Linen, genotrophs and a mid-century bridge to Eastern genetics.

People in Motion: Introduction to Transnational Movements and Transwar Connections in the Anthropological and Genetic Study of Human Populations

In January 1958 the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic launched a worldwide effort to showcase Romania's progress in health care. The decision reflected the Communist regime's medical Cold War diplomacy and was also a result of growing interest in what outside Eastern Europe was called “socialized medicine,” that is, a state-funded and organized health care system with equal and universal access for all citizens. Among the governments that wished to learn from Romania's experience were those of Bolivia and Argentina. Their representatives were invited to Bucharest for official visits or specialization courses. In the case of Argentina, the collaboration also stemmed from interwar encounters at international medical congresses between physicians of the two countries.This example of early exchanges between Romania and Latin American countries signals a broader research field that has recently emerged in Cold War studies: the multiple geographies of medical exchanges, mobilities, and conceptualizations in the 1945–1989 period. The volume edited by Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Raúl Necochea López is an essential addition to the growing literature about the relationship between health care, the bipolarity of the Cold War, and decolonization. Along with other pioneering studies, such as those by Marcos Cueto (Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 2007), Young-Sun Hong (Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime, 2015), and Dora Vargha (Polio across the Iron Curtain: Hungary's Cold War with an Epidemic, 2018), the collection explores the fascinating terrain determined by the relationship between Cold War politics and rhetoric, on one hand, and notions of health, disease, and welfare, on the other.Peripheral Nerve brings two new dimensions to this scholarship. First, it offers a comprehensive panorama of Latin American cases of local, regional, and transregional alignments engineered by medical experts. It goes beyond the usual focus on U.S. interventions in and hegemony over this part of the world. The contributors convincingly emphasize the agency of Latin American actors, their ability to engage with multiple partners, and their savviness in taking advantage of the ideological competition between the two camps of the Cold War.Second, Peripheral Nerve brings a new chronological perspective for discussing health care entanglements, circulations, and partisanships: ideas, choices, and affinities during the Cold War were rooted in the interwar period. They are linked to the institutional and intellectual history of medical reforms in Latin America before 1945, to international experiences such as cooperation within the League of Nations Health Organization, or to the fascination with the Soviet Union's radical experiment in state-managed health care. Moreover, many of the contributors provide suggestive connections between pre-1989 policies and phenomena that unfolded after the end of the Cold War.The overarching theme of Peripheral Nerve is that of local agency and, consequently, of revising the history of the Cold War from its margins. Such an approach brings Latin America back into the global history of the period, a task flagged by other recent publications as well. For instance, in the introduction to the impressive volume Latin America and the Global Cold War, Thomas Field Jr., Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettinà affirm that they compiled the book to revive “the history of what were once powerful interactions between Latin America and the rest of the Global South” (p. 2).Peripheral Nerve opens with a foreword by Gilbert Joseph, who places the volume in the general trend of “remaking . . . Latin American Cold War history” (p. ix). Three sections follow, each with its own distinct vantage point. The first deals with the interplay between leftwing internationalism and U.S. pressure on Latin America during the early Cold War. Katherine Bliss examines the biography of Lini de Vries, a former U.S. antifascist volunteer in the Spanish Civil War who sought to elude the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation by going into exile to Mexico in the 1940s. The Mexican government welcomed her contribution to rural health care reform, despite encountering criticism from U.S. officials. Nicole Pacino shows how the shrill anti-Communism of the 1950s in Washington led to the politicization of the Rockefeller Foundation's grants to medical schools in Bolivia, a departure from the institution's more ecumenical approach before 1945. Gabriel Soto Laveaga offers a fascinating study of how U.S. pharmaceutical companies skillfully employed Cold War rhetoric to control international prices and exert pressure on the Mexican government to open up its steroid hormone industry. If in the early 1950s a Mexico City company, Syntex Laboratories, controlled much of the world's steroid trade, by the end of the decade U.S. investors had purchased Syntex and relocated its headquarters to Palo Alto, significantly diminishing Mexico's domestic pharmaceutical capacities. In these three cases one can observe the degrees to which Latin American governments were able to maneuver in the increasingly troubled waters of U.S.