Love & Respect Redux: Kant on Sex, Marriage, and Friendship

Abstract

In light of contemporary understandings of marriage, Kant’s definitions of marriage and the marriage right strike some as grossly mistaken. I think, however, that a closer inspection of what Kant has to say about marriage and the limited way in which he intends it to solve the problem of sexual objectification shows that his position is not as nonsensical as some critics make it out to be. This is not to say that Kant’s account of marriage is without problems; I argue that Kant’s account of marriage only deals with half of the problem of sexual objectification as he presents it. But I also argue that Kant’s account of marriage points to the way in which a complete solution to the problem of sexual objectification is possible, the resources for which can be found in Kant’s ethics, namely, in his account of moral friendship. I proceed as follows. First, I present Kant’s view of the legal institution of marriage. I then explain how legal marriage and the special right that grounds it are supposed to solve the legal problem of sexual objectification as he presents it in his practical sexual ethics. Next, drawing on Kant’s distinction between right and virtue, I argue that legal marriage cannot solve the moral problem of sexual objectification. I then consider Kant’s account of moral friendship, and argue that friendship provides the kind of context in which two people can engage in morally permissible sexual activity.