Mapping reversals: an empirical account of Margrethe Vestager’s track record before the Court of Justice of the European Union

Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice of the European Union on Supplementary Protection Certificates: A Few Answers-Many Questions.

This chapter focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the judicial arm of the European Union. The CJEU consists of three courts: the Court of Justice, the European General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Its mission is to ensure that ‘in the interpretation and application’ of the treaties of the Union ‘the law is observed’. The chapter first traces the history of the CJEU before discussing issues of structure and procedure, the extent of the Courts' jurisdiction, and their role in the promotion of European integration. It then considers the criticism directed at the CJEU for the way it exercises its judicial powers, and more specifically the reaction of member states to its ‘judicial activism’. It concludes with an assessment of the main challenges facing the EU courts.

This article sheds light on two under-researched issue areas: the energy policy-shaping role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and how constitutionalization of EU state aid law gives the European Commission (Commission) increased leverage over EU policy development. EU state aid governance is embedded in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU’s prohibition of state aid. The CJEU and the Commissions’ Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp) have played important roles in the emergence of stronger EU steering of renewable energy support schemes after 2014. For many years, powerful member states, most notably Germany, stopped the adoption of EU rules requiring more market streamlining and European harmonization of renewables support. This primarily played out in regular EU decision-making (co-decision) related to adoption and revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. A radical shift occurred in 2014 when the Commission introduced new guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and energy, giving the Commission increased authority over development of renewables support schemes across Europe. These guidelines called for renewables investments to become more exposed to energy market pricing and introduced auctioning as the main allocation mechanism. Support schemes for renewable energy were included for the first time in the EU state aid guidelines for environmental protection in 2001. Back then, member states had ample leeway to design support schemes as they pleased. The 2014 version of the guidelines includes far more detailed requirements. While the first CJEU ruling on renewables state aid hindered the Commission to intervene, new CJEU rulings after 2008 enabled the Commission to draft more restrictive guidelines. This article concludes that constitutionalization, combined with the policy entrepreneurship of Commission officials, explains the shift in EU steering in 2014. This indicates that constitutionalization and Commission entrepreneurship should be assessed in conjunction. Constitutionalization may be particularly important in the state aid area due to the superior competence of the Commission.

The article analyses the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Skanska Industrial. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU recognised for the first time the so-called “economic succession doctrine” in damage claims concerning a breach of EU competition rules. In the judgment, the CJEU relied on its well-established case law. From this point of view, the ruling is “nothing extraordinary”. Nevertheless, the judgment represents an important milestone that contributes to the development of damage claims in Europe. The article first discusses the origins of the economic succession doctrine, which derives from the broad concept of “undertaking” developed by the CJEU case law and the so-called “single economic entity” doctrine. Afterwards, the article discusses the Skanska Industrial case, in particular by comparing the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Wahl with the CJEU ruling in the case. The article concludes by discussing the potential consequences of the CJEU ruling in Skanska Industrial on private enforcement of EU competition law, as well as the questions that remain open after the judgment. After Skanska Industrial, it remains unclear how the disclosure of evidence will take place in practice in the context of a damage claim following a corporate restructuring. Secondly, the limits of the economic succession doctrine remain unclear: it is unclear when a corporate restructuring indeed leads to the establishment of a “new” undertaking, free from the antitrust liability acquired by its predecessor. Finally, it remains unclear whether Skanska Industrial case law could also be extended to other remedies besides damage claims, such as actions requesting a court injunction, compensation for unjust enrichment, or a declaration that a contract is null and void. The article argues that in the coming years the CJEU will probably be called to clarify SkanskaIndustrial case law in order to answer these remaining questions.

