Abstract
We investigate an intriguing strategy where rival content platforms jointly launch a membership bundle that allows consumers to access both of their platforms at a reduced price. We highlight that this approach transforms the platform relationship from pure competition to coopetition. Using a game-theoretical model, we show how a membership bundle significantly influences additional content distribution and acquisition outcomes and the associated welfare implications. We further undertake various extensions to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. We enrich the understanding of platform coopetition and derive practical implications with relevance for both platforms and content providers.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.