Maritime chokepoints in the Asia-Pacific: geo-economic and security challenges for the GCC states amidst regional and great power competitions

Along with the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Straits, the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the most important bottleneck in international navigation because a large part of the global oil production needs to be shipped through this passage, which is only a few kilometers wide. In the context of the dispute about Iran’s nuclear program and new sanctions, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz for international shipping, effectively cutting off many Western countries from important oil imports. In this article, the legality of such action as well as the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz are investigated. In addition to the International Law of the Sea, general rules of international law and the international law of armed conflict are taken into consideration. Particular emphasis is put on the sovereignty of other states, which is infringed upon by such threats on the part of the Iranian leadership. First, the question has to be answered whether a passage through these waters would be transit passage through a Strait or normal passage through the coastal state’s territorial sea. The authors of the article conclude that the regime of transit passage applies qua lex specialis, as far as the part of the Strait of Hormuz, which is included in Iran’s territorial waters, is concerned. The next step is to ask the question whether preventing such a passage as well as threatening to prevent such a passage are permissible for Iran. In this context, the potential abuse of otherwise permitted traffic separation schemes is highlighted. Traffic separation schemes are of particular importance in narrow but highly frequented bodies of water, such as the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the contemporary Iranian state practice has received some attention. One issue to be considered in more detail is the requirement that foreign warships receive authorization from the coastal state prior to entry into the territorial sea. This approach might be incompatible with the right to innocent passage under both the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law, as there is no clear legal source, which provides for this requirement. Finally, the authors look at the question of the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz as opposed to actually closing the Strait. The sovereignty of other states may be affected to such an extent that such threats already amount to a violation of international law. In light of the historic precedents during the Iran-Iraq War, these threats should not be dismissed lightly. Iran would be well advised to refrain from such rhetoric.

There are approximately 116 straits used for international navigation around the world. Some of them are important international maritime chokepoints, namely the Dover Strait, Hormuz Strait, Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Russian straits across the Northeast Arctic Passage. Due to the high number of navigational traffic going through these straits, vessel-source pollution is endemic in these waters. This article examines the applicable international legal framework on protection of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation such as Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other related legal measures like International Maritime Organization conventions on protection of the marine environment. This article concludes by stating that the present framework is not sufficient in properly balancing two vital interests in the maritime world―protection of the marine environment vis-à-vis shipping.KeywordsUNCLOSStraits used for International NavigationShippingMarine EnvironmentMarine PollutionInternational Legal Framework

There are approximately 116 straits used for international navigation around the world. Some of them are important international maritime chokepoints, namely the Dover Strait, Hormuz Strait, Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Russian straits across the Northeast Arctic Passage. Due to the high number of navigational traffic going through these straits, vessel-source pollution is endemic in these waters. This article examines the applicable international legal framework on protection of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation such as Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other related legal measures like International Maritime Organization conventions on protection of the marine environment. This article concludes by stating that the present framework is not sufficient in properly balancing two vital interests in the maritime world – protection of the marine environment vis-a-vis shipping.

International trading flows have always been the subject of geopolitical risks and conflicts. Different stages of the supply chain, trade always face inherent challenges caused by geopolitical realities along given routes. In this study, the data concerning piracy and armed robberies of ships reported to the Global Integrated Shipping Information System were considered. The statistics include the information on the incidents during the period between 1998 and 2018 on different types of ships, in two most strategic areas, namely the South China Sea (SCS) and the Strait of Malacca (area 1) and the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf (area 2). According to the GISIS reports, most of the incidents occurred in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca are respectively 1684 and 610. Because of the importance of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait as the most vital waterway in the world, it is necessary to have a clear picture of the security situation in the two aforementioned Straits. This research allowed us: 1) to make a distinction between the security in two aforementioned areas; 2) to represent the source of the information for researchers.

International trading flows have always been the subject of geopolitical risks and conflicts. Different stages of the supply chain, trade always face inherent challenges caused by geopolitical realities along given routes. In this study, the data concerning piracy and armed robberies of ships reported to the Global Integrated Shipping Information System were considered. The statistics include the information on the incidents during the period between 1998 and 2018 on different types of ships, in two most strategic areas, namely the South China Sea (SCS) and the Strait of Malacca (area 1) and the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf (area 2). According to the GISIS reports, most of the incidents occurred in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca are respectively 1684 and 610. Because of the importance of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait as the most vital waterway in the world, it is necessary to have a clear picture of the security situation in the two aforementioned Strait. This research allowed us: 1) to make a distinction between the security in two aforementioned areas; 2) to represent the source of the information for researchers.