Brüstle Decision Is Unhelpful, but Not Catastrophic

Background Before the United Kingdom joined the European Union, the jurisdiction of the courts of England depended on English law. Now things have changed. Union law provides the main foundation for their jurisdiction: it is only where Union law does not operate that the traditional English rules still apply. In discussing the jurisdiction of English courts, therefore, we must begin with Union law. (The traditional English rules will be considered in a later chapter.) The European Union began more than sixty years ago when six European nations came together to form the European Coal and Steel Community. From these small beginnings, it has grown to a continent-wide organization with twenty-eight Member States. It has three political organs: the Council, which represents the Member States (its members are the delegates of the national governments); the European Parliament, representing the peoples of Europe (its members are elected by the voters of Europe); and the Commission, a sort of executive, whose members are appointed by the Council but must be approved by the Parliament. There is also a court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which consists of one judge from each Member State. Most cases before the CJEU fall into one or other of two categories. The first category consists of cases that begin (and end) before the CJEU. These are cases concerning the Union itself – for example, actions to annul Union acts, actions in tort against the Union, or actions by the Union against Member States. The second category consists of cases involving Union law that are referred to the CJEU by a court in a Member State. Here, the role of the CJEU is limited to interpreting the provision of Union law in question and, in some cases, ruling on its validity. After the CJEU has given its judgment, the case goes back to the Member-State court. Our interest in the CJEU will be confined to these latter cases, which are normally called ‘preliminary references’ or ‘references for preliminary rulings’. The CJEU gives a single judgment of the court: there are no concurring or dissenting judgments. The style is abstract and general. The close reasoning and analysis found in English judgments is absent. In the early days, case law was not cited, though whole passages in a judgment would sometimes be taken, without acknowledgment, from a previous case.

Quite unsurprisingly, the CJEU has held that the ECB's OMT program does not violate EU law. In accordance with this holding, I argue in the first part of this note that the OMT program does not transgress the ECB's mandate under the Treaty, which is often interpreted too narrowly, in particular by German legal scholars. Furthermore, I argue that a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing of the member States as enshrined in article 123, para 1 TFEU cannot be inferred from the ECB's announcement of a program, which has never been implemented. In any case, there is clearly no manifest and grave transgression of EU competences which, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC)Honeywelldoctrine, is required for an ultra vires finding. The second part of this note shows that the FCC's doctrine regarding transgressions of competences by EU organs (ultra vires review) is not only unconvincing as a matter of principle but also and worse (as on premises we can always reasonably disagree) not consistently applied to the OMT program. The note also objects to the Court's somewhat trendy blending of ultra vires and constitutional identity review of EU law through which it increasingly conceals its approach of applying the so-called constitutional constraints of European integration to the EU organs' conduct. The forthcoming FCC judgment is therefore less important as regards the quite foreseeable finding on the lawfulness of the OMT program but – hopefully – of vital importance as it might embody a more coherent relaunch of the FCC's standards of judicial review with regard to EU law.The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the European Central Bank's (ECB) 2012 announcement of future Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) comes as no surprise. It had not been expected that the CJEU would interpret the European Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) Treaty provisions the way the FCC had “suggested.” Neither had it seemed conceivable that the CJEU would reject the FCC's request for a preliminary ruling holding that a legally non-binding assessment of the EU action's lawfulness could not be requested under Article 267 TFEU. The judgment had nevertheless been awaited for with tension for two reasons: First, in the vigorous and in part very critical debate about the ECB's competences under the TFEU and its alleged ultra vires action a judgment by the CJEU was necessary to settle the fundamental European law issues at stake. This is all the more important with regard to the ECB's current Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP) as well as its interconnection with the European Stability Mechanism's (ESM) financial assistance programs. The CJEU's holdings on the ECB's competences within the EMU framework are discussed in the first part of this note regarding the distinction between monetary and economic policy (infra section A.I.) and the interpretation of Article 123, paragraph 1 TFEU which prohibits monetary financing of the member States by the ECB (infra section A.II.). Second, it was clear that the judgment would shape the new stage in the changing and sometimes explosive on-off relationship between the CJEU and the FCC, the stage entered into by Karlsruhe's first ever request for a preliminary ruling. The FCC had fortified its ultra vires doctrine and clearly indicated its readiness not to follow the CJEU but to insist on the notorious “last word” of the German Constitution instead. Thus, the second part of this note discusses the constitutional legal premises of the FCC's approach and the procedural and substantial manner in which the FCC tries to scrutinize the ECB's OMT program (infra sections B.I. and B.II.). In this context, possible scenarios for the upcoming judgment (infra section C.I.) and consequences for European multi-level constitutionalism (infra section C.II.) will be discussed.