-Soviet competition.The second section of the volume deals with the circulation of ideas and experts within the ideological camps of the Cold War. Each contribution underlines levels of ideological adaptation and transfer in various Latin American countries. Raúl Necochea López analyses how fertility surveys in Puerto Rico were the basis for U.S. advocacy of family planning policies throughout Latin America. He insists that this process antagonized Puerto Rican nationalists who used the Cold War to consolidate their position on the island. Gilberto Hochman and Carlos Herinque Paiva present the intellectual and ideological itinerary of parasitologist Samuel Pessoa. They link his fascination with Communist states’ health care systems (from the Soviet Union or China) and his membership in the Brazilian Communist Party to his interwar advocacy for medical, social, and economic reforms in the Brazilian countryside. The chapter provides glimpses into the multifaceted Latin American engagements with “socialized medicine.” From 1956 to 1961, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek emphasized state centralization and planning of programs for the control and eradication of rural endemic diseases (p. 151). Jennifer Lambe examines the evolution of psychiatry in Cuba from the perspective of debates pitting Sigmund Freud against Nikolai Pavlov as central paradigms of the profession. She stresses the prerevolutionary roots of these discussions. She insists on the eclecticism, particularly in the 1960s, of Cuban responses to official attempts to emulate the Soviet focus on the Pavlovian tradition. She also shows how the two Soviet psychiatrists sent to Havana to advise on the revolutionary reform of the discipline had to acknowledge the diversity of local approaches (pp. 172–173).The third section is centered on the multidirectionality of Latin American medical experiences throughout the Cold War. Jadwiga Mooney focuses on two biographies—those of Salvador Allende and Benjamin Viel—when recounting Chilean attempts to create a national health service. For both men, Mooney emphasizes the pre-1945 origins of their reformist projects as well as the role of other health care models, such as the British or the Soviet, in shaping their visions of the Chilean medical system. Marco Ramos's chapter explores Argentinian psychoanalysts’ syncretic interactions and cross-fertilizations with Soviet, Western, and Third Worldist approaches in the field. These exchanges pushed some professionals to call in the 1970s for the “nationalization” of psychiatry so that it would better reflect Argentine realities. Ramos shows the shifting meaning of anti-imperialism and its embeddedness in the local context. This sometimes caused “failed encounters” (desencuentros) between strands of anticolonial medicine (p. 212). Cheasty Anderson contributes a study of Cuban medical teams’ activity in Nicaragua during the Sandinista regime. The Cuban government sought to insulate its medical workers from Nicaraguan society, beyond their medical provision tasks. Nicaraguan officials likewise safeguarded their policymaking autonomy. Anderson offers an engrossing analysis of daily contacts between Cuban personnel and the Nicaraguan population, but she does not fully explore the potential hierarchies of this interaction, particularly the Cuban superiority complex that sometimes appears between the lines of her interviewees’ accounts. Anderson could have also pursued a comparison between Cuban activities and East German doctors’ experience at the Carlos Marx hospital, created and operated by the German Democratic Republic in the 1980s. Iris Borowy has written a captivating account of this medical institution in the journal História, ciências, saúde—Manguinhos (2017). Peripheral Nerve would have benefited from a more comparative exploration connecting Latin American experiences with other instances of medical entanglement and circulation in different regions during the Cold War.Peripheral Nerve ends with a conclusion by the two editors that discusses the new vistas for research on health, medicine, and the Cold War in Latin America. The linchpin for the issues they raise is the central role played by international institutions (e.g., the World Health Organization or United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund) in global health care dynamics. These bodies offered world forums for various governments and their experts to pursue their interests, engage in dialogue, and imagine their positions in international political and medical hierarchies. Birn and López also explore the continuities across the 1989 threshold, underlining that the end of the Cold War did not bring “a wholesale rebooting of health philosophies and proposals in Latin America, instead hosting a mingling of the old and the new” (p. 272). They connect medical solidarities across the region during the post-2000 Pink Tide of elected left-leaning governments with programs first established during the Cold War. For instance, they show how the 2005 PAHO Declaration of Montevideo revived the primary health care principles of the Alma-Ata Declaration (1978), and they point out that the Cuban-Venezuelan Misión Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood) was an offspring of Havana's pre-1989 medical diplomacy. In this last case, they should have stressed the blatant manipulation of the program by Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro to ensure his and his party's reelection, as detailed for instance in extensive reporting by Nicholas Casey in The New York Times in March 2019.The volume edited by Birn and López is a trailblazing contribution to the global history of medicine during the Cold War. It presents geographies and expertise that recapture the complex connections pursued from Latin America, which equally echoed and defied ideological divides during the second half of the 20th century. Such versatile reading of international health care politics is highly topical for the present: the COVID pandemic has reopened debates about medical diplomacy, competition among health care models, and vaccine nationalism.