The world is faced with a difficult energy crisis due to the lackage of fossil fuels, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war. The regions where fossil energy resources are found and produced in the world and the regions with high-energy consumption are separated from each other. For this reason, the transportation of energy from the source regions to the regions where the use consumption is done highly brings along cost and energy security problems. The political stance of Iran and regional conflicts are being dictated that together with Hormuz, the Bab-el Mandeb strait will also be another crisis point and geopardise the fuel transportation to Europe. Closing the Strait of Hormuz will put Europe in a more difficult energy situation. The Strait of Hormuz is an important transit point controlling the outflow of the fossil-energy-rich Persian Gulf, located between Iran and Oman (the Arabian Peninsula). In this study, the possible effects of the European Union on energy security in the event of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz because of possible political crises have been examined and strategic approaches have been proposed about what alternative transportation routes and lines should be to meet energy needs.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world. Located between the oil producers of the Middle East and the major oil consumers of the Far East, these Straits came second only to the Hormuz Strait in terms of the volume of global oil transportation. As straits used for international navigation categorised under Article 37 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (LOSC), littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore possess no rights to deny the exercise of the transit passage regime by foreign vessels plying these Straits. As a result, the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is gradually affected particularly by operational discharges from vessels. This paper looks at the possibility of designating the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a ‘Special Area’ under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) in enhancing the protecting of the marine environment of these important waterways from heavy shipping activities. The viability of such a designation is examined by looking at the ecological and oceanographic character of the Straits as well as the preparedness of the littoral States in fulfilling the requirements of such a designation. This paper concludes by recommending the most appropriate ‘Special Area’ designation under any of the Annexes of MARPOL 73/78 for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Maritime chokepoints are key corridors in the global supply chain because they connect waterbodies, countries, and regions worldwide with few alternative routes. In case of closure (as the blockade of the Suez Canal in March 2021), the energy supply is substantially affected. Therefore, clear and safe passage through these chokepoints plays a critical role in energy transportation, global economy, and sustainable development. This study uses Agent-Based Modeling to develop an LNG market model and simulate the disruption of three main chokepoints: Panama Canal, Suez Canal / Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Malacca Strait. After validating the computational model with the actual historical data, the model shows the chokepoints blockade effects on changing the LNG trade and exports from suppliers. The implications are immediate. In general, countries should work together to secure maritime trade routes, retain clear and safe maritime corridors, establish potential passages as alternatives to these chokepoints where possible, and decentralize LNG plants to have access from or to different maritime routes. Each importer should integrate their gas markets with pipelines networks, search for domestic gas resources, and diversify energy sources to decline energy dependency and gas imports from remote producing areas.

Straits have always been important to shipping. For a strait to qualify as a strait used for international navigation, it must satisfy geographical and functional criteria. Both Australia and Papua New Guinea acknowledge that the Torres Strait is a strait used for international navigation within the meaning of Part III of the LOS Convention. The Torres Strait is a difficult strait for ships to navigate because at one point it has an under-keel clearance of only one metre, strong currents, the narrow channel, and the tidal difference, which means that the strait is navigable only during certain windows. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are probably the most important straits in the world. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of world trade, 50 per cent of the world's oil shipments, and two-thirds of the world's trade in liquefied natural gas, pass through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Keywords:Australia; functional criterion; geographical criterion; international navigation; Strait of Malacca; Strait of Singapore; straits regime; Torres Strait

Protecting vital sea lines of communication: A study of the proposed designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a particularly sensitive sea area

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the world’s most significant international maritime chokepoints. The number of ships transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has increased gradually and significantly over the period of 10 years since 2000. This scenario has enhanced the likelihood of the occurrence of maritime accidents in these Straits. This is further aggravated by the fact that the Straits themselves have many navigational hazards which may make navigation difficult. The navigational hazards in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore that could potentially endanger mariners and the adverse environmental impacts arising from a maritime accident are discussed in this paper. The remedies available to the littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore under the International law are identified for enhancing safe navigation. As an important shipping way for oil transportation, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have to remain open for international shipping as the closure of the Straits would be detrimental to the global economy.

Deemed as the “world’s most important chokepoint” for oil and international shipping, the Strait of Hormuz is the main thoroughfare to and from the Arabian/Persian Gulf. A disruption in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would have severe consequences for the world economy. Without securing by American forces, oil tankers could be threatened by Iran or non-state actors such as pirates. This paper outlines three potential scenarios for U.S. engagement in Hormuz. In the first scenario, “Maintaining the Status Quo,” the U.S. sustains a large, unilateral force in the Arabian Gulf. In the second scenario, “Strategic Partnerships,” the U.S. reduces its overall footprint but ensures security through a close partnership with GCC countries. In the third scenario, “Limited Engagement,” the U.S. withdraws from the Gulf and cedes leadership roles to a rising China. Based on our analysis, there are two main policy implications. First, U.S. policymakers should emphasize the importance of shipping lanes in the Arabian Gulf and their continued relevance to U.S. interests. Second, GCC states and U.S. policymakers should realize the importance of forging stronger defense partnerships. Not only do their interests converge, but a partnership could allow U.S. to maintain security with a reduced budget.

