Maritime security technologies and coastal neo-fortification

This paper seeks to discuss the use of new-age technology for maritime safety and security in the African waters for ensuring economical and effective exploration of sea resources. The paper deals with two main variables - technology and maritime security in African waters. Technology enhances surveillance, communication, information sharing, access control etc. which also decreases marine insecurities. Terrorist activities start on the terrestrial land but eventually make their way to the waters, making the sea a hotspot for illegal activities. This paper seeks to investigate how piracy, illicit oil bunkering, unreported and unregulated fishing, attacks on unmanned submersibles, etc. in the coastal zone of the African continent are major maritime menaces. This impedes the optimum exploration of the sea resources. Innovations in Africa’s maritime security have led to greater regional coordination and cooperation. Moreover, the 5+5 dialogue between North Africa and Southern Europe, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (2013) and the Djibouti Code (2009) are some of the main pillars to this issue. The paper undertakes qualitative and quantitative methodologies to study the problem of terrorism with a special focus on the Gulf of Guinea. The paper contends that though the implementation of science and technology requires massive investment, it is the most favorable path to address security threats at sea and boost sea exploration efforts. Since the technology for effective implementation of maritime security and optimum utilization of sea resources are at a nascent stage of development, much would depend on international cooperation and the development of an international regime.

Despite a hangover from the worldwide economic crisis, international trade rebounded nicely with a record-level growth in late 2010. A sharp rise in international trade has sparked the international traffic growth. A majority of this traffic growth originated from maritime logistics which could move cargoes in large volume and at cheaper freight costs. Due to its cost-efficiency and easy access, maritime logistics typically accounts for more than half of the worldwide freight volume. However, maritime logistics poses a greater supply chain risk, since ocean carriers used for maritime logistics are more vulnerable to unpredictable weather conditions, piracy attacks, terrorist hijacking, and cargo damages on the open sea than any other modes of transportation. Also, given the vast areas that maritime logistics covers, it is more difficult to protect maritime logistics activities from potential hazards and threats.To better protect maritime logistics activities from potential security lapses, this chapter introduces and develops a variety of systematic security measures and tools that were successfully used by best-in-class companies and government entities across the world. Also, this chapter proposes a total maritime security management model as a way to formulate maritime risk mitigation strategies. To elaborate, this chapter sheds light on the roots of maritime security measures and tools, the ways that those measures and tools are best utilized, the roles of advanced information technology in maritime security from the global supply chain perspectives, the visualization and identification of potential maritime and its related supply chain risks, and policy guidelines that will help enhance maritime security.

The increasingly growing and complex maritime security threats identified by the emergence of the Coronavirus outbreak needed to spread quickly. This virus threat can mean Hybrid Warfare and a proxy where this type of threat can be exploited or used by parties who intend to invest their interests in Indonesia. This threat must be the concern of all countries, and cooperation in the sea between countries required in dealing with it. The Indonesian Navy sees the importance of increasing capabilities in using C4ISR technology (Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Recognition) and how to combine it into one unit that can operate in an integrated manner within the Indonesian Navy. The framework of maritime defense and security of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Furthermore, the cooperation of the Navy with all maritime stakeholders is also urgently needed to build pleasing cooperation to realize Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the National area. The importance of Indonesia as a regional maritime security barometer, namely; as a measure of the independence of Indonesia's ability to face maritime security threats, measurable patterns, methods, and technology of Indonesian maritime security forces in dealing with threats, as well as predicting trends in maritime security threats that occur. The Indonesian Navy, as the main component of national defense, is required to carry out capacity building in maritime defense and security so that the defense industry's role is needed to provide and realize C4ISR-based force development.

Background: Remote sensing has become an important technology in monitoring coastline change and maritime security. In this context, the literature highlights the history and understanding of remote sensing, its benefits in defense and security, and its applications in disaster mitigation and environmental management. Shoreline change analysis methods such as Digital Shoreline Analysis System (DSAS) and COASTSAT are also the focus of study to understand effective approaches in shoreline monitoring. Methods: This study used a literature review method to collect and evaluate journal articles, research reports, and official documentation related to remote sensing, maritime defense and security, and shoreline change analysis. The collected data were analyzed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the concepts, applications, and methods related to the research topic. Results: The results of the literature review show that remote sensing plays a crucial role in monitoring shoreline change and maritime security. The benefits include monitoring military activities, disaster mitigation, and coastal environmental management. Moreover, the analysis of shoreline change using the DSAS and COASTSAT methods offers a different yet effective approach in measuring and understanding shoreline change. Conclusion: In order to maintain maritime security and effectively manage shoreline change, collaboration between countries and the utilization of remote sensing technologies are key. This research provides an in-depth understanding of the concepts, benefits and methods related to the topic, and encourages further exploration of the potential of remote sensing in supporting environmental sustainability and regional peace.

