Loophole or Fire Alarm? The Consensus Requirement for the Appointment of Appellate Body Members and the Institutional Design of the WTO

Abstract

The past four years have shown that, in contrast to previous assessments that saw the WTO dispute settlement organs as exercising irresistible authority over the WTO Agreements, a WTO Member can single-handedly derail the functioning of the WTO by obstructing appointments to the Appellate Body. This article investigates the origins and character of this feature of theWTO Agreements and examines possible means to overcome it, arguing that merely appointing seven new Appellate Body members will not be sufficient to the future operation of the dispute settlement system. If Members wish to avoid obstruction of appointments becoming a regularly employed negotiation tactic, they must explicitly establish that this possibility is not an integral feature of the institutional design of the WTO– a fire alarm thatMembers can resort to in case they are dissatisfied with developments within the organization – but an unwarranted loophole in the WTO institutional structure. Among the possible courses of action available to address it, one that is both politically feasible in the short term and unlikely to have its legal effects disputed is a decision, made by consensus by theMembership, to clarify the relationship between the decision-making authority of the Ministerial Conference and the provisions governing appointment of Appellate Body members. World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, International Dispute Settlement, Institutional Design, Dispute Settlement Body, International Courts