Locke on Consent, Societal Membership, and Political Obligation

There is an increasingly prevalent view among some contemporary Locke scholars that Locke's political philosophy is thoroughly subordinate to theological imperatives, centered on natural law. This article challenges this point of view by critically evaluating this interpretation of Locke as advanced by some of its leading proponents. This interpretation perceives natural law as the governing principle of Locke's political philosophy, and the primary source of transition and reconciliation within it. This article advances a very different reading of Locke's political philosophy, perceiving within it competing imperatives that cannot be subsumed by natural law, and are, in some respects, at odds with it. In this way, the article shows how the “theological” interpretation of Locke's political philosophy, centred on natural law, fails to account for some of that philosophy's fundamental features, and is unable to explain some of its key outcomes, with the result that this interpretation falls short of its critical ambitions.

A “recent consensus” has emerged in Locke studies that has sought to place theology at the center of Locke's political philosophy, insisting that the validity and cogency of Locke's political conclusions cannot be substantiated independently of the theology that resides at their foundation. This paper argues for the need to distance Locke from God, claiming that not only can we “bracket” the normative conclusions of Locke's political philosophy from their theological foundations, but that this was in fact Locke's own intention, intent as he was to justify these conclusions to a diverse political audience often divided by faith. In other words, this “recent consensus” in Locke studies is premised on an erroneous understanding of Locke's political philosophy, even as advanced by Locke himself. Locke's own philosophical discourse bears witness to the very “bracketing” of his political conclusions from their theological foundations that these Locke scholars claim is impossible.

Introduction 1. Locke's life and times J. R. Milton 2. Locke's theory of ideas Vere Chappell 3. Locke's philosophy of body Edwin McCann 4. Locke's philosophy of mind Jonathan Bennett 5. Locke's philosophy of language Paul Guyer 6. Locke's theory of knowledge Roger Woolhouse 7. Locke's philosophy of religion Nicholas Wolterstorff 8. Locke's moral philosophy J. B. Schneewind 9. Locke's political philosophy Richard Ashcraft 10. Locke's influence Hans Aarsleff.

Introduction 1. Locke's life and times J. R. Milton 2. Locke's theory of ideas Vere Chappell 3. Locke's philosophy of body Edwin McCann 4. Locke's philosophy of mind Jonathan Bennett 5. Locke's philosophy of language Paul Guyer 6. Locke's theory of knowledge Roger Woolhouse 7. Locke's philosophy of religion Nicholas Wolterstorff 8. Locke's moral philosophy J. B. Schneewind 9. Locke's political philosophy Richard Ashcraft 10. Locke's influence Hans Aarsleff.

'Tacit consent' has long interested historians of political thought and political philosophers, but its nuances nevertheless remain unappreciated. It has its roots in the Roman law concept of a 'tacit declaration of will'. Explicating this concept allows a new conception of tacit consent to be proposed, which I term the 'tacit declaration of consent'. The tacit declaration of consent avoids both the triviality of common sense views and a weakness in Hobbes' account. Unlike other contemporary philosophical accounts, it avoids fictions and meets the condition of intentionality. Furthermore, it also advances understanding of the sorts of claim offered by proponents of a tacit consent-based theory of political obligation, whilst facilitating a more radical critique. The tacit consent-based theory of political obligation is not simply limited in application, but indefensible. It unwarrantedly transposes onto tacit consent the potentially fictional character of declarations of will.

Locke's political philosophy has generally been presented and assessed in terms of certain conclusions drawn from a few basic premises. Since Locke's political theory was not constructed according to the presuppositions of analytical philosophy, such an interpretive approach to his political thought seems better designed to portray Locke as an inconsistent or unclear thinker than to provide the reader of the Two Treatises of Government with an understanding of what Locke was attempting to do in writing that work. I propose in this essay to follow another interpretive path by beginning with Locke's conclusion, namely, that “it is lawful for the people . . . to resist their King” (T II.xix.232: 437), and ask how and why did he come to that conclusion? If, as I shall argue, it was part of Locke’s intentional objective in writing the Two Treatises to persuade his readers that they should resist the king, then putting the question in this form will assign considerable importance to determining the relationship between political theorizing and engagement in political actions.