The currently growing and complex maritime security threat is marked by the Coronavirus outbreak, which is thought to spread quickly. This virus threat can mean Hybrid Warfare but can also mean proxy where this type of threat can be exploited or used by parties who intend to invest their interests in Indonesia. This threat must be a concern of all countries, and cooperation at sea between countries is needed to overcome it. The Indonesian Navy sees the importance of increasing capabilities in the field of utilizing C4ISR technology (Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, And Recognition) and how to integrate it into a single unit that can operate optimally within the framework of maritime defense and security of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. Furthermore, cooperation with the Navy and all naval stakeholders is also needed to build collaboration in realizing maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the national region. The importance of Indonesia as a barometer of regional maritime security, namely; as a measure of the independence of Indonesia's ability to face naval security threats, measuring patterns, methods, and technology of Indonesia's marine security apparatus in dealing with threats, as well as predicting trends in maritime security threats that occur. As the main component of national defense, the Navy is required to carry out capacity building in marine protection and security, So that the defense i

Depending on the actual demand of maritime security, this paper analyzes the specific requirements of video encryption algorithm for maritime monitoring system. Based on the technology of Internet of things, the intelligent monitoring system of unmanned surface vessels (USV) is designed and realized, and the security technology and network technology of the Internet of things are adopted. The USV are utilized to monitor and collect information on the sea, which is critical to maritime security. Once the video data were captured by pirates and criminals during the transmission, the security of the sea will be affected awfully. The shortcomings of traditional algorithms are as follows: the encryption degree is not high, computing cost is expensive, and video data is intercepted and captured easily during the transmission process. In order to overcome the disadvantages, a novel encryption algorithm, i.e., the improved Hill encryption algorithm, is proposed to deal with the security problems of the unmanned video monitoring system in this paper. Specifically, the Hill algorithm of classical cryptography is transplanted into image encryption, using an invertible matrix as the key to realize the encryption of image matrix. The improved Hill encryption algorithm combines with the process of video compression and regulates the parameters of the encryption process according to the content of the video image and overcomes the disadvantages that exist in the traditional encryption algorithm and decreases the computation time of the inverse matrix so that the comprehensive performance of the algorithm is optimal with different image information. Experiments results validate the favorable performance of the proposed improved encryption algorithm.

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an efficient tool to exchange positioning data among participating naval units and land control centres. It was developed primarily as an advanced tool for assistance to sailors during navigation and for the safety of the life at sea. Maritime security has become a major concern for all coastal nations, especially after September 11, 2001. The fundamental requirement is maritime domain awareness via identification, tracking and monitoring of vessels within their waters and this is exactly what an AIS could bring. This paper will be focused on how the AIS-derived information could be used for coastal security, maritime traffic management, vessel tracking and monitoring with the help of GIS technology. The AIS data used in this paper was collected by the Canadian national aerial surveillance program.

This chapter considers maritime security as it appears at headquarters, considering how container security relates to the national security calculus, and how it is (not) pursued by the responsible state agencies in different national contexts with an emphasis on how to methodologically deploy technology to reduce associated risks. In this context, it proposes the CRAVE (costs, risks, and values evaluation) framework for GTD decisions, including supply chain security. It discusses the role of technology in container security and illustrates the characteristics of container security strategic decisions. Also, it explains the CRAVE framework, including how it can be used to make good decisions in container security.

IBIA welcomes biometric technology in US maritime security

Introduction This chapter discusses how the European Space Agency (ESA) and European space policy (ESP) have sought to make a case for the benefits and synergies that can be gained from working with what is traditionally considered an unrelated area – EU maritime policy and the marine environment. Since the establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in 2002 (Commission 2002), ESA and the ESP have provided support to enable EMSA to carry out its work. This chapter identifies how institutional actors have sought to promote satellite technology and the crucial role it can play in improving the security, safety and environmental protection of the EU’s maritime regions. The development of policies may be in response to the bias or opinions of the policy actor, individually or collectively, resulting in policy areas being transferred from the national to the supranational level (Dudley and Richardson 1999: 226). This might depend, for example: on whether that policy is one-dimensional or multi-dimensional and whether it is the result of individual or collective action to push forward that change (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008: 435-439); on the role of the institutions and actors working towards institutional change and how such change meets the preference of the actors driving it forward (Kohler-Koch 2000: 515); and on how, despite the European Commission being viewed as a coherent and strategic actor, it is a complex organisation that has complex relationships with external actors in areas such as industry and defence (Morth 2000: 173-189). This chapter is set in the context of the hypothesis of Horber (2012: 78) that Europe has developed beyond the guiding ideals of European integration for the purpose of peace and prosperity after the Second World War and has now entered a phase of consolidation and exploration. This idea was supported by Manners (2002: 240), who identified an evolution from post-war nationalism towards a Europe of pooled resources and common principles. Similarly, Vogler and Stephan (2007: 390) noted that the EU pursues collective action and advances its own regional integration to establish an identity for itself as an actor on the global stage.

