Metrics as Pseudo Goals of Reforms

Abstract

The article emphasizes the significance of numerical indicators in economic policy and explains the widespread use of metrics as a tool for regulation and control. It highlights the correlation between metrics and the competitive ideology within the neoliberal framework of public administration. Metrics serve as pseudo-goals for the state, and the article delves into the distinctions between actual state goals and these pseudo-goals of regulation. The author provides examples demonstrating the disparities between the outcomes of metric-based management and the missions of public sector organizations, particularly in the realms of science and higher education. Furthermore, the text elucidates the reasons why Key Performance Indicator (KPI) analogues are not fully suitable for the non-profit sector and how they can contribute to an increase in transaction costs. It also explores how metrics can trigger an institutional mechanism of adverse selection, impacting the behavioral strategies of government employees. The article discusses how metrics may lead to the economic decline of the public sector and affect the broader social relations system. Moreover, it outlines a foundational set of axioms embraced by proponents of metrics-based management and outlines the essential conditions for its effective implementation. The article argues that oversimplified interpretations of the role of metrics are misguided and presents arguments regarding their adverse effects on the quality of public services. Finally, the article advocates for accountability in the unwarranted adoption of vertical metrics and a reduction in the number of measurements within the state regulatory system.