Consent and Conventional Acts in John Locke* FRANK SNARE WHILE IT IS GENERALLYAGREEDthat the notion of consent is crucial to the understanding of Locke's political theory in the Two Treatises oy Government, the interpreters of Locke have not, with only a few exceptions, attempted to give any analysis of this concept .1Nor, in the use of this term in their interpretations, have they been especially clear as to which of the several uses of this word they themselves have been employing. The fact that there are several ordinary uses for this word has made, generally, for an ambiguity in the phrase "government by consent." This paper has the following purposes. First, to distinguish several relevant uses of "consent." By implication I will also be distinguishing several quite different doctrines called "government by consent." Second, I will be concerned to isolate that use of "consent" which is fundamental to the basic argument in the Two Treatises. As we shall see, it is true that in other contexts Locke uses "consent" (as we do) in other ways, but in the context of political argument he is fairly consistent--more consistent than most of his interpreters----in using the word in the particular way which I shall outline. This bit of textual interpretation turns out to be crucial to a number of issues in Locke which cannot all be discussed in a short paper, e.g., the issue of whether representative government is really central and basic to Locke's theory. Does government by consent imply representative government?2 Third, I would like to give the be~nning of an analysis of that use of "consent" basic to Locke, not only because it is of some help in the interpretation of Locke, but also because it is of interest to the moral philosopher to investigate the claim that rights and obligations (whether political or otherwise) can arise from consent. I. CONSENT AS A PASSIVE STATE OF MIND A rather crucial distinction is to be made between those views which treat consent as an action--something one does--and those which treat it as a passion--something one has (e.g., an attitude, sentiment, opinion, belief, etc.). This is not the distinction between those properties of persons which continue over time and those which do not. Both actions and passive states of mind may either continue over time or only happen momentarily. I mention this obvious point because I think that some philosophers in their talk of "continual consent" have, in spite of this * I would like to thank Professor John W. Yolton of York University who read a longer version of this paper and made a number of detailed comments which were very helpful in my inquiry. 1 As far as I know, Professor Plamenatz is alone in doing any workmanlike analysis of this concept. Cf. Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1968),chap. 1. See also, Man and Society, 2 vols. (London, 1963), I, chap. 6. I shall discuss my objections to Plamenatz' analyses in section H below. Others of Locke's interpreters will be mentioned in the footnotes throughout. Cf. J. W. Gough, lohn Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1950), pp. 59, 72. [27] 28 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY terminology, really meant to indicate thereby a special passive state of mind? It is quite natural to use the phrase "continual consent" to distinguish consent as a passive state of mind from consent as an act, since no one imagines the theory of government by consent to mean that a government has legitimate authority over me as long as I continue in the performance of a certain act cal/ed "consenting." No one seriously thinks consenting is a frequentive act, such as singing is, which might endure indefinitely. Rather, everyone has tended to assume that either it is a particular act performed at some time in the past or else it is a passive psychological state (usually a disposition) which has to endure if government is to continue to remain legitimate.4 It is important to be clear about the distinction between these two different notions of "consent," primarily because the interpreters of Locke have often remained systematically obscure with...

