Mao after Death: Charisma and Political Legitimacy

Abstract

The relation of Mao Zedong to Chinese political life is chimerical. After his death in 1976, foreign analysts assumed that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would follow the path blazed by the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The succeeding ten years in China witnessed harsh critiques of Mao by the Communist Party (CCP) leadership, destruction of his personality cult, and trials of his intimates, friends, and advisors. At the same time, Mao has not yet suffered the fate of deStalinization. Indeed the CCP leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, has been careful to disavow any trends toward de-Maoization, and has argued relatively consistently that Mao is an important and revered figure in the history of the PRC. Nevertheless, policy content, economic and political reforms, and attacks on programs associated with Mao's leadership point to an extreme disaffection with Mao's ideas. Historical and political perspectives provide scholars with an array of frameworks from which we can analyze the complexity of these events. Alternatives include focusing on leadership transition and policy transformations that arise from them; analyzing the connections, interplay and policy preferences of individuals and factions involved in the Chinese political struggle; and integrating the analysis of ideological change with policy and personnel changes. In this essay I want to suggest another framework, one that focuses on the charismatic authority relationship and the efforts of successor regimes to retain charisma as a source of legitimacy.' The theme is the Mao question faced by the Deng leadership. The successors to Mao are confronted with a fundamental dilemma: how can they disa-