Martin Heidegger: reflexes of the picture of the world (be continued)

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Some thoughts by the tánaiste (deputy leader of the government), Mary Harney, are instructive here: ‘I have to say we have a new breed of university president now […] many of them are from the same background […] they have a scientific background which is wonderful.’ Complaining that academics are timewasters who do not care for what they do as they have permanent jobs, she outlines how these presidents will bring the new dawn: ‘Gerry Wrixon (University College Cork [hereafter UCC] president, 2000‐) is right, and I agree totally with him on the need to buy into the new vision of excellence and of everybody being accountable’ (both statements in ‘A New Breed of President’, UCC News [September 2004], p.1). Universities have been isolated from work: ‘we need a lot of reform in the university structure and how people are awarded tenure […] keeping people in touch with the real world […] and not just working for industry here, but working for industry globally’ (p.2). How is this going to happen? ‘What we want is a powerful Dáil/Oireachtas [parliamentary] Committee that will scrutinize what is happening, both from a policy perspective and an expenditure perspective’ (p.2). You would be forgiven for thinking Ireland is in a disastrous state, with vast unemployment and poverty ravaging the land, but oddly enough, even from an instrumentalist perspective, this supposedly malfunctioning education system has assisted enormous economic growth over a long period. 2. Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1989); De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Flammarion, 1990). 3. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Self‐Assertion of the German University’, in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1993), pp.29–39 (p.37). ‘Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität’, in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp.107–17. 4. Martin Heidegger, ‘The University in the New Reich’, in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin, pp.43–5. 5. Éamonn Sweeney, ‘The Challenge of Managing Change in a University’, in University College Cork as a Learning Organisation, ed. Áine Hyland (University College Cork, 2004), pp.134–42 (pp.134–5). UCC president Wrixon actually takes credit from creating a sense of crisis: writing of the ‘challenges and changes of the last four years’ (i.e. his tenure) and ‘UCC facing a period of enormous and unprecedented change’ (Wrixon, ‘Foreword’, in Hyland [ed], p.4). He could have added ‘unwarranted’. The Irish government funds such self‐publication handsomely. 6. See ‘Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger’, in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin, pp.91–116. The interview took place in 1966, but was only published after his death, in 1976. 7. For a useful summation and investigation of the question of how Heidegger's relation to the university in the context of Nazism has been understood, see Iain Thompson, ‘Heidegger and the Politics of the University’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 41:4 (2003), pp.515–42. For a sense of how Heidegger's relation to Nazism has been dealt with, see Richard Wolin, ed, The Heidegger Controversy; and Günther Neske and Emile Kettering eds, Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers (New York: Paragon House, 1990). 8. See Martin Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save Us’, pp.97–101. Whilst it is in his interest to emphasize certain actions, or even to fabricate a retrospective position of defiance, see also François Fédier, ‘Revenir à plus de décence’, in Martin Heidegger, Écrits politiques, 1933–1966 (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), pp.9–96, and pp.81–3 in particular, on his very specific refusals to carry out Nazi policies. 9. Derrida, Of Spirit, p.39, trans. slightly modified. Heidegger is happy enough to use the vocabulary of this ideology though: ‘the forces that are rooted in the soil and blood of a Volk’ (‘Self‐Assertion’, pp.33–4); ‘seiner erd‐ und bluthaften Kräfte’ (Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.112). 10. Martin Heidegger, ‘Self‐Assertion’, pp.30–1. 11. ‘L'université allemande envers et contre tout elle‐même’, in Martin Heidegger, Écrits politiques, pp.97–110. 12. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.34 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.113]. 13. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.34. 14. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.34. 15. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.35 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.114]. 16. For further references to this view of science, see Thompson, ‘Heidegger and the Politics of the University’, p.531. 17. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.30 and p.35 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.108 and p.114]. 18. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.29. 19. Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.107. Derrida picks up on the word ‘Gepräge’ [stamp] to note that the mark is always connected with force (Of Spirit, p.34; De l’esprit, p.47). The stamp that conveys authenticity is a central part of the non‐concepts of ‘quality’ and ‘excellence’. 20. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.34 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.112]. 21. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.37 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.115]. 22. Other things listed in dictionaries as capable of being ‘echt’ are diamond, leather, silk, Burgundy wine, pearls, Persian carpet, Rembrandt, stone, crystal glasses, cream, blonde. 23. See Martin Heidegger, Écrits politiques, p.107, for example. 