Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948-1953

Unethical studies on transplantation in cardiothoracic surgery journals

Reviewed by: The Rise of China and the Overseas Chinese by Leo Suryadinata Ja Ian Chong The Rise of China and the Overseas Chinese Leo Suryadinata Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017. 278 pp. Leo Suryadinata's The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond is a very welcome addition to the discussion of ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ethnic Chinese living beyond its borders. Suryadinata makes the case in the book that as the PRC becomes more globally prominent, it is increasingly blurring lines in its treatment of PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese overseas. This claim comes amid allegations of growing PRC efforts to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities abroad to serve its national interests, be they economic, political, or strategic. These concerns are not new and are in fact a throwback to the past. They give the book an added timeliness and importance. For much of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese communities in non-communist parts of Southeast Asia faced the suspicion of being a possible subversive fifth column for the PRC, especially if they seemed left-leaning. Such perspectives diminished as the PRC engaged in economic reform from the late 1970s, eschewed radical revolution, and passed a nationality law in 1980 clearly demarcating non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese abroad from PRC citizens. Recent reports of PRC efforts to lobby and police opinion in foreign countries using members of local ethnic Chinese communities ranging from Europe and North America to Oceania and Southeast Asia have again brought these long-dormant issues to the fore.1 This is an issue on which Suryadinata has previously written, and he provides readers a brief reminder of these themes in Chapter 3.2 [End Page 151] An Awkward Closeness Suryadinata organizes the book into four parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) discusses the PRC's rise to prominence from the 1980s till the present, changes in ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, and the organization of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). The OCAO is the government body responsible for managing official ties with ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, be they PRC citizens abroad or ethnic Chinese who do not hold PRC citizenship. Within these pages, Suryadinata introduces his main observation—that Beijing seems to be reverting to its older policy of reducing distinctions between PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese in foreign jurisdictions. The key motivation behind this move, according to Suryadinata, is PRC efforts to advance and protect its interests and concerns overseas. Part II (Chapters 4–8) examines how the PRC responds officially to events outside its borders that affect ethnic Chinese and PRC citizens. Each chapter contains a case where ethnic Chinese come under threat from developments outside China and assess the PRC position. Beijing's reaction to the 1998 anti-Chinese race riots in Indonesia and violence in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa indicates a willingness to evacuate PRC citizens, especially those who work for PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2014 anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, triggered by a Beijing-initiated escalation in its maritime dispute with Hanoi, suggests that the PRC is not above placing its citizens overseas in danger for the pursuit of more important interests. However, contrasting PRC responses to incidents involving ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and Myanmar point toward an evolution in Beijing's position. Beijing responded to alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by Malaysian police in 2005 as well as political pressure, even violence, toward ethnic Chinese Myanmar citizens in the Kokang region along the PRC border in 2015 with diplomatic entreaties. Such actions resulted from Beijing's desire to maintain positive official relations with Malaysia and Myanmar. Threats against ethnic Chinese Malaysians in 2015, in comparison, saw the then-PRC ambassador to Malaysia publicly expressing an intention to protect these co-ethnics even though this was tantamount to intervention and divided local opinion. This step appears to portend an effort by Beijing to extend influence over non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese communities overseas, even at the risk of upsetting foreign governments. The next four chapters in...

