Abstract
Questions of methodology are questions of power also in international law. But where are the boundaries of judicial power and methodology to be drawn in identifying the existence of international crimes? And where are they drawn in practice? The book answers the first (normative) question on the basis of the principle of consensus as the basic norm-like sources theory. It argues, inter alia, for a more restrictive use of deductive methods with a primacy of induction. Subsequently, the judicial practice is analyzed on this normative background foil. It reveals problematic assertions (especially with regard to the meta-law) and violations of the principle of consensus. Yet, it also shows a commendable dominance of the inductive method.
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