Marmosets as model species in neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology

Abstract

Marmosets are increasingly used as model species by both neuroscientists and evolutionary anthropologists, but with a different rationale for doing so. Whereas neuroscientists stress that marmosets share many cognitive traits with humans due to common descent, anthropologists stress those traits shared with marmosets – and callitrichid monkeys in general – due to convergent evolution, as a consequence of the cooperative breeding system that characterizes both humans and callitrichids. Similarities in socio-cognitive abilities due to convergence, rather than homology, raise the question whether these similarities also extend to the proximate regulatory mechanisms, which is particularly relevant for neuroscientific investigations. In this review, we first provide an overview of the convergent adaptations to cooperative breeding at the psychological and cognitive level in primates, which bear important implications for our understanding of human cognitive evolution. In the second part, we zoom in on two of these convergent adaptations, proactive prosociality and social learning, and compare their proximate regulation in marmosets and humans with regard to oxytocin and cognitive top down regulation. Our analysis suggests considerable similarity in these regulatory mechanisms presumably because the convergent traits emerged due to small motivational changes that define how pre-existing cognitive mechanisms are quantitatively combined. This finding reconciles the prima facie contradictory rationale for using marmosets as high priority model species in neuroscience and anthropology.