This dissertation offers new perspectives on China's transition to socialism by investigating a fundamental question--how did the state build capacity to know the nation through numbers? With the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, jubilant Chinese revolutionaries were confronted by the dual challenge of a nearly nonexistent statistical infrastructure and the pressing need to escape the universalist claims of capitalist statistics. At stake for revolutionary statisticians and economists was a fundamental difficulty: how to accurately ascertain social scientific fact. Resolving this difficulty involved not just epistemological and theoretical debates on the unity or disunity of statistical science but also practical considerations surrounding state-capacity building. The resultant shift toward a socialist definition of statistics, achieved by explicitly following the Soviet Union's example, was instrumental in shaping new bureaus, designing statistical work, and training personnel. New classificatory schemes and methods of data collection also raised issues of authority and policy, ultimately not just remolding state-society relations but also informing new conceptions of everyday life and work. By the mid-1950s, however, growing disaffection with the efficacy of Soviet methods led the Chinese, in a surprising turn of events, to seek out Indian statisticians in an unprecedented instance of Chinese participation in South-South scientific exchange. At the heart of these exchanges was the desire to learn more about large-scale random sampling, an emergent statistical technology, which, while technically complex, held great practical salience for large countries like China and India. "Making it Count" engages with and contributes to scholarship on the history of modern China and on the global and Cold War histories of science and social science. While the historiography on statistics and quantification has focused primarily on the early-modern and nineteenth century world, the dissertation brings this history into the twentieth century, when states, multi-national institutions, and private actors, regardless of their ideological hue, mobilized statistics on behalf of positivist social science and statecraft. By examining the collection and deployment of data, a process critical to the ambitions of the revolutionary PRC state but one that has largely been overlooked in the historical literature, the dissertation also provides an alternative account for a decade often portrayed as lurching from one mass campaign to another. Finally, the examination of the Sino-Indian statistical links reveals that pioneering innovation took place in many contexts after 1945 and challenges Cold War paradigms that are predisposed to assume the United States or the Soviet Union as the primary nodes from which scientific and other forms of modern knowledge emanated.

International Law and the Extraordinary Interaction Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan

: On 11-12 June 2014, the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD) conducted an unclassified Strategic Seminar Wargame (SSWG) to develop insights into how the People s Republic of China (PRC) views land power1 and how the U.S. government might use American land power in the western Pacific, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to help deter the PRC from aggressive regional actions that would adversely impact U.S. interests. The consensus view of the SSWG participants, each with expertise regarding the PRC and the Western Pacific region, is that the PRC s concept of land power differs from that of the United States military, although the PRC s concept is not codified in doctrine. The PRC has not previously defined land power within or distinct from military power, but may need to do so as the PRC s naval and air forces grow in both capabilities and capacity. To date negating a requirement to define something which they implicitly understand all of the most senior leaders of the People s Liberation Army (PLA)2 have been ground force personnel although this too may very likely change. Restoration and recognition of China s place as a regional hegemon and as a Great Power by 20503 is the overarching goal of PRC government policies. The current PRC leadership would prefer to accomplish its objectives without fighting a war, and strongly believes an incremental and creeping advance toward its goals will lead to success and is less likely to draw significant counter-action. As a result, United States Prevent, Shape, or Deter plans and activities particularly those involving force presence or posture must take into account the PRC s extended strategic timeline (as well as the PRC s own deterrence strategies vis- -vis the United States and its regional partners).

In the contemporary era of international relations, some government officials and non-government observers have posited that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a rising power that challenges the existing, rules-based global order. But it would be an oversimplification to argue that the PRC always seeks to undermine the rules-based component of that order. Therefore, this chapter examines the PRC’s approach to the rules-based component of the global order more closely, and reaches a more nuanced conclusion. At the outset, this chapter assumes that the PRC is competing with other states within a complicated international system composed of complex relationships. Yet while international conflict is undesirable and international cooperation can be appealing, sandwiched in between the two is international competition, which is not inherently bad or evil. In the competitive aspect of relationships between states, individual states can and will use a range of tactics to further their own interests, to include tactics involving law and rulesets. Over the past two decades, American legal scholars coined the portmanteau “lawfare” and Chinese military strategists have developed the concept of “legal warfare,” both of which are defined as “using law as a weapon.” These labels, however, might be too warlike, provocative, or under inclusive in nature to capture what the PRC is actually doing. If a primary goal of any competition is to win, then one must consider what might be the best way to characterize tactics employed by players for the purpose of winning. In the competitive context of sports and leisure games, particular behavior by participants could be labelled as “gamesmanship,” which has been defined as “the art of winning games without actually cheating.” Therefore, in the context of the PRC and its actions in relation to the existing rules-based global order, one must consider how the PRC is utilizing various “legal gamesmanship” tactics in different situations for a competitive advantage. This chapter argues that the PRC seeks to shape and reshape the normative aspects of the rules-based component of the global order, while also attempting to leverage the instrumental aspects of that same component. To support this argument, this chapter explores several of the common “legal gamesmanship” tactics employed by the PRC, offers specific examples of those employed tactics, and analyzes the purposes of those tactics. While the PRC’s approach to international law is more nuanced than arguing that the PRC always seeks to undermine the rules-based component of the global order, what the PRC is seeking to accomplish remains troubling nonetheless. Thus, this chapter concludes by showing why those tactics should be concerning to other states, and recommends a number of counter-tactics for other states to employ in order to counter the PRC’s “legal gamesmanship.”