24. ‘National Socialist Education’, in The Heidegger Controversy, ed. Richard Wolin, pp.55–60 (p.58); ‘Zur Eröffnung der Schulungskurse für die Notstandarbeiter der Stadt an der Universität’, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, pp. 232–7 (p.235). Without wishing to absolve Heidegger from his clear initial support for Hitler and Nazism, there are clear issues in how the texts of the 1930s are presented in this volume – they are selective, they over‐emphasize a word which carries, since Nazism, a sinister and purely racialist resonance (Volk), and in this case, a highly directive title is imposed to emphasize (or perhaps we should say exaggerate?) Heidegger's actual position in relation to Nazism. 25. Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.237. ‘True strength’ in ‘National Socialist Education’ (p.60), ‘sa force de bon aloi’ in Écrits politiques (p.141). 26. Martin Heidegger, ‘Wege zur Aussprache’, in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 13 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), pp.15–21 (p.15). 27. ‘Philosophy is knowledge without immediate utility, but nonetheless the ultimate knowledge of the essence of things. The essence of Being remains that which is most worthy of questioning’ [‘Philosophie ist das unmittelbar nutzlose, aber gleichwohl herrschaftliche Wissen vom Wesen der Dinge. Das Wesen des Seienden bleibt jederzeit das Frag‐würdigste’ (Heidegger, ‘Wege zur Aussprache’, p.18)]. 28. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.32 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.110]. 29. ‘Self‐Assertion’, p.34 [Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, p.113]. 30. ‘Der deutsche Student als Arbeiter’, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, pp.198–208 (p.201). 31. In the world of ‘teaching excellence’, there is a shadow of this questioning, as the teacher ‘reflects’ on his or her practice (which apparently nobody ever did before), often through compiling a teaching portfolio. This ‘reflection’ though is not a questioning as Heidegger envisaged it. In this new world, research is frowned upon, unless it is a ‘scholarship of teaching’. Hyland writes that ‘a key element of learning organisations is that practitioners are themselves enquirers, rather than passive recipients of the expertise of other researchers’ (‘Introduction’, in Hyland [ed], pp.5–9 (p.5)). This is a bizarre view of research, but it is the ‘enquiring’ that interests me here. This enquiry (about ‘my’ practice, conducted according to Carnegie Foundation ideology) is a substitute for questioning, a turning away from questioning that doubles back and takes the place of that Heideggerian questioning. The term ‘learning organisation’, surprisingly, does not refer to the university's business of teaching and research, but its capacity to learn about itself. 32. Martin Heidegger, ‘Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft’, in Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers, ed. Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggler, pp.5–27 (p.9); Heidegger, ‘La menace qui pèse sur la science’, in Écrits politiques, pp.167–92. ‘Wissen’ and variants are much closer to the French ‘savoir’ which partially includes science but also knowing in a wider sense. 33. Martin Heidegger, ‘Die Bedrohung’, p.10. 34. ‘Gang und Gäbe’ (‘Die Bedrohung’, p.19). 35. Martin Heidegger, ‘Die Bedrohung’, p.21. 36. Karl Marx, Capital Vol I (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 205. 37. Bettie Higgs, ‘The Reflective Co‐ordinator’, in Hyland [ed], pp.27–30 (p.29). 38. As I write this, one of the vice‐presidents of UCC has sent an email, to all staff, admonishing those who criticize ‘blackboard’ software's usefulness, without having attended the correct fora where this would be ‘debated’ – and the correct response, no doubt, achieved. 39. Bettie Higgs, ‘The Reflective Co‐ordinator’, p.29. 40. Bettie Higgs, ‘The Reflective Co‐ordinator’, p.29. The positing of a university in crisis is only the prelude to resolving that crisis through our soon‐to‐be‐unified will: ‘There is an excitement about teaching in UCC [due to awards for excellence, participation in ‘teaching and learning’ seminars that started out as voluntary and are now key for promotions]. The ripples that were started in 2001 have become a mini tidal wave, washing over the institution. Staff [the believers] are leading the changes themselves, and everyone has something to offer and something to gain. It is clear that there is no going back’ (Higgs, ‘The Reflective Co‐ordinator’, p.30). The enthusiastic rallying call ends in a note of clear menace, with, unspoken, the prospect of people having something to lose. Higgs is not simply describing something that has occurred in UCC; she is part of what Graham Allen has noted about the ‘nowness’, the call for action now, that pervades the scholarship of teaching literature. In the perpetual ‘now’ of crisis and self‐analysis, it (the ‘scholarship of teaching’ culture) can congratulate itself on its gains, and celebrate its future progress (Graham Allen, ‘You Are Here. The Time of Teaching’, in Language – Text – Bildung/ Sprache – Text – Bildung: Essays in Honour of Beate Dreike/Essays für Beate Dreike, ed. Andreas Stuhlmann, Patrick Studer and Gert Hofmann (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 233–49 (p.235). 41. In Heidegger's period as rector of the University of Freiburg, attempts were made to get academics involved in labour camps, and workers into the universities – a development of which Heidegger seems to have been strongly in favour (see ‘The Call to the Labour Service’, in Wolin [ed], pp.53–5, ‘National Socialist Education’ and also his call to the labour service ‘Der Ruf zum Arbeitsdienst’, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 16, pp.238–9, among others). 