This paper analyzes Hungary's export linkages of the interwar and Cold War periods using gravity model and historical analyses. Hungary is a useful example of former Soviet satellites because it combines relative political stability (since 1956) and experimentation with the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) during the 1970s and 1980s. Historical analysis reveals seven events since World War I that changed Hungary's trade patterns. Gravity model analysis for 1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985 shows the dramatic cleavage of the “Iron Curtain,” the effect of the NEM, and particularly strong and weak linkages for Hungarian trade that may result from historical legacies, complementarity, or specific political contacts.

“We are no longer sure,” wrote the late Giovanni Arrighi in his monumental survey of the long twentieth century, “that the crisis of the 1970s was ever really resolved.”1 Almost two decades on, this observation seems truer than ever. Another economic crisis, larger even than that of the seventies, is upon us, and the European left is stranded without an economic program. Over one hundred years after the first of the parties affiliated to the Second International won a plurality in a parliamentary election (Finland, 1907),2 social democracy—that most protean of political traditions—may finally be running out of rope.Today's stark choices are being posed as the result of a major economic shift within capitalism: the deep disruption of capital accumulation as a consequence of the crisis in global financial markets unleashed in 2008. With the end of the recent long boom—or rather, long bubble—social democrats have been dealt a tremendous double blow. On the one hand, their decade-long strategy of full accommodation to neoliberalism in order to skim off the surplus for ameliorative social spending has collapsed with the end of the growth upon which it depended. On the other, they have fallen victim to a breathtaking act of political jujitsu. Contrary to expectations, the crisis has not thus far unseated neoliberalism as the reigning economic paradigm, and with this “strange non-death”3 financiers and the political right have neatly turned the tables on the center left. The big banks, having caused the crisis in the first place and led governments to borrow vast sums to come to their aid, have successfully redefined the resulting fiscal deficits as a matter of the need to cut back public spending and slash social protection. Sovereign debt crises are painted as cause rather than effect of the downturn.4 Social democrats have thus been cut off from the exits, unable to escape into the soft neo-Keynesianism that is their more progressive reflex.Nature, too, has some nasty surprises in store: “The repo girl is at the door.”5 As a result of global warming that has already occurred, it is now too late to avoid “a cascade of local and regional ‘natural’ disasters in the medium term.”6 Price shocks, supply disruptions, dislocations, the rising costs of urban coastal infrastructure and remediation efforts: Hurricane Sandy—a direct hit on the world's financial and media capital at an estimated cost of $60 billion and counting—is the shape of things to come: price shocks, supply disruptions, dislo- cations, the rising costs of urban coastal infrastructure and remediation efforts. At the same time, a $20 trillion bubble of “unburnable carbon” inside the global financial system7 will require—if the planet is to be saved—deliberate capital destruction on a scale roughly twice that of the end of slavery.8Even when—if—growth resumes, it will not deliver on the promises with which it is being invested. A modeling exercise for the Resolution Foundation by the Institute for Employment Research and the Institute for Fiscal Studies finds that on the basis of annual average UK growth of 2.5 percent from 2015–2020—an optimistic scenario—and no further cuts in public spending, living standards will fall for low and middle income households by as much as 15 percent.9 Only the rich will escape this ravening maw of austerity. We may not quite be facing the “end of growth”10 altogether, but it would be a foolhardy politics that retained any strategy relying upon a return, even in the medium term, to anything approaching the status quo ante.It is in these circumstances that the political battle lines of the coming era are being drawn. In a thousand voices the figures of the established order—politicians, financiers, economists, media commentators, spokespersons of the ‘international community’—all urge the same course: “Given the harsh world that daily confronts us with challenges, we must climb the steep slopes of productivity, budget reduction, technological innovation, the good health of our banks, and job flexibility.”11 For all the difficulties, the crisis has at least smashed the false separation of politics from the market that has been a precondition of neoliberal theory. As governments move to close schools, pare back local authorities, cut public spending and reduce wages, they are conjuring up a series of class struggles that are already playing out in the streets. Continuing through this tunnel of pain, the hope for the left should be to emerge from the other end with a new political economy and a system design truly capable of sustaining democracy, equality and community, while meeting head on the challenges of concentrated ownership and power, and ecological meltdown. The question is whether social democracy will play its part in the development of these solutions or whether it will become an obstacle on the road to systemic change.How have Europe's social democrats responded to this conjuncture? The early signs are not propitious. There are “morbid symptoms” aplenty, of precisely the kind