The Saudi Arabia’s “Fundamentalists” the position runs counter in the basic religious doctrine with, and People's Republic of China ’s “Communist” and “Socialism” the idea, also can affect the Saudi Arabian imperial family’s benefit and the stability. However the Saudi Arabia actually purchases the missile to the People’s Republic of China, and established diplomatic relations in 1990 . The Transformation in Diplomatic Relations between Saudi-Arabia and China was really worth studying and the discussion truly. Because in 1973 the petroleum crisis took Saudi Arabia the huge economic interest, enable Saudi Arabia’s government to have the abundant financial resource to foster the talent, but caused in this border to have the social structure change, because the group accepted the higher education or overseas abroad study return to homeland, dominated the political power to Saudi Arabian’s Government and the traditional royal court to be discontented, finally urged Saudi Arabian’s King to implement the reform as well as the cabinet carries on the reorganization, in addition, also enabled the sand country tradition political power abandonment passing the country to have to “the communism” first impressions ares most lasting the hostility, and after suffered US ‘s Parliament to go back a promise to sell the Saudi Arabian F-15 fighter plane, originated the policy using the disperser arms sale to purchase missiles form People’s Republic of China. In the international environment aspect, the Saudi Arabia after the excavating petroleum, is admires the US military force to protect its petroleum benefit, but because US's Israel's policy, causes the Saudi Arabia to the American confidence vacillation, however, this time People’s Republic of China actually unceasingly (the People’s Republic of China using the United Nations Security Council), the economy (purchases petrified industry and wheat), the military (sells the missiles), the psychology (using religious relations), at that time Saudi Arabia is in order to maintain the Saudi Arabian leader regime stably, strengthens own national defense military force, by the consolidated this country in under the Islam world leading positions consideration, urges Saudi Arabia choose People’s Republic of China to purchases missiles, and establishes both sides official foreign relations.

"Apres Moi Le Deluge"? Judicial Review in Hong Kong Since Britain Relinquished Sovereignty

This article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.

The Political Economy of News in China: Manufacturing Harmony. Jesse Owen Hearns-Branaman. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. 162 pp. $75.00 hbk. $74.99 ebk.The Political Economy of News in China: Manufacturing Harmony sets out to undertake three tasks: an exploration of the political economy of news media in the People's Republic of China (PRC), an assessment of Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's Propaganda Model (PM) as a tool in comparative media research, and an implied criticism of the U.S. news media system.Hearns-Branaman's application of the PMs' five filters-size, ownership and profit motive, sourcing, advertiser's influence, flak, and dominant ideology-to the case of the media environment of the PRC not only reveals that the model remains an effective tool in comparative research of media in different settings, but also illuminates specific aspects of the media of the PRC, some similar to and others diverging from the case of the United States. As outlined extensively in the book, the ownership structure of both settings acts to limit diversity while creating a hierarchy of elite agenda setting that attracts affluent audiences that are attractive to advertisers. While sourcing patterns in the PRC privilege elite mainstream voices, entrenching elite interpretations of the world, the struggles inherent in such processes occur, in the case of the PRC, within political systems rather than across them. The underdevelopment of a civil society in the PRC means a lack of externally generated flak directed at the media; similarly, advertiser influence works to promote a consumption consciousness while passively censoring material viewed as harmful to advertisers. Finally, the aspect of a dominant ideology filter-a belief in the market and a powerful nationalist sentiment-a basic element of the PM, is similar between the United States and the PRC, a reflection of the truth that the only real difference in the media between these global leaders is simply a different set of elites with different legitimation that both work toward reification of market mechanisms. Thus, while the PRC is without doubt a unique system, with characteristics that differ from those inherent to most media studies-oriented theoretical viewpoints and the models associated with them, the results of the examination reported on in The Political Economy of News in China points to a fairly universal outcome: a description of a media system that works to persuade people to accept the naturalness of the existing order, an ongoing project that is essential for the benefit of society's elites.Hearns-Branaman, a lecturer of media and communication at the Graduate School of Language and Communication at the National Institute of Development Administration in Thailand, largely succeeds in the dual purpose of descriptively analyzing PRC media while assessing the PM as a comparative model by virtue of an exhaustive application of the model to the history and current practices of media in the PRC. …