42. Mary Lawlor, of Fás, email communication, 29/04/04. 43. Not everyone will be eligible, not everyone's excellence is acceptable to the Empire – as seen in the 1936 Olympics. 44. It is infinitely easier and more valuable to police the employed, who often welcome the chance to be disciplined, than the unemployed. As Foucault told us in Discipline and Punish (London: Allen Lane, 1977), surveillance and control are only marginally about the outsiders, the criminals and delinquents. 45. Mary Lawlor, Fás, email communication, 29/04/04. 46. Freudians will of course enjoy this figure, but should be aware it is parodic, para‐Freudian. In a figure of so many reversals, it could even be seen as representing a ‘potency complex’. 47. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Basic Writings (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1993), pp.143–202 (p.170). The text derives from lectures in 1935–36. 48. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p.167. Independence as total entanglement, but where the entanglement already undoes itself.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Laotse, Tao Te Ching, trans. Derek Lin (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2006), p.29. 2 Dgen, ‘Uji’, Sh b genz , trans. Eid Shiman Rshi and Charles Vacher (Fourgeres: encre marin, 1997), p.51. 3 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p.92. 4 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), p.94. 5 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 1971), p.176. 6 Michael Hardt and Antoni Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 7 Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.219; translation modified. 8 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p.151. 9 Karl Marx, Capital, p.151. 10 Martin Heidegger, On The Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), pp.1-54. 11 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.334; translation modified. 12 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 170 13 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p.173. 14 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p.340. 15 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p.170. 16 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, pp.187-188. 17 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), p.166. 18 The difference between negation and nihilation can perhaps be thought in the following way. Nihilation is neither positive nor negative, and refers instead to the force of das Mögliche, of that which has the force, or the ability, to open, always futurally, the play of possibilities. Negation comes into play, so to speak, within this already opened realm of the possible, specifically at the moment when what is possible is let be valid. Negation ‘becomes possible’ when being comes to stand as a being, and thus to have a value of presence (or absence) and the validity of being present. In short, in its clearing or emptying, nihilation renders negation, as well as positing and affirmation, possible. The distinction here is between the force of rendering possible, which frees the futural and emptying play of time-space, and the force of negativity, which works in relation to what has already been allowed to stand as a being. 19 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p.336. 20 Dgen, ‘Uji’; Dgen, ‘Bush’, Sh b genz , trans. Eid Shiman Rshi and Charles Vacher (Fougeres: encre marin, 2002). 21 Dgen, ‘Bussh’, p.17. 22 Dgen, ‘Uji’, p.49. 23 Dgen, ‘Uji’, p.85. 24 Dgen, ‘Bussh’, p.163. 25 Dgen, ‘Bussh’, p.47. 26 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World, p.71.

Derrida on Heidegger’s opposition, in Being and Time, to the metaphysics of subjectivity, Heidegger’s notion of man as asking the question of Being, as ek-sistence, as leaping beyond the ontic to the ontological; Heidegger’s rejection of notions, such as consciousness, soul, and spirit, associated with the metaphysics of subjectivity; Derrida on Heidegger’s celebration of spirit in the 1933 “Rectorship Address,” and his ongoing inquiry into spirit from that point on; spirit as the ‘flaming hearth’ of Heideggerian discourse; Heideggerian spirit’s connection to the question of Being, to world, to earth and blood, to resoluteness; Derrida on spirit in Heidegger’s readings of Schelling and Holderlin; Derrida’s deconstructive reading of spirit in Heidegger’s essay on Trakl; spirit as identified with doubling, difference, and writing; the blurring of Heidegger’s hierarchical distinctions between spirit’s inside and outside, proper and improper spirit, spirit as air and spirit as fire; metaphysical spirit as an ineluctable ghost that haunts Heidegger’s attempts to escape it; spirit as trace, as differance; despite deconstructing the elements of Heidegger’s thought on spirit, Derrida avoids deconstructing its overall logocentric structure; Derrida avoids linking the various steps in Heidegger’s argument for the animality of Germany’s Other; Derrida avoids uncovering the underlying metaphysical structure of Heidegger’s discussion of spirit, and its political consequences; Derrida avoids linking Heidegger to Nazism directly; Derrida avoids acknowledging Heidegger’s guilt; Derrida’s appropriation of Heidegger’s arguments for his own philosophical purposes: to show how Heidegger’s reflections on origin lead to Derrida’s differance; Derrida avoids acknowledging the metaphysical nature, hierarchical structure, and violence, of Heidegger’s thought on difference; Heidegger does, yet doesn’t, transgress metaphysics: his hierarchy of differences retains propriety as a metaphysical value; hierarchical thinking is manifest even in Heidegger’s 1953 essay on Trakl, though couched in eschatological language; failure of Derrida’s putative extrication of the Trakl essay from the racist context of Heidegger’s thought on spirit.