This chapter explores aspects of Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law that highlight the role that this Court has played in enhancing the global reach of EU law and the influence of its own judgments abroad. It addresses two main themes. The first theme is concerned with the CJEU’s contribution in shaping the institutional arrangements established by international agreements concluded by the EU with its neighbouring countries, particularly as regards the role carved out for the CJEU within them. The CJEU has succeeded in enhancing its own role and interpretative authority within the framework of these agreements. The chapter argues that the CJEU has emerged as an agent of its own authority by jealously guarding its interpretative supremacy, as well as the autonomy of EU law. The second theme is concerned with CJEU case law addressing ‘global reach’ EU law. This includes EU law which is extraterritorial, or which gives rise to territorial extension. It also covers EU legislation, which serves as a catalyst for the ‘Brussels Effect’. It is argued that the CJEU has enhanced the external influence of EU law by interpreting broadly and upholding the lawfulness of global reach EU law. Taken together, these two themes exemplify the ways in which EU law, including CJEU judgments, can have influence in third countries. This analysis contributes to our understanding of why some judgments issued by the CJEU have proved to be particularly influential in third countries, as exemplified by the various chapters included in this volume.

This chapter discusses how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has used judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its legal reasoning. The CJEU uses ICJ jurisprudence in three main ways: when discussing customary international law, when applying the law of treaties, and when using international law to interpret and develop principles of EU law. The chapter reviews the cases in which the CJEU and the Advocates General have discussed ICJ cases, including areas of international humanitarian law, diplomatic and consular law, nationality and citizenship, the law of the sea, and the international law of treaties. On the one hand, the CJEU’s use of ICJ case law may show its commitment to the universality and coherence of international law. However, the CJEU also has a strong commitment to the coherence and unity of EU law, and has emphasised the autonomy of the EU legal order. The chapter shows that, upon closer inspection, the CJEU interprets and applies ICJ jurisprudence through an EU law prism. It also shows that, over time, principles of international law are transformed into principles of EU law. In these instances, the CJEU no longer refers to ICJ/PCIJ jurisprudence, but as autonomous EU law principles. ICJ jurisprudence is used to fill gaps, or to support certain legal arguments, but it is not followed as if it were a hierarchically superior court.

This chapter focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the judicial arm of the European Union. The CJEU consists of three courts: the Court of Justice, the European General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Its mission is to ensure that ‘in the interpretation and application’ of the treaties of the Union ‘the law is observed’. The chapter first traces the history of the CJEU before discussing issues of structure and procedure, the extent of the Courts' jurisdiction, and their role in the promotion of European integration. It then considers the criticism directed at the CJEU for the way it exercises its judicial powers, and more specifically the reaction of member states to its ‘judicial activism’. It concludes with an assessment of the main challenges facing the EU courts.

What role does the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and EU law play in elaborating the rights and principles embodied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)? Over the last 20 years, human (or ‘fundamental’) rights have become a constant part of the way the CJEU interprets and applies EU law. In a period where fundamental rights and values are increasingly under threat both globally and in Europe, judicial institutions remain an important last bastion of protection. Commenting on Judge Rosas’ (2007) observation that the CJEU is not in fact a human rights Court, three critical questions are derived: The first question is the most related to this special issue. What does the development of the CJEU—an institution with human rights responsibilities—mean for general international human rights law? The second takes up Judge Rosas’ observation that the CJEU, unlike the Strasbourg Court, has extensive judicial responsibilities beyond human rights. What does the development of EU human rights law mean for EU law more broadly? Finally, if Judge Rosas is right that the CJEU is not a human rights Court, what does that mean for its relationship to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the other organs of the Council of Europe? In answer to this last question, the article cautiously advances the argument that the very fact that the CJEU is not a human rights Court implies a more robust role than Judge Rosas suggests for external review of EU law by international human rights bodies.

