Abstract
The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by a bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemon problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. Then banks currently short of liquidity may prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007-2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) flight to overnight in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