Why are Martin Heidegger’s texts so difficult to translate? Several complicated answers might be given to this simple-seeming question. (1) Because Martin Heidegger’s texts employ a quirky, highly eccentric, idiosyncratic German dialect (Swabian? Friesian? Or maybe just Heideggerian?) that can’t easily be imitated (without risk of travesty or parody) in a comparable English dialect. (2) Because Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently rely on elaborate etymological word-play and elusive esoteric punning on Old High German words (Wahren, Walten, Wesen, etc.) or even contemporary German expressions (l ike the quintessentially Heideggerian Dasein/das Sein/das Sein des Seienden, etc.) which can’t be duplicated in the English lexicon. (3) Because Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently proceed by breaking down (“de-construct-ing,” ab-bauen) even the simplest German words (for example: bauen: Old High German buan, buri, buren, beuren, beuron, etc.) and twisting and distorting them (the essential meaning of one of Martin Heidegger’s favorite verbs: verwinden) to make them disclose strange meanings and obscure, unfamiliar senses previously un-heard of in those German words. After the controversy surrounding Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly’s notoriously unreadable translation of the Beitrage zur Philosophie, the contemporary translator might do well to contemplate these difficulties before embarking on the task of translating Martin’s Heidegger’s difficult texts. But the simple answer is: Martin Heidegger’s texts are difficult to translate because they’re difficult texts! even in the twentieth century German original in which they are written (which is obviously not Goethe’s German! naturlich!). And an English translation of Martin Heidegger’s difficult texts is bound to be as challenging, as difficult (and, sometimes, as obscure) as Martin Heidegger’s texts themselves. Which doesn’t mean that the contemporary translator should simply give up on the difficult texts as incomprehensible or un-translatable. But the translator should realize, in translating these difficult texts, it’s probably not possible to reduce them to a simple, straightforward, unequivocal translation; to a simple-minded crib or definitive gloss; or to what’s called, in the Western tradition of “Great Authors,” an authorized translation; even when that translation is authorized by the twentieth century’s Greatest Philosopher: Martin Heidegger himself. And so, because Martin Heidegger’s texts are difficult (beyond most texts) to translate, it’s maybe uncharitable to find fault with Andrew J. Mitchell’s translation of Martin Heidegger’s Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking. This is one of Heidegger’s most difficult collections because it contains some of his most inscrutable, elusive texts (like “Das Ding”) which carry his cryptical, elliptical word-play to strange heights (or depths?) of paradoxical simplicity and abstrusity (simple example: Das Ding dingt: the thing things) and, at the same time, also contains some of Martin Heidegger’s most directly political texts (like “Die Gefahr”), wherein Martin Heidegger (for maybe the only time after his brief controversial endorsement of the German National Socialist Party and its Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler, in 1933) discusses diffi-

This thesis examines the question of ethics in the thought of Martin Heidegger, focusing especially on his earlier works. While set against the backdrop of the ongoing controversy over Heidegger’s associations with National Socialism and the idiosyncratic anti-Semitism of passages in the recently published Schwarze Hefte, the thesis is not offered as a contribution to that debate, especially as it relates to its biographical content. Rather, the focus is on the extent to which the “fundamental ontology” Heidegger develops in the 1920s makes a serious contribution towards what I have referred to (with a nod to Frederick Olafson), as Heidegger’s ‘ontological ground of ethics’. In doing so, I explicitly take up Heidegger’s later claim (in his famous Brief uber den 'Humanismus) that “If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ἦθος, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being … is in itself originary ethics [ursprungliche Ethik].” (GA9: 356). As such, the thesis looks to examine a web of ideas in early Heideggerian texts of the 1920s that provide a compelling case for such an originary ground of ethics, in the sense of a condition of possibility for moral normativity. Of course, such a ground cannot be understood as a traditional metaphysical foundation, for like Dasein itself, it is an Ab-grund, a groundless ground, a factical ground. For this ethical ground is eventually nothing other than Dasein itself, a being that, as thrown, “never [has] … power over [its] ownmost Being from the ground up,” but must rather take on the ground of its dwelling (ἦθος) in the world. The thesis proceeds by examining four inter-related themes in the early Heidegger that I suggest interweave in providing what Heidegger refers to in Sein und Zeit (in terms of one of these themes), as “the existential conditions for the possibility of … morality in general, and for the possible forms which this may take factically.” (SZ: 