<p>The aim of the article is to present the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant. This investment can also be related to the Paks II nuclear power plant investment, therefore the two investments are compared too. Both projects were examined by the European Commission, which take an important part when the national aid was awarded to Hinkley Point C and Paks II projects, and the decision of the CJEU also had influence on it. The author considers the European Commission’s aid conception positive, because the less developed countries are not forced to use only the renewables, but the environmental and security aspects of nuclear energy are also allowed (e.g. Hinkley Point C and Paks II nuclear power plants). The subsidy was allowed in both cases, but the reasons are different. In these cases, the limits of the EU energy politics can be seen, i.e. the right to select the package and the priority of the energy security and sustainable development. To mention an example for the difference, in Great Britain the energy sector was divided among the participants on the market but in Hungary the nuclear energy remained under state control. In the first option the state wanted to prove that it grants offset for the help to the general market services and in the second option the market investor principle was highlighted in order to show no other market participant act in other way. These points were not accepted, the state aid was provided both cases with permissible reasons because the projects condescend the goals of environmental policy and energy security. The decisions show that as a result of the efforts to protect the environment the dependency on energy increased and it cannot be solved only be encouraging the usage of the renewables. The permissive attitude of the European Commission can be found here and it is influenced by the increased state regulative roles. According to the author, it also appears in the environmentally friendly decisions which refers to the Paris Agreement’s fulfilment and the involvement of environmental requirements into politics. Moreover, the European Union tries to maintain its leader role in economics, which can be reached by the decrease of energy dependency and the exclusive usage of renewable energies is not the appropriate solution. The CJEU judgement is relevant in several respects. The article focuses primarily on the issue of environmental protection, state aid and the relation between the Euratom Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.</p>

Reversing the Lens: In National Judiciaries the CJEU Trusts? Insights from EU Migration and Asylum Law Trust and distrust have been explored as drivers influencing the choices of national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure, that is, whether to hand over the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This article proposes a novel account by reversing the roles to explore the CJEU’s trust and distrust in national judiciaries. While the reliance on national courts is inherent in the decentralised system of European Union (EU) law enforcement, the CJEU can impose significant limitations on national courts’ discretion in the application and enforcement of EU law. Trust and distrust in national judiciaries reflect the CJEU’s effort to reconcile averting claims of judicial activism with safeguarding the rule of law and promoting further European integration. Drawing on earlier literature on trust and distrust between judicial actors in Europe, this article conceptualises the CJEU’s trust and distrust in national judiciaries. It also establishes an analytical framework for analysing them through identifying trust-related considerations in the CJEU’s preliminary rulings: the intensity of interference with national procedural autonomy, the frequency of the use of deference to national courts, and the rigidity of the assessment of judicial independence. Zooming into the CJEU’s case law in a highly politicised area – EU migration and asylum law – suggests a shift from trust to distrust in national judiciaries. Having exposed vulnerabilities of Member States’ judicial structures, the rule of law and migration crises put into question the trustworthiness of national judiciaries and invite rethinking the judicial architecture of the EU.

This chapter focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which comprises two courts: the CJEU and the General Court. It first provides an overview of the CJEU’s structure and functions, and then discusses some of its main rulings and their significance. It further considers rulings on the powers of the institutions, some key legal judgments made in response to questions referred to the CJEU by national courts, the impact of CJEU rulings on EU policy, and post-Maastricht trends in the CJEU and EU law. It also assesses the evolving political reactions towards the judgments of the Court, along with the debate over whether the member states have been able to effectively curb the CJEU’s radical jurisprudence.

A short few days in September 2020 saw an extraordinary turn of events. The Member States of the European Union used the withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union (EU) as a pretext to dismiss a sitting Advocate General (AG) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) before the expiration of the duration of her mandate provided for in primary law. The Member States replaced her with another nominee in the absence of a vacancy. This occurred in direct violation of EU primary law, including the cardinal principles of security of tenure and judicial independence. The CJEU had the opportunity to prevent this from occurring; yet did absolutely nothing to prevent it. Instead, the CJEU went out of its way to facilitate the appointment of Mr. Athanasios Rantos in place of AG Eleanor Sharpston. The drama in Three Acts, involving numerous elements – hints of lawlessness; signs of complicity between the Member States and the CJEU; confirmation of the lack of structural independence of the CJEU – has ultimately raised doubts whether the CJEU is legally composed. These September 2020 developments resulted in the dismissal of a member of the Court that the Member States did not want, no matter what the law said. In this article, these cumulative events are analyzed systematically through a legal lens, regrettably confirming a startling omission in the EU legal order – that the EU lacks a structurally independent court of law sitting at its apex, and that the EU legal system is not immune to ultra vires Member State interventions. Notwithstanding these developments and a severe pounding to the credibility of the CJEU, there remains a possibility for this deficiency in the EU legal order to be rectified. The CJEU will have to state at some future juncture that decisions within the sphere of Article 253 TFEU are subject to judicial review for procedural irregularities, thus ensuring that the EU is truly a complete system of legal remedies and procedures. In the meantime, questions do linger about the lawful composition of the CJEU with the position of ‘AG’ Rantos in situ, which the CJEU should and must address.