Abstract
The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities. On the other hand, since property rights define the distribution of wealth and political power in a society, changes in property rights structures are likely to be influenced by more than pure efficiency considerations. Therefore, in order to achieve a balanced analysis of the evolution of property rights institutions, the model of endogenous property rights creation should be modified. We did that by introducing the neoinstitutional theory of the state in the model.
Highlights
The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities
Ključne reči: Endogen razvoj svojinskih prava, Zatvorenikova dilema, Kooperacija, Egzogen razvoj svojinskih prava, Neoinstitucionalna teorija države JEL: P26, D72
Summary
Svojinskopravni sistem ima karakteristike javnog dobra tako da je za njegovu izgradnju potrebna određena vrsta dobrovoljne kolektivne akcije. U našem slučaju to bi moglo, između ostalog, da znači da svojinska prava ne bi uopšte bila definisana ili ne bi bila dovoljno zaštićena ukoliko bi mehanizmi zaštite bili privatnog karaktera, odnosno bili zasnovani na nekoj vrsti dobrovoljne kolektivne akcije. U okviru teorije igara apstraktna formulacija problema kooperacije prilikom proizvodnje javnih dobara data je u vidu tri igre: zatvorenikova dilema, igre pilića i igre sa garancijom. Pri tom većina teoretičara smatra da u igri pilića, a posebno u igri sa garancijom postoji veća verovatnoća za nastajanje kooperacije nego u igri zatvorenikova dilema. U našem primeru svaki igrač ima dva izbora na raspolaganju: saradnju (S) i nesaradnju (N) sa drugom stranom prilikom definisanja svojinskih prava. U tabeli 1 data je jednostavna igra sa dva igrača koji su suočeni sa problemom definisanja svojinskih prava nad komadom zemlje
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