Metaphysical Vagueness, Identity of Legal Cases, and the Rule of Law

Abstract

In the paper, I address a little-reflected area: the influence of metaphysical vagueness on law. The purpose of this article is to make at least a partial investigation concerning the identity of legal cases precisely in the context of metaphysical vagueness. I do so specifically by analysing the challenge that, as Diana Raffman argues, is posed by the metaphysical vagueness to the rule of law principle. I oppose the construction of a metaphysical soritical series underlying the challenge by using Evans’s argument, which, when interpreted standardly, at least theoretically always allows for a distinction between legal cases, thereby blocking the possibility of constructing a metaphysical soritical series and thus the challenge itself. Subsequently, I try to answer the question whether Raffman can avoid the conclusion of Evans’s argument, which is problematic for her in the context of the law. However, Parsons’ well-known solution is found to be inapplicable on the grounds that it would lead to a radical and perhaps undesirable revision of the theory of legal cases, which Raffman, moreover, does not pursue. The contribution of the article lies in opening up the debate on the impact of metaphysical vagueness on the theory of legal cases and in arguing for a rather sceptical position regarding the implications of metaphysical vagueness, as well as in supporting the metatheoretical position of those authors who believe that philosophical theories can have important implications for arguments in legal theory, in this instance specifically the theory of legal cases.