Market Society and Meaning in Locke's Political Philosophy* E. J. HUNDERT LOCKE HAS TENDED TO LEAD separate, if not completely distinct lives in the history of political philosophy. According to one set of accounts, 1he expounded the liberal doctrine of constitutional guarantees for the maintenance of individual liberties , and defined the role of "government by consent" in contriving a legitimate polity. This was the view of Locke's adherents in the English-speaking world after the American Revolution, of some of the French philosophes and their continental associates after about 1750 and, in part, of his most subtle early opponents, Viscount Bolingbroke and Charles Leslie? Another set of accounts maintains that liberalism's most distinctive feature is its assertion of individual, pre-political property rights, and views this claim as part of a comprehensive social philosophy of the individual's place in society. Nineteenth-century radicals and reactionaries both often shared these opinions. They saw Locke providing in The Second Treatise philosophical foundations for the bourgeois, and hence liberal theory of society. Marx said that it was "the classical expression of bourgeois society's ideas of right against Feudal society, ''3 while George Fitzhugh, the most articulate defender of American slavery, thought that virtually all "modern social reformers.., proceding upon the theory of Locke... propose to dissolve and disintegrate society. TM Each of these readings has ample textual support, but the "constitutionalist" interpretation seems the least convincing historically. Its narrow focus of concern almost precludes a way to comprehend how Locke, the defender of natural liberties against intrusions by government, the man who claimed that all men were born free, in "a State of Equality," could at the same time argue for strict governmental regulation of economic life, and propose a policy of hard labor, whipping and even torture for that large segment of the population which he thought led an animal existence and were *A slightlydifferent version of this paper was presented to The Society For the Study of the History of Philosophy at Northwestern University,Evanston, Illinois,on April 26, 1975.I wishto thank members of The Society, and particularly Paul J. Johnson, California State College, San Bernardino, for their comments and criticisms. For example, J. W. Gough,John Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1956);and M. Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke (London, 1968). 2See LouisHartz, The Liberal Tradition inAmerica (NewYork, 1955);Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (London, 1970),passim; Viscount Bolingbroke, The Philosophical Essays, Fragment XIII, in Works (Philadelphia, 1841),vol. IV; and Charles Leslie, The Finishing Stroke (1711), the first systematic criticism of The Second Treatise. 3Karl Marx, Theories of SurlHus Value (Moscow, n.d.), p. 356; see also, pp. 354-355. 4 Cannibals All, ed. C. Van Woodward (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 71, cited in John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in John Yolton, ed.,John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge, 1969),pp. 78-79,n. 5, [331 34 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY prone to idleness, irrational outburst and riot s Moreover, Locke's views about the poor were, if anything, conventional at the time he expressed them. No one, to my knowledge, thought these ideas contradicted his politics until the very end of the eighteenth century when the terms "liberal," "liberalism," and "liberalist" acquired their modern meanings6and Locke was appropriated as the philosophical instructor of the "school" to which Mill, for example, said he belonged in the essay on "Coleridge" (1840). Before about 1790, English government publicists, and even Burke, gave Locke's name the official stamp of the distinctly illiberal Whig oligarchy ,7while Opposition ideologues wrote in the political language of Cicero, Machiavelli , Harrington and Montesquieu rather than Locke's? In America this same constellation of "republican" ideas which championed "virtue" over and against "acquisitiveness" and "commerce" had an even greater force. It set the terms of political debate well into the Revolutionary period. Madison's argument in Federalist Paper no. 10 then took on the status of official doctrine, enlarged into the nineteenthcentury mythology of a liberal American political tradition whose sources were almost completely Lockean. Government, in this view, could not control acquisitiveness -the source of faction--but was obliged...

Preface 1. John Locke's conception of freedom Raymond Polin 2. Locke, liberalism and nationalism M. Seliger 3. Locke and English liberalism: the Second Treatise of Government in its contemporary setting Esmond S. De Beer 4. The politics of Locke in England and America in the eighteenth century John Dunn 5. The family and the origins of the state in Locke's political philosophy Gordon J. Schochet 6. The state of nature and the nature of man in Locke Hans Aarsleff 7. John Locke, the great recoinage, and the origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-1698 Peter Laslett 8. Locke, Newton and the two cultures James L. Axtell 9. The science of nature John W. Yolton 10. Faith and knowledge in Locke's philosophy Richard Ashcroft 11. What is a nominal essence the essence of? W. Von Leyden 12. The essayist in his Essay Rosalie Colie 13. Some observations on recent Locke scholarship Hanns Aarsleff Index.