The article highlights piracy as a global problem for shipping in the modern period. The study of the problem of maritime piracy is important for developing security strategies and ensuring the stability of global maritime transport. The novelty of the study is the disclosure of data on dangerous areas of the world where there are pirate attacks. This will allow sailors to adjust the routes of ships. Attention is paid to the analysis of socio-economic, political causes of attacks on ships. The article reveals the geographical location of the most dangerous sea routes (West Africa (Gulf of Guinea), East Africa (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, etc.), Southeast Asia (Singapore Strait, etc.). Getting up-to-date information about the danger will help ships optimally adjust their routes. Piracy is a historical phenomenon, this term first appears in the period of antiquity. But the international - this term received in the second half of the twentieth century. its essence is defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. Piracy is any unlawful act of violence, detention or robbery committed for personal purposes by a crew or passengers of a private naval or aircraft. Piracy attracted worldwide attention in the late 2000s after a sharp increase in attacks off the coast of Somalia. The weakness of the central government and the lack of control over the territory are often considered as the main reasons for the revival of maritime piracy. Data on the activity of pirates on the sea routes of the world is provided by the International Maritime Bureau. According to its information, unlawful acts of violence or robbery on the high seas do not stop. The article considers the number of pirate attacks over the past 5 years. Considered geographical areas of piracy in 2022 and 2024 for comparison purposes. Attention is paid to three dangerous areas of piracy: West Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia. During 2021 - 2024 stable cases of pirate attacks were recorded in West Africa (Gulf of Guinea), East Africa (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somalia, Arabian Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, etc.) and Southeast Asia (Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, etc.). Now the most dangerous and saturated with pirates area of the world is the Gulf of Guinea. There is a negative impact of attacks on trade flows, the cost of transporting goods, the existing environmental costs of pollution. The theme of piracy in Southeast Asia is not as popular as the theme of piracy in the west and east of Africa. Southeast Asian coastal states value their sovereignty more than issues of cooperation. Geographical, socio-economic, political factors that cause the actions of pirates on the main sea routes of the world are revealed. These are recommendations that can help reduce the pirate threat and strengthen global security at sea. Maritime piracy is a complex phenomenon that requires a concerted international response. To eliminate this phenomenon, it is necessary to use radical methods of struggle. It is necessary to involve naval forces to eliminate criminals, to create a mechanism of international cooperation in order to increase security on sea routes. Key words: piracy, sea routes, shipping, West Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia.

A major component and concern of the OBOR Initiative is the utilisation of the concept of SLOCs, namely, the maritime trade routes employed by ships. In addition to the traditional shipping lanes, there exist potential new routes, for example, weather permitting, via the Arctic Ocean. From the European perspective, cargo shipped from the ports of East Asia via the Polar Silk Road would take a relatively shorter duration than using the routes through the South East Asian seas. However, the sea lanes of communication via the geographical choke points, for example the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Bab-el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Gibraltar have experienced, and still report, a fair share of problems in the context of maritime security, especially acts of piracy and terrorism. Ensuring safety of the ships and the cargoes they carry, the personnel and the commercial value of the ships is of prime concern to operators and governments of the littoral states. Whereas freedom of navigation and innocent passage are rights that apply to all commercial shipping, a ‘legal grey area’ exists for ships engaged in scientific research and other activities. This chapter highlights the problem areas, examines the issues and offers an analysis of maritime security.

‘The history of Sea power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war’ Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. Thispaper envisages Chinese String of Pearls' strategy as ageo political tussle between potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region spreading regional disparity and instability in South Asia. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, extending from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. Spreading regional discrepancy along the sea lines, it runs through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the Lombok Strait. The investigation underscores that the neck or the continental mass around which the string hangs includes Pakistan, Tibet, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. On the seaward side, it starts with Hainan the southernmost Chinese province that has a submarine bay; listening post at Coco, Hainggyi, Kyaukpyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun port facilities in Myanmar; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka; Chittagong in Bangladesh and Gwadar on the Arabian Sea in Pakistan which are referred here as Pearls. In effect, it surrounds India all around its frontiers, except Bhutan. In military-strategic sense, a port facility for the Chinese navy in Myanmar provides it with a direct access to Bay of Bengal without having to voyage through South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. It shortens the journey to Bay of Bengal by 3, 000 km or 6–7 days. Ports in Myanmar undoubtedly provide China one of the biggest advantages in the region.