Gramsci ascribed to a crisis interregnum in which “the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”12 There has been a near-total lack of solidarity among the parties of the Socialist International, whether in government or in opposition, as they have fallen in with the needs of their own narrowly defined national capitalisms. The mask of the much vaunted European social model—proclaimed just a few short years ago by Jürgen Habermas to be “a model” for the rest of humanity13—has slipped badly, revealing the true features of northern capital that were behind it all along: Once crisis struck, cohesion in the Eurozone could only come, not from social expenditure, but political dictation—the enforcement by Germany, at the head of a bloc of smaller northern states, of draconian austerity programmes, unthinkable for its own citizens, on the southern periphery, no longer able to recover competitivity by devaluation.14The politics of austerity is proving as disruptive as the economics. To the “zombie households, companies and banks”15 of the post-crisis landscape must now be added “zombie governments.” A horror show of decrepit political formations not seen since the interwar years has been exhumed from the crypt and installed across Europe: national governments, externally-imposed technocrats, even—in Greece—a troika-dictated regimen “reminiscent of Austria in 1922, when a High Commissioner was posted to Vienna by the Entente—under League of Nations colours—to run the economy to its satisfaction.”16 Turnouts at elections are falling, and an anti-incumbency tide has swept over Europe to which governing parties in country after country—Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, France—have succumbed. The likelihood of continuing political volatility can be seen in the fact that, for the most part, their successors are prescribing even larger doses of the same awful medicine.Against this backdrop, many social democrats—still desperate to haunt the “house of power”17—have begun to position themselves as the left wing of austerity. Social democrats are propping up conservative-led governments in Ireland and the Netherlands. In France, hopes that Socialist president François Hollande might rally the center left for a challenge to German-led austerity have quickly given way to disappointment as Paris reached its own détente with Berlin. Hollande has seen his poll ratings plunge to the lowest level ever afforded a new French president. In Germany, prospects for change in the bastion of austerity policies seem highly doubtful. The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) is running Peer Steinbrück, perhaps the most conservative of the leading social democratic contenders, against Angela Merkel in 2013. Merkel is looking increasingly unassailable.One result of this posture is that social democracy is beginning to face significant challenges from the left: from Sinn Féin in Ireland, the Socialist Party in Holland, Die Linke in Germany, the Front de gauche in France.18 Another is the rise of populist anti-politics in keeping with the Argentine slogan of 2001, ¡Que Se Vayan Todos! (“They All Must Go!”), typified by forces such as the Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo in Italy. Thus far, existing party systems have just about contained the fallout. Greece, however, is the counter example, and should serve as a cautionary tale. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) went into the May 2012 elections on the back of a 43.9 percent showing last time around but carrying heavy baggage as a signatory of the troika memorandum. The retribution it was dealt was impressive. PASOK slumped to 13.2 percent, a fall of some 2.2 million votes since 2009. New Democracy, meanwhile—the main party of the center right—also lost ground: At 32 per cent, the combined total for the two ‘parties of government’ was less than half their aggregate support in the previous elections. PASOK's vote share was even lower than the 13.4 per cent it secured on its first appearance in 1974. Similarly, ND's vote share was the lowest ever received by the main party of the right since the interwar period.19The main beneficiary of this rupture has been SYRIZA, the left coalition, which trebled its vote to 16.8 percent—a close second—and will be waiting in the wings when the current ‘grand coalition’ falls. The response of social democrats elsewhere in Europe has been to heap vitriol on SYRIZA and paint its leader, Alexis Tsipras, in the most lurid of colors. His crime? Opposing austerity and daring to put forward what amounts to a genuine social democratic platform.The difficulties facing social democrats today are deeply embedded in their history. Always more pleased with itself than its record would warrant, social democracy must now make a true reckoning of that history if it is to emerge from the current crisis as a continuing force for progressive change.Social democrats first entered government in the interwar period, “largely as temporary shock-absorbers in the great European turbulence that followed the Armistice.”20 Part of their function was containment and suppression of political unrest. The widespread belief that they were moving with an inevitable historical current seemingly absolved them of the need for any specific economic program of their own, and as a result they did not initially make their mark anywhere. “The conformism which has been part and parcel of Social Democracy from the beginning,” Walter Benjamin observed, “attaches not only to its political tactics but to its economic views as well.”21 In Berlin in 1923, the SPD's Rudolf Hilferding was a model of economic orthodoxy, as was Philip Snowden in London in 1924, chancellor in a minority Labour government that busied itself with nothing much