Method and Melancholy: Aristotle and the defence against Cartesian estrangement

‘Charges that he [John Sergeant] was a disciple of Blacklow [Thomas White] … rest on … unsatisfactory evidence.’ Godfrey Anstruther’s conclusion has not, so far as I know, been directly challenged; so this note aims belatedly to offer some evidence in support of Sergeant’s close Blackloist connections.John Sergeant (1623–1707) is now usually remembered as the leading Catholic protagonist in the ‘Rule of Faith’ debates, though he has also been presented as an informer at the time of the so-called Popish Plot, and as a far from negligible philosopher. It will be argued here that, in both theology and philosophy, he was essentially a follower of Thomas White (1593–1676), leader of the influential faction of English Catholics who derived from his best-knownaliastheir title of ‘Blackloists’; for Sergeant himself, in the words of Bishop Richard Russell quoted in the title, ‘everywhere proclaimed himself White’s disciple’.

Aristotle still had a following among English philosophers in the middle of the seventeenth century. Kenelm Digby, John Sergeant, and Thomas White were all advocates of his doctrines. They were also reformers of Aristotle: writers who wanted to rid the master of the false notions attributed him in scholastic commentaries, and who tried to return to what they took to be the correct interpretation of Aristotelian texts on methodology. White emphasized the need to use experiments to confirm scientific conclusions and to resolve disputes. Sergeant tried to clarify the demonstrative character of Aristotelian explanation. Neither White nor Sergeant was a purist. Often they were willing to invoke non-Aristotelian principles. For example, both adopted the Baconian view that what ultimately justifies science is an improvement of the human condition. Because the Reformers were eclectic, their differences with the so-called modem philosophers are not always clear-cut. John Locke read Sergeant and took him seriously, and he shared the reformers’ respect for Aristotle’s intellect. Again in common with the Aristotelians, he valued the certainty afforded by demonstration. He also believed that experience was the foundation of all our knowledge. In this essay I shall consider in some detail the relation of Locke to Sergeant. I shall show that while Sergeant’s and Locke’s views agree more than might have been expected, their disagreements bear out the classification of Locke as a modern.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

678 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER 1991 Nadler accomplishes very well the first half of his program. He carefully analyzes Arnauld's and Malebranche's theories of perception and makes several convincing claims about them. For Malebranche, an idea is an object present in the mind representing the outside world to that mind; for Arnauld, an idea is a mental act, not a representative proxy standing between the perceiver and the outside world. Nadler argues that Arnauld's theory faithfully interprets Descartes and provides a foundation for a direct realist theory of perception. Moreover, he places Arnauld's account of intentionality within the tradition of late Scholastic doctrines to which they are indebted. He also argues that, in the light of Arnauld's developments of Cartesian theories, one can see that the attribution by some modern commentators to Descartes of the historical roots of contemporary epistemic problems is mistaken. Nadler develops his theses skillfully, paying close attention both to the primary texts and to the important secondary literature ; he not only discusses the readings of Lennon, Watson, and Yohon, but also those of Guerouh, Robinet, and Rodis-Lewis. Nadler's historico-philosophical analysis is disappointing, though. Except for some very interesting but brief comments in Chapter 2 about Arnauld's views on the Eucharist , the historico-philosophical analysis is basically relegated to a five-page appendix ("The theological debate," pp. 179-85). This is regrettable, as is the decision to focus the debate on just Arnauld and Malebranche. As Nadler himself would agree, the late seventeenth-century debate about ideas was not merely a series of abstract arguments about representationalism, realism, etc. Arnauld's purpose in the debate was to undermine what he took to be the foundations of a theology he found unacceptable. But Arnauld remains an enigma. What is one to make of the brilliant theologian who early on constructed the most interesting critique of Descartes (including a devastating critique of Descartes's account of the Eucharist), but who later became a wholehearted and enthusiastic Cartesian, in spite of the feebleness of Descartes's responses and the general anti-Cartesianism and anti-intellectualism of his associates at Port-Royal? What is one to make of an acute thinker who does not see any conflict among Augustinism, Jansenism, and Cartesianism? In sum, Nadler's work is a fine preliminary study of a major intellectual event of the late seventeenth century. Readers will find extremely useful its careful development of various philosophical positions, but there is still room for a study of the debate that places it more fully in its intellectual context. ROGER ARIEW Virginia PolytechnicInstitute and State Universit,~ Nicholas Jolley. The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes . New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 199o. Pp. x + 2o9. $39.95In The Light of the Soul, Jolley proposes a new account of the development of seventeenth-century theories of ideas, focusing on the views of Descartes, Male- BOOK REVJZWS 679 branche, and Leibniz. He argues that the course of early modern discussions of the nature of ideas can best be understood as a debate over whether ideas are to be conceived as mental items with temporal and causal properties (what he calls the "psychologistic" conception), or as eternal, abstract objects (the "logicist" conception). According toJolley, Descartes's writings contain elements of both these views, although for the most part the psychologistic appears to dominate. The tensions inherent in Descartes's position are clearly detected by Malebranche, who comes down firmly on the side of the Iogicist conception. Malebranche is thus a Cartesian supporter who nevertheless rejects "the fundamental Cartesian tendency to classify everything nonphysical as mental" (3). Instead Malebranche defends a view of ideas as abstract objects, a position he elaborates in his theory of vision in God. Leibniz, by contrast, under the influence of his nominalism, opts for a psychologistic conception of ideas, and this significantly shapes his treatment of innate ideas and self-knowledge. In a final chapter , Jolley briefly discusses how Locke, Berkeley, and Reid align themselves on this issue; and he suggests that with Reid the debate largely comes to an end until it is...