??8 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. ?, Spring 1999 John W. Garver. Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1997. xii, 193 pp. Paperback $18.95, isbn 0-295-97617-9. From March 8 to March 25, 1996, the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched missiles directed toward the vicinity of Kaohsiung and Keelung, the two major seaport cities on Taiwan, and conducted a series of extensive live-fire military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These PRC military actions occurred as Taiwan was engaged in its first-ever direct, popular presidential election. The United States responded to this PRC military intimidation by deploying two aircraft-carrier battle groups in the waters near Taiwan—the largest concentration ofAmerican naval power in East Asia since the Vietnam War. This was the first Sino-U.S. military confrontation since the one involving Vietnam in the late 1960s; faced with superior U.S. forces, the PRC backed down and an international crisis was averted. What led to this PRC saber-rattling? What objectives was the PRC trying to achieve by these threats of force? Why did the United States decide to intervene against these acts of military intimidation? What is the significance of the 1996 crisis and the consequence ofAmerican intervention? How has democratization in Taiwan affected Taiwan-China and Taiwan-U.S. relations? These are among the many issues that John Garver painstakingly examines in Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. According to Garver's analysis, two major sets of grievances prompted Beijing to commence large-scale military exercises to intimidate Taiwan (p. 13 ). One was concerned with recent shifts in U.S. policy toward Taiwan: President Bill Clinton's decision in May 1995 to issue a visa permitting Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, was seen by Beijing as a clear and major violation of "explicit commitments" by the United States on the Taiwan question—such as the "One China" policy. The other was concerned with Taiwan's domestic developments and external behavior. The steady process of democratization and the transformation of Taiwan's ruling elite and polity on the one hand and its "pragmatic diplomacy" and growing international status on the other indicated to Beijing that Taiwan was moving closer to independence and further away from unification with the PRC. According to Garber, "The drastic measures of 1996 were, in large part, an© 1999 by University effort to abort this process" (p. 14). ofHawai'i PressRightly or wrongly, PRC leaders at first believed that they could strike a deal with Taiwan's autocratic KMT rulers, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, on the matter ofTaiwan's unification with China. Democratic change Reviews 119 in Taiwan thus created a major problem for the PRC—for Beijing could no longer expect to reach a setdement that might totally ignore the wishes of the people ofTaiwan. The death of Chiang Ching-kuo and the political ascendancy of Lee Teng-hui presented new worries for Beijing: although a member of the KMT, Lee is an ethnic Taiwanese and seems to have weaker ties to the mainland than the Chiangs. The PRC leaders were especially incensed by an interview Lee gave in 1994 to a Japanese writer, Ryotaro Shiba, in which Lee (1) stated that Taiwan must belong to the people ofTaiwan, (2) called the KMT regime in Taiwan "an alien regime," and (3) castigated the post-1945 KMT rule in Taiwan as "a period of oppression and darkness for the people ofTaiwan" (p. 24). When Lee used the Old Testament story of Moses leading the Hebrew people out of slavery in Egypt to imply his self-conceived mission for Taiwan, PRC analysts equated Egypt with China and concluded that Lee intended to lead the people ofTaiwan out ofChina (p. 24). Under Lee, Taiwan has also endeavored to reverse its diplomatic isolation by taking a series ofinitiatives to seek greater international recognition. Under the term "pragmatic diplomacy," Taiwan established diplomatic ties with several states that had already recognized the PRC, compelling Beijing to sever relations with them. From 1993 on, Taiwan began knocking on the...