besides RAF bombing of recalcitrant tribes in Iraq.22It was not political victory but total war that first installed social democracy in government with an effective economic program of counter-cyclical demand management and welfare state expenditure. In this, social democrats were borrowing the clothes of two heirs of nineteenth-century liberal progressivism: Keynes and Beveridge.23 With the Second World War and victory over fascism, there was a mass influx of workers into unions and politics across Europe. The stage was set for an extended period of broad-based economic growth that could accommodate both increased profit rates for capital and higher real living standards for labor.24 Thus began les trente glorieuses, the ‘thirty glorious years’ of the postwar boom. Among the principal beneficiaries of this golden age was social democracy, which had now found its raison d' être: Keynesianism suddenly provided working-class political parties with a reason to be in office…. If the economy was producing at a level below its capacity, given the existing stock of capital and labor, a proper government policy could increase output until it approached the economy's full potential.25Underpinning it all was the increased political weight of organized labor. The power of trade unions provided social democracy with ‘a place to stand’ vis-à-vis the economy from which to engage in redistributive politics.The extent of social democratic success during this period should not be overstated. Center left parties were not hegemonic. Nor did the class struggle simply disappear, instead being partially displaced onto public budgets through struggles over welfare provisions, subsidies to business, military and social spending, conflicts over taxation and the like.26 “Revisionist in ideology, reformist in project, and technocratic in practice,”27 from the Erfurt Program of the German SPD in 1891 to the crisis of the 1970s, the deep conservatism of the Western social democratic parties became apparent in their defense of a generalized status quo: They defended the growth model of Western capitalism … many traditional socialist commitments were in practice abandoned or relegated to an ever-receding long term: the end of capitalism, universal peace, the reform of the state, the abolition of all forms of political and economic inequality between the sexes. Attention was entirely concentrated on the main short-term aims: full employment for all male workers and the provision of welfare services to meet needs not provided through the market.28Attempts to push in another direction by radicals hostile to the wholesale adoption of reformist statism, from Rosa Luxemburg to G.D.H. Cole, were rebuffed. In Britain, the Labour Party rejected out of hand plans for social credit, guild socialism, and other such solutions in favor of the dismal managerialism of nationalization, and then only for industries—such as electricity, coal, gas, civil aviation, telecommunications, and railways—which were not particularly profitable at the time, and for which their owners were richly compensated.29In America, it did not even prove necessary to have a social democratic party to create a welfare state (albeit a severely truncated one—the US was always a “welfare state laggard,” in Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward's phrase).30 What in Europe had taken the might of the organized parties of the left—socialist, social democratic, and labor—was in the United States largely the work of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “a pseudo-aristocratic politician whose avowed ambition was ‘the salvation of American capitalism’.”31 In The Great Evasion, William Appleman Williams that the New became “a state in the and that, as was the with the welfare state, it was by the the and other received on their in than the or the The from the during was The government a total of billion on all its public its public health its to and all other welfare is not to that the social systems in the United States and Western Europe were or that they were without a They were to years of and to the power of in a period that the of national struggles and and in the United States in the and of the welfare state was only and through the of war and War and the resulting of and increased military spending, which time and to the economy out of of the social democratic posture became In redistributive social spending was to the postwar boom. the of the 1970s, the of this were being into as and facing rates of new to mass trade in the 1970s social democrats had no at As social democratic and policies of the era to the mass of in the of a new of political of facing welfare programmes, left the of the accumulation of social democratic redistributive taxation that, in the long it was an and particularly when set against the of for in the social there were to what could be the of social democracy in that the social democratic was The change in … the public of … rates were many and into the services the of the … Thus the of economic was a of social and political the of social democratic it is not that there are not a of good for the taxation of is the of any capital increasingly to over time, both to conservative political and to economic the late seventies, the social democratic was in crisis, with a by wages, in social and global and an to the democrats found themselves face to face with a new The victory of social democracy in its was to have successfully its conservative of the of its now the set In the some were to a most with the in which would have to the of accumulation through a share and the of it was social democrats themselves were the first to Keynesianism for beginning with the government in With of the of the no less a social democratic than to if the it make such a