286). The first chapter explores Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s notion of φρόνησις, as a lens through which the other three themes – Gewissen (chapter two), Eigentlichkeit (chapter three) and Mitsein (chapter four) – might be read most effectively for this purpose. In the light of Heidegger’s reading of φρόνησις as a practical skill for discerning the best way of acting in relation to factically available possibilities, Dasein can be understood as an ontologised ix version of Aristotle’s φρόνιμος. This phronetic Dasein’s deliberative action is tailored to a desired end (τέλος); that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνeκα) it acts. In this way, ethics is grounded not as a ‘science’ of definite knowing (eπιστήμη, or as a τέχνη), but as phronetic skill and understanding. In this light, Heidegger’s analyses of Gewissen, Eigentlichkeit, and Mitsein are inherently phronetic, and the abyssal ground of ethics that emerges is thoroughly hermeneutical. In his presentation of the authentic “call” of conscience, Heidegger provides an account of “the ontological foundations of … the ordinary way of interpreting conscience” (SZ: 314,) thereby distinguishing the ontological condition of possibility of conscience from its existentiell actualisation in the experience of moral normativity. His account of Eigentlichkeit, far from providing an egoistic (indeed Cartesian) understanding of Dasein’s ‘authentic’ self, can then be read as an analysis of emancipatory resoluteness. Dasein as φρόνιμος, in taking on its destiny and fate (that are not of its own making), emerges as an engaged Being-in-the-world-with- others, “free[ed] for its world.” (SZ: 344). This then leads into an analysis of Heidegger’s account of Mitsein: of Dasein as Being-in-the-world-with-others. Here I build on Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation of Dasein as irreducibly (if paradoxically) “singular plural,” in which the I of Dasein is absolutely equiprimordial (or “co-originary”) with the ‘we.’ I show how this assessment is consistent with the text of Sein und Zeit, and how this branches into Heidegger’s account of Rede and especially Fursorge in terms of Dasein’s authentic “leaping ahead,” as this is attested in freedom and responsibility as well as the ethically profound opening that Heidegger allows to a certain sense of empathy. The thesis conclusion includes a few comments about the significance of the thesis’ findings for contemporary ethics after Heidegger.

This research aims to investigate how Heidegger's thoughts are received in Iran and how the Iranian interpretation of Heidegger has influenced contemporary Iranian thinking. The significance of Heidegger’s philosophy for Iranian thinkers can be due to the fact that Heidegger is the most radical critique of the Western civilization, modernity, and modern rationality. On the one hand, Heidegger’s thought can provide Iranians with the theoretical foundations based on which the Eastern traditions can be reinterpreted and reconstructed. On the other hand, Heideggerian view of the history of philosophy can be used by Iranians as a mirror to see themselves and the whole tradition of Eastern thinking. I also try to provide a sketch of the thought of Ahmad Fardid as the first interpreter of Heidegger in Iran and his influence on some other Iranian thinkers. My main claim is that the religious-spiritual interpretation of Heidegger by Fardid is by no means a distortion of Heidegger’s thoughts but a necessary step towards the academically and scientifically true understanding of Heidegger as the greatest critique of the Western thinking. There are various historical, philological, and interpretive clues in Heidegger’s life and works that make the spiritual (but certainly not theological) interpretation of Heidegger possible. In my opinion, contrary to some claims by Iranian scholars and intellectuals, a secular Heidegger is by no means the true Heidegger, because the secular interpretation is in opposition to the main insight of Heideggerian thought that is overcoming nihilism and forgetfulness of being.

Abstract.This paper is an effort to defend Heidegger's essentialist philosophy of technology against the charge of determinism. Rather than merely accepting its all-encompassing power, Heidegger provides three responses to the challenge of technology: 1) “aggressive essentialism” or the elimination of technology; 2) “moderate essentialism” or the reform of political, social and cultural institutions to better reflect the changes that technology brings; and 3) “passive essentialism” or the acceptance that we cannot act against or direct technology.Résumé.Dans cet article, l'auteur s'efforce de défendre la philosophie d'essentialisme de technologie proposée par Heidegger contre l'accusation de déterminisme. Plutôt que simplement accepter le pouvoir omniprésent de la technologie, Heidegger fournit trois réponses au défi qu'elle présente: 1) “ l'essentialisme agressif ”, ou l'élimination de la technologie; 2) “ l'essentialisme modéré ”, ou la réforme des institutions politiques, sociales et culturelles pour mieux refléter les changements apportés par la technologie; et 3) “l'essentialisme passif ”, ou l'acceptation du fait que nous ne pouvons ni agir contre la technologie ni la diriger.