Translating the Socialist State:Cultural Exchange, National Identity, and the Socialist World in the Early PRC Nicolai Volland (bio) The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 marked not only the start of a profound transformation of the Chinese state institutions, the society, and the economy, but also the beginning of a monumental project to redefine the nature of the Chinese nation-state and its position in the world. The establishment of a new government was to give new meaning to the Chinese nation, in its own eyes, and in terms of its interaction with other nations. The politics of "leaning to one side (yi bian dao)," that had been agreed on in 1949,1 meant that the PRC was conceived as a state in the broader framework of the "socialist camp" from its very first hour.2 The integration of the PRC into an emerging socialist world that spanned half of the globe, from Berlin to Pyongyang, from Warsaw to Hanoi, and from Sofia to Novosibirsk—was a momentous event and gave legitimacy to the young regime that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was starting to build; it left an imprint on this regime for decades to come. On the topmost plane of politics, the PRC's entry into the socialist camp was translated into a series of bilateral treaties that the Chinese government signed with other socialist nations, and with the Soviet Union in particular. These processes have been relatively well-researched.3 However, the institutionalization of China's cooperation with the socialist nations of Eastern Europe and Asia could be but a first [End Page 51] step in the enormous project of redefining the Chinese nation-state. The next task for the CCP, arguably at least as important as winning diplomatic recognition from its new allies, was to reshape the nation's identity in the minds of its citizens. This new identity had to be both national and international; it was to define the nation-state and at the same time to transcend the national borders. To generate this kind of consciousness among the citizens of the nations in the socialist bloc was key to consolidating the new regimes—a task faced not only by the Chinese government, but by the other socialist nations as well. In this process, cultural factors played a key role, and a fundamental mechanism to create a feeling of cohesiveness and shared goals and values was the promotion of cultural exchanges.4 Soon after the founding of the PRC, the CCP thus began to set up a network of contacts and institutions entrusted with fostering exchanges in the cultural field designed to anchor the PRC firmly in the socialist camp. The government set out to build a cultural diplomacy that would assist and complement the PRC's efforts on the high-level diplomatic fronts and would penetrate deep into the populace to instill identity politics in the people's minds. In contrast to the formation of foreign policy in the early PRC, these efforts in cultural diplomacy have received surprisingly little scholarly attention.5 This article is an effort to explore some of the institutional dimensions and fields of activity of cultural exchange between the PRC and the [End Page 52] Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and to relate them to the complex patterns of identity politics in the early Cold War era.6 In the following pages, I will discuss several crucial avenues of cultural exchange that characterized the involvement of the PRC in the cultural diplomacy of the socialist camp. These include mutual visits of orchestras, writers, and drama troupes, the participation of Chinese delegations in international competitions and festivals, and the exchange of students in fields such as arts, drama, and music. Finally, an especially important field was the translation of literature across the socialist camp. In a coordinated effort, representative examples of the national literatures—in particular new works written in the socialist spirit—were translated simultaneously into multiple languages and circulated across the bloc. Readers in Poland thus read the same Russian novels at the same time as their peers in Romania, North Korea, and the PRC, and Chinese...

