Abstract
Criminal liability for corporations may seem quixotic insofar as corporations appear neither to have the same cognitive capacities as individuals, nor to be capable of acting except through the efforts of the individuals who constitute them. One way of clarifying the basis of corporate criminal liability is to consider whether and how corporations (and other groups) are genuine agents, capable of having attitudes and taking actions in ways that go beyond the attitudes and acts of their constituent members. In this brief essay, I consider the recent, ambitious and ground-breaking work by Christian List and Philip Pettit in this regard. I outline the major themes and positions taken and critically discuss the connection they suggest between group agents and group responsibility.
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