In the article, referring to the method of rational reconstruction described by R. Rorty, an analysis of some works of J. Locke has been made in order to identify new prospects in John Locke's philosophy researches. As a result, it's been demonstrated the presence of silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect J. Locke's research of realms of cognition, political philosophy and philosophy of education. This is not covered in modern John Locke's philosophy researches. The authors emphasize that J. Locke, although not directly exploring silence as an argument, however, describes the argument ad ignorantiam, the wording of which in the work «An Essay Concerning Human Understanding» and his understanding of tacit consent in the work «Two Treatises of Government» are related to silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect. The position that silence as an argument is present in all four arguments (argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad judicium) described by J. Locke is substantiated. Additionally, the argument ad ignorantiam can be considered both as an argument from silence (ex silentio argument) and as a kind of argument to silence. Considered arguments can serve as an argument to silence for the proponent and/or the third party, that is, anyone who is not directly involved in the dispute. Basing on J. Locke's explanation of the characteristic feature of tacit consent, that is, the absence of the expressed consent/disagreement, the possibility of distinguishing the indirect connection between tacit consent and the argument ad ignorantiam is demonstrated, since both tacit consent and the argument ad ignorantiam in J. Locke's works rely on the absence of expressed statements on the consent or disagreement of the opponent. It is established that the ideas of the education of children described by J. Locke also correlate with silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect. Applying the classification of the types of respect proposed by S. Hudson and complemented by R. Dillon to the use of the term «respect» to the various texts of J. Locke, it is substantiated that described by him respect covered almost all kinds of this classification.

Philosophic politique et obligation politiqueL'auteur examine la thèse selon laquelle la notion d'obligation politique constitue la question centrale de la philosophie politique. Après avoir clarifié l'énoncé de cette thèse, il en fait une triple évaluation : premièrement, en regard de l'histoire de la philosophie politique, deuxièmement en tant que concept logique de la philosophie politique et, troisièmement, en tant qu'énoncé normatif. Il lui apparaît que la thèse ne saurait tenir sur aucun de ces trois plans. Par contre, il soutient que l'on sous-estime l'importance de la notion d'obligation politique en en confinant la pertinence au seul libéralisme, puisque toute philosophie politique d'importance doit en tenir compte.

T HE STATE OF NATURE is in many ways the central concept at work in Locke's Two Treatises of Govertnmnent. It is the concept with which Locke chooses to introduce the Second Treati.se.' And it is only against and by means of the state of nature that Locke offers us accounts of political obligation and authority, the limits on political power, and the occasions for justified resistance. But the state of nature is probably also, as John Dunn has observed,2 the most misunderstood idea in Locke's political philosophy. Progress has been made, of course, largely because of Dunn's own work' and an influential paper by Richard Ashcraft.4 It is, as a result, no longer fashionable to simply dismiss Locke's claims about the state of nature as bad history or bad psychology.f Nor is it as easy as it once was to accuse Locke of blatant inconsistency or deceptiveness in his descriptions of the social conditions men would endure in the state of In spite of this progress, however, widespread obscurities and errors persist in discussions of Locke's state of nature, mistakes that often conceal the nature and virtues of the concept with which Locke chose to work. Most of these mistakes, I will suggest, stem from two sources: running together (in various ways) Lockean and Hobbesian conceptions of the state of nature and taking as definiitions of the state of nature in Locke, his statements of mere coniditionis (necessary or sufficient) for men's being in the state of nature. I will try in this article to remedy those mistakes, but I have three more general aims. First, I want to (finally) present a clear account of and definition of Locke's state of nature. With this definition in hand, many of the familiar worries about Locke's account are much easier to unravel. Second, I will point to what I believe are Locke's true confusions about the state of nature, which lie in rather different areas than is generally supposed. Third, I hope to cast some light on the point and the virtues of the particular concept of the state of nature we find Locke employing in the Two Treatises.

Locke's Labor Lost

The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems

The term ‘political legitimacy’ is unfortunately ambiguous. One serious source of confusion is the failure to distinguish clearly between political legitimacy and political authority and to conflate political authority with authoritativeness. I will distinguish between (1) political legitimacy, (2) political authority, and (3) authoritativeness. I will also articulate two importantly different variants of the notion of political authority. Having drawn these distinctions, I will argue first that political legitimacy, rather than political authority, is the more central notion for a theory of the morality of political power. My second main conclusion will be that where democratic authorization of the exercise of political power is possible, only a democratic government can be legitimate. Another ambiguity is also a source of confusion. Sometimes it is unclear whether ‘legitimacy’ is being used in a descriptive or a normative sense. In this article I am concerned exclusively with legitimacy in the normative sense, not with the conditions under which an entity is believed to be legitimate. However, a normative account of legitimacy is essential for a descriptive account. Unless one distinguishes carefully between political legitimacy, political authority, and authoritativeness, one will not be clear about what beliefs in legitimacy are beliefs about.