Following the market liberalization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United States has sought to diminish the PRC’s ability to influence the US-backed international order. This paper examines the foreign policy strategies employed by the last four complete US presidential administrations against the change in the diplomatic power of the PRC from 1993-2020 to find which strategy was most effective in achieving this objective. Diplomatic power is measured through the PRC’s foreign direct investment (FDI) excluding the US, International Monetary Fund (IMF) voting share, and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting coincidence between the PRC and the US. Change in FDI shows the Trump Administration trade war failed as the PRC’s FDI excluding the US increased even when protectionist policies were imposed, as the PRC was able to pivot trade to other nations due to the unilateral nature of the policies. Change in IMF voting share and the PRC’s formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank show that the Obama Administration’s attempt to dissuade the PRC into rewriting institutions failed; the Obama Administration achieved advancements on mutual issues of climate, nuclear non-proliferation, and maritime security that supported norms set by the US. UNGA voting coincidence did not show meaningful correlation with US strategy. A successful US foreign policy is one that cooperates on concrete initiatives but not in a flawed manner by giving into PRC demands; when engaging in competition, the US must do so with a coalition of allies to check against PRC diplomatic and trade flexibility.

Chairmen:Prof. Y.T. Xiong, Wuhan University, China;Prof. G.X. You, Wuhan University, China;Prof. Z.B. You, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Members:Prof. H. Davis, Boya Century Publishing Ltd., Hong Kong;Prof. K. Georgiou, University of Waterloo, Canada;Prof. W.L. Xiao, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Prof. H.W. Hua, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Prof. J.X. Zhang, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Prof. J.Y. Zhong, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China;Prof. J.D. Wang, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Prof. T. Cui, Guizhou Institute of Technology, China;Prof. W.L. Su, China University of Geosciences, China;Prof. H.F. Liu, Jiangsu University, China;Prof. H.Y. Zhu, Chongqing University, China;Prof. X.J. Gao, Hefei University of Technology, China;Prof. X.P. Han, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, China;Prof. H. Chen, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, China;Dr. J. Hu, Ohio State University, USA;Dr. W. Zhong, New York State University at Stony Brook, USA;Dr. C.W. Yang, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. W.M. Luo, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. G.W. Yang, Shanghai University, China;Dr. H.T. Zhang, South China University of Technology, China;Mr. Q. Yun, Chi Shun Chemical Co., Ltd., China.Organizing Committee:Prof. Z.B. You, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Prof. S. Hu, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Prof. D.G. Yang, Wuhan University, China;Prof. T. Liu, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. C.W. Yang, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. S.F. Zhao, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. W.M. Luo, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China;Dr. G.L. Liu, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Dr. X. Xiao, Wuhan University of Technology, China;Ms. Y.F. Ma, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Mr. Z.P. Ma, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Mr. B.T. Zhou, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Mr. H.T. Ke, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Mr. X.L. Jiang, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Mr. Y.J. Shi, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Ms. W.H. Qin, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China;Ms. D.W. Liu, Hubei New Wen Sheng Conference Co., Ltd., China.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become an important importer for many countries. This paper investigates how turbulence in the PRC can spill over to trading partners through the trade channel. Exports from several East Asian and Southeast Asian countries to the PRC exceed 10% of their gross domestic products. To shed light on economies’ exposures to the PRC, this paper estimates a gravity model. The results indicate that Taipei,China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are exposed to the PRC because they produce goods for the PRC market and are exposed to advanced economies because they ship parts and components to the PRC for processing and reexport to the West. The Republic of Korea is more exposed to a slowdown in advanced economies that purchase processed exports from the PRC than to a slowdown in the PRC. Major commodity exporters such as Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia and exporters of sophisticated consumption and capital goods such as Germany and Switzerland are exposed to a slowdown in the PRC domestic market. This paper also estimates import elasticities for the PRC. The results indicate that imports for processing into the PRC are closely linked to processed exports from the PRC to the rest of the world and that ordinary imports are closely linked to PRC gross domestic product. The renminbi exerts only a weak impact on imports, however. The paper concludes by recommending that firms and countries diversify their export base and their trading partners to reduce their exposures to the PRC and to advanced economies.