Meta-Invariant Structure in Stimulus Arrays: A Response to Mace's Zetetic Challenge to Ecological Perceptual Researchers

Abstract

ABSTRACTEcological perception, per James Gibson's theory, avows that perception depends on informative structure in stimulus arrays, where information is defined as stimulus array invariants. Gibson, however, was somewhat vague about the nature of such structure. Consequently, ecological perceptual research—even acknowledging some remarkable successes—has generally been ad hoc: Lacking principled heuristics, researchers examine array structure, which, by some means, they have come to discover as (or believe to be) informative. Here, I propose a series of heuristic principles potentially useful for the discovery of informative structure in stimulus arrays, with examples to suggest how those principles might apply. The major benefit of principled search for stimulus array invariants is more efficient elaboration of their function in perception. While admittedly preliminary, the principles outlined may both guide perceptual investigations and prompt additional consideration of how to approach the search for stimulus array invariants.