海德格哲思對高達美詮釋學性的哲思生成發展之影響誠無庸置疑。然而，海德格本身哲思亦有其生成發展亦即，其哲思啟始及其前期《存有與時間》(Sein und Zeit)之基本存有學，其哲思之「轉向」(die Kehre)以及其「轉向」後時期。問題在於，在《真理與方法》(Wahrheit und Methode)一書之哲學詮釋學生成中，到底海德格哲思發展那一部分具關鍵性的效應？在此問題視域下所呈顯的課題脈絡乃在於，高達美詮釋學哲思生成與海德格哲思本身發展的互相關聯與差異。而在此主題意識下，本文主在探討《存有與時間》之基本思路與此思路本身所蘊含「轉向」之傾向對高達美詮釋學哲思生成之影響，以及後者對「基本存有學」(Fundamentalontologie)之詮釋學性的轉化與批判性的攝納，以及此與「轉向」之傾向底關聯。基此題旨，本文首先依海式哲思基源問題一存有問題一來綜觀《存有與時間》之基本構思，亦即「此有」之為「在世存有」底基本構思，以及其基此所發展的方法，詮釋學性的現象學之為思路。其次，將依「基本存有學」之思路綜觀此著作，如是將發現關於此有之解析中的兩條進路以及期間之張力，亦即此有之為在世存有之詮釋學性的現象學解析與此有之為具體性的主體之基本存有學式解析，盼得以褐示海德格為何只完成此構思第一部分之前半部而中途邁向「轉向」之線索。然後本文將由以上對海德格《存有與時問》之整體思路理解其對高達美哲思之啟發以及高達美對其之轉化，亦即在基源問題上由存有問題至真理問題，在思想透觀上由此有之為在世存有及其時間性至效應歷史意識及其歷史性，以及在哲思進路上由詮釋學性的現象學至哲學詮釋學。最後在本文整體脈絡中綜理出兩者哲思生成發展中之動態同異處。

This article deals with the theme of the Sacred in Heidegger' s thought on the basis of E. Brito's work Heidegger et l'hymne du Sacre , Leuven, Peeters, 1999. After an introduction which shows the interest of Heidegger' s thinking on the sacred, the author deals with the structure of the work, then tracks down the dimensions of the Sacred in Heidegger' s thought and finally reflects on the relationship between ethics and the Sacred in Heidegger' s thought. He concludes by pointing out Heidegger' s pertinence to theological thinking itself.

The author tries to analyze the method of Heidegger's early philosophy, that is, Heidegger's phenomenological-hermeneutical method. This subject is accessed bearing in mind Heidegger's understanding of one of the key concepts of phenomenology in general – the notion of intentionality – on the basis of which Heidegger himself builds his own understanding of phenomenology. The analysis of the notion of intentionality begins with Heidegger's insights from History of the Concept of Time and ends with an analysis of the implementation of the concept of intentionality in Heidegger's Being and Time . Afterwards, the autor focuses Heidegger's notions of understanding and hermeneutics, and points out the necessity of the hermeneutical aspect of Heidegger's method.

Gadamer's encounter with the magnetic force of Heidegger's interpretations made him cautious not to become simply a follower of the great master. To maintain his independence, he studied with Paul Friedlander, the great classical philologist. He attained certification in classical philology to teach in the secondary schools, but his true motive was to be able to resist the powerful interpretations of Greek philosophy put forward by Heidegger. Nevertheless, Heidegger remained a major leavening influence on Gadamer's classic, Truth and Method, and Gadamer became a major interpreter of Heidegger's thought, and a constant friend. After a few comparisons between them, I turn to three major philosophers other than Heidegger who contributed concepts to Gadamer's masterwork: Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. Regarding Plato, I point to the emphasis in Gadamer on dialogue and conversation and the concept of eumeneis elenchoi, the respect the opponent that recognizes that he could be right, so they join together in dialogue in quest of the truth. Although there are many other debts to Plato in Gadamer, I point to these two and testify to Gadamer's gifts as a conversationalist and debater. I single out three concepts of Aristotle that Gadamer used: phronesis, mimesis, and tragedy. Phronesis is the practical wisdom that goes beyond calculative reason. It is based not on formulas that can be learned but on experience of life. Mimesis in Aristotle is not just copying, but on a recognition that ultimately conveyed truth about life. Finally, tragedy for Aristotle is not just a structure with six parts but an experience of pity and terror that transformed the perspective of the viewer. This was important in the hermeneutics of Gadamer that looked at the viewer's experience of recognition and application, a participatory experience of the meaning of the action of the tragedy. Gadamer is indebted to Hegel for the historical character of consciousness, the Hegelian dialectic, and the recognition that that art is a sensuous representation of the real. He did not agree with Hegel that art was a thing of the past, and also explained what Hegel meant by this: we no longer saw art as a disclosure of the divine. I mention an experience I had of Heidegger's visit to Heidelberg, where he spoke after Gadamer's lecture rejecting his effort to connect his dialect of clearing and concealing with Hegelian dialectic, because Hegel’s philosophy always ended in absolute knowledge. For the second major part of the lecture, I turn to an analysis of Gadamer's essay on art, The Relevance of the Beautiful (1977), comparable in a way to Heidegger's famous lectures on The Origin of the Work of Art (1936). In the latter work, Heidegger declares his independence of his masterwork and presents art in terms of the tension between earth and world. In Gadamer's essay on art, he goes beyond the Heideggerian emphasis on the ontology of the artwork by seeking to establish the anthropological roots of art in Greek culture. He discusses the roots of all culture in play, the significance of the symbol, and the meaning of religious festivals. But he begins with an analysis of the problem of formulating a theory of art that does justice both to classical art and contemporary nonrepresentational art. In all three elements, play, symbol, and festival, Gadamer finds a foundation for art in the deep roots of our culture as found in the ritual, dance, and tragic plays of ancient Greece.

