Abstract
This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying can affect both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.7 billion (3.2%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