The US has been constructing a security network in the Indo-Pacific, composed of US-led alliances and security partnerships. This network is less hierarchical than the hub-and-spoke alliance structure that the US maintained during the Cold War. The article suggests that, akin to the ‘connectivity strategy’ introduced in this special issue, the US, which once dominated a hierarchical hub-and-spoke system with unquestioned centrality, is now striving to enhance its centrality within the US-led security network. To achieve this, the US has been working to improve its ‘closeness’, ‘betweenness’, and ‘eigenvalue’ centrality, in addition to degree centrality. Furthermore, the article posits that the US adopts ‘the strategy of association,’ as introduced in this special issue. The US has been at the forefront of regional missile defense, maritime security, and dual-use technology development to foster like-mindedness and build trust among network members, viewing China (and North Korea) as the ‘other’. Lastly, the article conceptualises ‘security mutuality’ by building upon the concept of ‘alliance mutuality’ proposed by William Tow and Amitav Acharya. It asserts that fostering ‘security mutuality’ is essential for sustaining US coalitional hegemony.

This study deals with the current status and strategic importance of technological security practices in ensuring maritime safety within the scope of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine of Turkey. In recent years, Turkey's allegations of rights on maritime jurisdiction, sharing of energy resources and security of marine traffic, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea has created intense geopolitical tensions. In this process, the importance of technology -oriented, dynamic and integrated systems has increased by going beyond classical security approaches. In the study; Radar systems, unmanned marine vehicles, electronic warfare elements, artificial intelligence -supported analysis software, cyber security infrastructure, coastal surveillance networks and the contributions of the national defense industry in this field are discussed. The technological investments carried out by Turkey's Coast Guard Command and the Navy Command and the domestic and national projects developed by institutions such as ASELSAN, HAVELSAN and STM are also evaluated within the scope. The findings obtained from the literature are not only the military of technological maritime security; It also reveals that it has a multidimensional structure with economic, environmental and diplomatic effects. In addition, the study shows that by integrating technological systems, deterrence in the seas and early intervention capacity can be increased. It is emphasized that technological security strategies should be further developed in order to protect their national interests within the borders of Turkey.

Regulatory requirements for surface and subsurface surveillance and detection as a part of requisite Port, Facility and Vessel Security Plans -set forth following the implementation of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) "International Ship and Port Facility Security Code" (ISPS), and its U.S. equivalent - "The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002" (MTSA) - are generic and vague in terms of specific goals and objectives Neither MTSA nor ISPS make specific mention of technology requirements or capabilities, or which entities are specifically charged with deployment, operation, and maintenance of such systems installed in any given geographic region. Nevertheless, both the ISPS Code and the MTSA 2002 REQUIRE implementation of provisions for monitoring and surveillance tied to approved facility and vessel security plans. These requirements leave undefined any specific provisions that a port, facility or vessel owner/operator must apply to ensure that all security goals are met. As a result, the means and methods of identifying and mitigating potential waterside threats are being unevenly applied throughout the maritime community, with some port authorities and individual facilities purchasing and installing expensive and sophisticated surveillance and detection systems, while others are doing nothing more than traditional "watch standing". Such disparate interpretation of need and requirement, abetted by regulatory "approval" of security plans that incorporate and validate this diversity of capability and response, has created an environment of uncertainty and complacency where uneven standards of operational maritime security prevail.

Within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, the Borders and Maritime Security Division (BMD) develops and transitions technologies that help enhance the security of the nation’s borders and waterways without impeding the flow of commerce and travelers. BMD is identifying next-generation renewable-energy solutions for inclusion in its research portfolio. Recognizing the potential of renewable energy to contribute to border security, BMD partnered with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to examine border-security energy demands and to ensure that advances in renewable energy and energy storage lead to increased security in these areas. NREL has examined the energy needs along U.S. borders, especially in remote areas, to identify opportunities to apply renewable energy solutions today and to define the near- and long-term research agendas that will position border components and activities to take advantage of renewable energy technologies in the future. This report is a result of those efforts.

The South China Sea is a strategic area rich in natural resources and a crucial international shipping and trade route, making it a focal point of territorial disputes between China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. This conflict escalates tensions and the potential spillover effects of mosaic warfare that can impact Indonesia's national security and stability. This journal analyzes the strategic implications of the South China Sea conflict for Indonesia, exploring defensive and proactive strategies to mitigate risks and enhance national resilience. This research uses a qualitative descriptive approach based on historical analysis and content analysis, successfully identifying key areas of concern such as increased maritime security risks, the need for enhanced military capabilities, and the importance of regional and international cooperation. Proposed strategies include increased diplomatic engagement, strengthening defense capabilities, intelligence and security technology cooperation, and diversifying economic and trade routes. Indonesia must adopt a multifaceted and proactive strategy to protect its interests amidst regional instability, strengthen diplomatic relations within ASEAN and globally, enhance military and surveillance capabilities, and ensure economic resilience against potential disruptions in maritime trade routes. Public education and adherence to international law are also crucial for maintaining regional peace and security.