Dalley problem were resolved, the Commissioner-General proactively helped SIFE head of counter-intelligence Alec MacDonald to disseminate their interpretation to local intelligence agencies by sponsoring a regional intelligence conference in April 1949.96 This indicates some success for SIFE in helping MacDonald see past more parochial concerns relating to intelligence production in Malaya, instead appreciating the value of having SIFE guidance on the Cold War bigger picture

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Summary

Introduction

In 1946, the British Security Service (MI5) created a regional outpost in Singapore: Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE). As Rory Cormac reminds us, ‘the so what question remains’.8 In addition to the lack of study devoted to regional intelligence agencies, the broader area of British Cold War policy in South-East Asia has received comparatively little attention in contrast to other theatres.

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