As one of the most influential philosophers in 20th century, Heidegger is not only acclaimed for his tremendous effort and achievement on contemplating the question of Being(Seinsfrage), which also inspired other great minds in different intellectual domains; he also suffered some of the most severe critiques for his once “lost” in political actions and practices. Although he could return to his own course with a detached and critical attitude, he was still blamed for not willing to admit his own “fault” directly and publicly. Scholars of philosophy, politics and sociology pose different standpoints, interpretations, and judgments toward the so-called “Heidegger’s Case.” Under such background which forms a pre-understanding, this thesis attempts to return to Heidegger’s thinking legacy as such, takes it as the point of departure, and responds to the core problem of the case－the problem of the political. Based on such studying interest, instead of his political stance and assertions, we concentrate on Heidegger’s philosophical efforts－thinking the question of Being－try to find the foundation for his thinking on the political, locate both the end and the way of his thinking on such question. As a result, the thesis is divided into two major parts. The first part answers the following questions with three chapters: How did the question of Being come into Heidegger’s horizon? How and why such question is connected with the question-raiser’s Being-transitive? During the period between 1927’s magnum opus, Being and Time and the early 1930s, how did Heidegger put a philosophical question which asks “Who we are” as a political question? The second part which includes the fourth chapter represents my own attempt. Following the question “Who we are,” I try to sketch out the contour of the political which Heidegger never put aside but contemplate far more than ever known. Finally, I would like to show that, by way of retrieving its origin and making a leap (Ur-sprung) for it, Heidegger’s interpretation and excavation of polis unified his deliberations between Being, the political and “We.” This also provides us a possibility which enable us to take up the question of how to settle ourselves in the world during the age of the flight of Gods and the exhaustion of the earth, anew and constantly.

Teesid: Käesolevas artiklis annan ülevaate filosoofiaprofessor Ülo Matjuse (1942–2023) fenomenoloogilisest mõtlemisest ja tegevusest. Kirjeldan Matjuse kujunemisteed fenomenoloogina, vaatlen tema kirjutatud fenomenoloogia-alaseid tekste, konverentsiettekandeid ning loenguid fenomenoloogilisest filosoofiast. Ülo Matjus oli 1970. aastatest alates üks esimesi fenomenoloogilise filosoofia uurijaid Balti riikides. Ta oli fenomenoloogilise ja olemisajaloolise mõtlemise maaletooja Eestis, selle tõlkija ning õpetaja. Matjuse fenomenoloogia-alane tegevus ei piirdunud aga ainult Eestiga. Ta oli 1970. aastatel seotud Riia fenomenoloogide ringiga ning pidas ettekandeid ka Saksamaal, kohtudes saksa filosoofi Hans-Georg Gadameriga (1900–2002). Ülo Matjuse fenomenoloogia-alased tõlked ja artiklid jäävad kestma ning õpetused jätkuvad tema õpilaste kaudu. The article introduces professor of philosophy, Ülo Matjus (1942–2023) as a phenomenological thinker. Matjus was a professor of philosophy at the University of Tartu from 1992 to 2015. His research was mainly focused on Roman Ingarden’s (1893–1970), Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938), and Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) philosophy, but he also investigated Estonian intellectual history and was an avid bibliophile. He prepared the establishing of the Chair of Intellectual History at the University of Tartu and also studied Estonian book history and published several articles on the topic. This article focuses on Ülo Matjus as a phenomenologist. Ülo Matjus was one of the first phenomenological thinkers and researchers of phenomenological philosophy in the Baltic States in the 1970s and also a member of the Latvian Circle of Phenomenology in the same time period. Matjus started his phenomenological journey in the Soviet Union in the 1970s when Estonia was one of its parts. His earlier articles were written in Russian due to the Russian occupation and the restrictions posed by it in the Baltic States. These—for example the article ‘The Problem of the Being of “Material Things” in E. Husserl’s Phenomenology’ (1988) introduced Roman Ingarden’s and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological thinking to the Soviet intellectuals. His doctoral dissertation was also written in Russian, and was concerned with Roman Ingarden’s aesthetical views on art—its title is The Problem of Intentionality in Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics. The thesis was supervised by professor Leonid Stolovitš (1929–2013) and defended in Riga, Latvia in 1975. Since the 1990s when Estonia restored its independence, Matjus could concentrate more on Martin Heidegger’s thinking. He had an opportunity to meet and talk with Heidegger’s student, the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) in Bonn (in Bad Godesberg) on the symposium ‘On Heidegger’s Philosophical Relevance’ (1989). Matjus participated in the event as a scholarship holder for the Alexander von Humboldt’s Foundation and gave a presentation (Matjus [1989]2004b, 313). In 1993 Matjus also had a conversation with Martin Heidegger’s son Hermann Heidegger (1920–2020) about translation of Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics into Estonian (Matjus 1999, 278–280). Matjus translated several phenomenological texts, for example Heideggers Introduction to Metaphysics and The Origin of the Work of Art into Estonian (1999 and 2002, respectively) and wrote afterwords to the translations. He also translated some articles and presentations by Heiddeger, for example ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ (Estonian in 1989), ‘A Question about Technique’ (1989), ‘Creative Landscape. Why we Stay in Province’ (1989), ‘Spiegel’s Conversation with Martin Heidegger’ (1992) and ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ (1994). He also translated Edmund Husserl’s The Paris Lectures (1993), to which he wrote an introduction entitled ‘Edmund Husserl on the Paths of Descartes’. Matjus taught several courses on phenomenology at the University of Tartu since the 1990s and attended conferences both in Estonia as well as in Latvia and Germany. For example, in 1995/1996–2001/2002 he gave a lecture course “The Basics of Aesthetics” (later “Aesthetics” and “Aesthetics II”) at the University of Tartu, which introduced traditional European philosophical aesthetics and Heidegger’s non-metaphysical aesthetics from The Origin of the Work of Art. In addition, Matjus gave lecture courses entitled ‘Development of Phenomenology and its Basic Problems’ in 1997/1998 and 1999/2000 and ‘Phenomenology from the Estonian Perspective’ (2012/2013, 2013/2014 and 2015/2016). Matjus also gave presentations on phenomenological philosophy, for example, ‘On the Interdisciplinary Origin of Phenomenology’ (2014) and ‘On the Benefits and Harms of Intentionality’ (2010) at the Annual Conferences of Estonian Philosophy. Some of his students have also studied phenomenology—Margit Sutrop (b. 1963), Anne Kokkov (1960–2017) and Juhan Hellerma (b. 1986) wrote their MA theses about phenomenology. Matjus also applied a phenomenological and open-minded attitude (i.e. an attitude without prejudice) in his life. As a professor and phenomenologist, he warned his students what to beware of, and toward which one must hold on to, which is part of phenomenological attitude, but let them stay themselves at the same time. He had respect for his students. He was very supportive and at the same time taught them that you have to find your own way. His teachings now live on through his students.

Two Birds of Paradise in North Holland, 1592: The Gift in the Exotic

The Internet of Things designates a vision of an informationalized world, in which everyday objects are modified through computer technology such as RFID, sensors and sensor systems, tracking systems, or small computer units, giving them additional information or functions and integrating them with their environment. This paper explores the phenomenon of Internet of Things by applying some of the key concepts found in the philosophical works of Martin Heidegger and conducts a critical analysis using Martin Heidegger’s reflections on “world” and “technology” from Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) of 1957, and from the paper “Die Frage nach der Technik” (“The Question Concerning Technology”). The concept of “Ge-stell” introduced by Martin Heidegger to the philosophy of technology describes the situation of mankind and technology in a world shaped by modern technology. Both, mankind and technology, are tied to one dimension and share the same world. The world has been shaped and redesigned by technology, and the individual is completely tied into the technologized world. The basis for all Internet of Things concepts and installations is the expression of real-world things and processes as mathematical quantities and concepts, and the connecting of individual values and concepts with each other. The basis for all information technology is the reduction of reality to figures and calculable structures. Mathematics is the foundation of computer science, and thus the foundation of ubiquitous computing.