Map Making Game

Cooperation is a relevant and controversial phenomenon in human societies. Indeed, although it is widely recognized essential for tackling social dilemmas, finding suitable policies for promoting cooperation can be arduous and expensive. More often, it is driven by pre-established schemas based on norms and punishments. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social interactions on networks and spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms on individuals behavior. We show that the presence of these mechanisms in a prisoner’s dilemma game, may oppose the willingness of individuals to defect, thus allowing them to behave cooperatively, while interacting with others and taking conflicting decisions over time. These results are obtained by extending the Evolutionary Game Equations over Networks to account for self-regulating mechanisms. Specifically, we prove that players may partially or fully cooperate whether self-regulating mechanisms are sufficiently stronger than social pressure. The proposed model can explain unconditional cooperation (strong self-regulation) and unconditional defection (weak self-regulation). For intermediate self-regulation values, more complex behaviors are observed, such as mutual defection, recruiting (cooperate if others cooperate), exploitation of cooperators (defect if others cooperate) and altruism (cooperate if others defect). These phenomena result from dynamical transitions among different game structures, according to changes of system parameters and cooperation of neighboring players. Interestingly, we show that the topology of the network of connections among players is crucial when self-regulation, and the associated costs, are reasonably low. In particular, a population organized on a random network with a Scale-Free distribution of connections is more cooperative than on a network with an Erdös-Rényi distribution, and, in turn, with a regular one. These results highlight that social diversity, encoded within heterogeneous networks, is more effective for promoting cooperation.

The development of cooperation in human societies is a major unsolved problem in biological and social sciences. Extensive studies in game theory have shown that cooperative behaviour can evolve only under very limited conditions or with additional complexities, such as spatial structure. Non-trivial two-person games are categorized into three types of games, namely, the prisoner's dilemma game, the chicken game and the stag hunt game. Recently, the weight-lifting game has been shown to cover all five games depending on the success probability of weight lifting, which include the above three games and two trivial cases (all cooperation and all defection; conventionally not distinguished as separate classes). Here, we introduce the concept of the environmental value of a society. Cultural development and deterioration are represented by changes in this probability. We discuss cultural evolution in human societies and the biological communities of living systems.

One of the biggest problems of human society is facing crises. Origins of many crises go back to strategy selection in the relations between human beings. The international community is faced with many crises, such as poverty and lack of development of a large section of human society, global warming, economic crises, the incidence of infectious diseases, the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, wars, migration, lack of food and clean drinking water are among the crises that threaten international community. Each of these challenges alone would require measures and facilities that in many cases are beyond the limited resources of the international community. In this article, the crises have been discussed, whose origin is relations between human beings. By defining critical points in 2 x 2 games, we provide a mathematical model to detect this type of crises, and then by defining a unique compromise point, we offer solutions for this type of crisis. Sometimes the compromise point corresponds to the Nash equilibrium, and sometimes better than Nash equilibrium. We believe that what is presented in this article can help fill the void. Fixing the vacuum in game theory and optimal use of compromise and critical points leads to the development of cooperation–cooperation strategy in the world.