Abstract

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the textbook claim that Luxembourg was a null player with a more comprehensive picture of Luxembourg’s role in EEC’s voting system. The assessment of Luxembourg’s voting power is sensitive to the role played by the European Commission in the decision-making procedure and the measurement concepts underlying power evaluations.

Highlights

  • On 25 March 1957, Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty ofRome which established the European Economic Community (EEC)

  • A closer look into the decision rules specified in the EEC Treaty reveals that in all other cases—in particular if Council decisions had to be taken by weighted voting without an initial proposal of the Commission—Luxembourg was not a null player, i.e., had positive voting power

  • The case of Luxembourg is the textbook example for illustrating the concept of a null player. This is somewhat misleading: whether Luxembourg was a null player from 1958–1972 depends on the institutional context, i.e., the two different decision rules embodied in Art. 148(2) of the EEC Treaty

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Summary

Introduction

On 25 March 1957, Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty of. The case of Luxembourg is often invoked as a textbook example in the analysis of voting power It illustrates that a positive number of votes does not necessarily come with a positive share of power. It wielded one vote out of a total of 17 votes, there was not a single configuration of votes in which Luxembourg’s decision could theoretically have made a difference. A closer look into the decision rules specified in the EEC Treaty reveals that in all other cases—in particular if Council decisions had to be taken by weighted voting without an initial proposal of the Commission—Luxembourg was not a null player, i.e., had positive voting power.

The Council’s Internal Decision Rule
The Benelux as a Key Driver of European Integration
Simple and Weighted Voting Games
Power Indices
Luxembourg in Traditional Voting Power Analysis
Power in a Composite Game with a Benelux Union
Power in a Game with Communication Structure
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
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