if Labour be few years the was New governments were installed across the social democratic of northern Europe. In reduction, and became the main of a to a economic The had been set for the and are all with the end of this The of a long period in for social democratic such as Labour in and the SPD in Germany, with continuing and led the parties of the Socialist International into a accommodation with one in social market The long years in the social democracy was “the great at the with center left governments in in out of of the of the European social democratic policies were to be economic these governments largely to and in some to In political they further their own Part of the price for into government had been the total of parties that were on into In Britain, of the of “a party with a its job being to the parliamentary into there is a election … fall into the the is The was a of the of the Great social democratic parties to have been in when the crisis are to their and a to austerity. The itself now in the as a and in a of or the for social democrats that in the of will be in the of economic management already into social democrats may that an for solutions will only further their As long defense of policies with the to the for the good while social democracy may be at an history is on the to and from to the of change is in the and as a of a of has out across southern in in and and in Greece, and A crisis is in the social from the continuing economic crisis has it the first time in about capitalism in a this new for a major public about political challenges to the system thus far have been contained by the continuing of a lack of the same time, the of has an of of the fact that for much of the the US has largely been elsewhere has as the of this innovation, with new in and in perhaps lack of many of the social democratic features of European a of has been place in the United of have been They new and can work in What is more capital to up the over an and to all this and show in it forms the of a system capable of economic and ecological this about a is perhaps more in and the United Europe is no to the many of them have their in the political and economic struggles of the and European The of the can be back to the and now a billion In and on the lines of austerity are that show the power of these when taken to scale in the of Spain, the is now the has been an economic the The is much lower in the country than in as a when was to off workers in and they were by other companies within the in has given rise to the The economy now over half of the and has from one of the in in to one of the in Europe social democrats have not already given themselves over to the new politics of austerity have not the to the that would their political to these and to the new unleashed by the Social democrats are of and the as a of from which they turned long or as but They should one to the of organized that has social democratic we to up other power that can to stand’ in the democracy today is of an economic program. will be in in the of demand At the same time, the left has not an to an and state The of their two major political in any the that they are no longer the way for the European left to to its and the that are a part of its is time to new and forms of ownership of this the American left is already a has the question as to from a global the too a to a on its own, if the social now way are to their this may the and of democratic an for the and of the left in Europe and the United States as through the of a new set of economic and political power this will a to change and a to of the false choices and of crisis this, the behind austerity must be into is a deep that the Great is among some of the the world has ever the of the forces of have been new As and have elsewhere in this the US economy in per of In in the same the was in Germany, it was in Greece, through the of reached over per is given the by change and other to The challenge is not technological but and is a matter of systemic is already to out the of what a system on forms of democratic capital ownership might there is political to be in this is increasingly For social democracy, there are for such to Among the most is the The Rudolf at the the trade his in the 1970s as a response to the two facing the at the time, to increase the level of but not inequality of and to that an increase in would into the kind of that would full and the of a and on the that in part from public the that a significant of their to workers as To capital would not have the right to their they would be to regional public or would for a time to the as capital within the and direct the to meet social would not only have provided an income from capital for public spending some of the on but would have it for the and to welfare system by running their in and off to as has to the abolition of ownership and by the estimated that it would have taken years to percent of the of a at an annual of profit of the real of the was that the higher the the the that, a such as that percent of its the would percent of the stock after for In years it would have over percent and would be in fact the as as the at which reform over into systemic The was in but the lost the election that and the was a much finally being by the the support of the in a of the with share could have the of the economy within is as against with spending more the than the out by all the parties in the given we the against a of economic As the in would no longer be to over of the further seems to have reached its The would increase the of over their … the of … would then more and more the question of and the without in other in its the however, the that were set up the position that they would not simply had and that, as one put capital can work just as as other capital In we are for the of Social Democracy, this is the place to In the face of the current crisis, the are any left strategy the after capital been 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Atomic Historiography Michael Kimmage (bio) Rosemary B. Mariner and G. Kurt Piehler, eds. The Atomic Bomb and American Society: New Perspectives. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2009. Illustrations, bibliography, index, and notes. xxxi + 447 pp. $42.00. The large-scale periodization of American history rests on a few phrases, usually referring to a military conflict of one kind or another. There is the age of conquest, the revolutionary age, the antebellum era, the interwar years, the postwar period and, finally, the atomic or nuclear age. This is the age that began definitively with the creation of the atomic bomb, and it encompasses both the Cold War, which would not have been cold without atomic weapons, and the rise of the nuclear family. One could go a step further and describe the individualism of the postwar period as atomistic individualism, as if the mobile atom—and its power—were metaphors for modern culture and modern geopolitics alike. The Atomic Bomb and American Society, a collection of essays edited by Rosemary B. Mariner and G. Kurt Piehler, takes as its working premise the link between atomic weaponry and the drift of postwar American history. Based on a 2005 conference held in Oak Ridge, Tennessee—itself a significant site in atomic and American history—The Atomic Bomb and American Society is devoted to charting “the social swath of this atomic sword [nuclear weapons] in the context of the Cold War” and to examining the atomic bomb and “its lead role in the culture surrounding the Cold War” (pp. xix, xxiii). The included essays range from military to cultural history, from women’s history to the history of public memory. They demonstrate how wide the bomb’s “social swath” was, wider perhaps than Americans may have known during the Cold War. In the volume’s concluding essay, “The Challenges of Preserving America’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” Jason Krupar remarks on the vastness and the relative invisibility of America’s nuclear weapons complex. “The Cold War created a national web of black spaces,” Krupar writes, “zones hidden from public sight even while located in the midst of it” (p. 399). The Atomic Bomb and American Society helps to illuminate these black spaces, without fully proving the bomb’s lead role in the culture surrounding the Cold War. In an essay that frames this volume as a whole, “Sixty Years and Counting: Nuclear Themes in American Culture, 1945 to the Present,” Paul Boyer [End Page 145] addresses the complexity of the bomb’s role in postwar American culture. A distinguished historian of American culture and the bomb, Boyer breaks this role into three phases: an early phase of anxiety, running from 1945 to the mid-1950s; a relaxation of fear in the 1960s and 1970s, after the Cuban Missile Crisis had passed without incident; and a widening fear of atomic catastrophe in the late 1970s and 1980s.1 Boyer emphasizes that nuclear fear or questions prompted by the existence of nuclear weapons were unsteady variables in American culture, waxing and waning for the duration of the Cold War. Nor did nuclear questions disappear together with the Cold War: the 1995 dispute over the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay exhibition demonstrated precisely how unmasterable America’s nuclear past had remained, some six years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.2 What did disappear after 1989, according to Boyer, was the coherence or urgency that had previously been attached to nuclear questions. “In contrast to earlier eras, a fundamental disconnect arose between politics and the popular culture” after the Cold War, Boyer writes (p. 14). Nuclear proliferation was sharply relevant as a strategic issue in the 1990s, while American popular culture was celebrating the harmless incompetence of Homer Simpson, the cartoon employee of an atomic energy plant (p. 14). And yet, the old fears were still there under the surface, made worse, in fact, by the fading of the Cold War. “During the Cold War, the adversary was at least the nation-state headed by rational leaders with whom one could negotiate,” Boyer states. “In the volatile destabilized post–Cold War world, lethal menace could lurk anywhere, and the popular culture reflected the resulting anxieties” (p. 12). One...

INTRODUCTION The relationship between industry and the financial system in the interwar years has been extensively discussed, almost always with a perspective of seeking to allocate some kind of blame for poor performance. This approach stems from two closely related fundamental positions. The first of these, inspired by the work of Hilferding (1910), postulates a hegemony of financial capital over the needs of productive industry. Authors such as Newton and Porter (1988) have argued that the interwar years can be seen as a period in which the core institutional nexus of the Bank of England, the Treasury and the City of London exercised a malign influence on policy making – the return to the gold standard at an inappropriate exchange rate being the prime example. The needs of manufacturing were systematically ignored by a banking and financial system obsessed with liquidity and unattainable standards of creditworthiness (Ingham 1984). The second approach is located in the general institutional understanding of the decline of the British economy. This takes the view that, by the interwar years, the set of institutions and ways of doing things, which had delivered so much economic success and prosperity to Britain in the nineteenth century, were no longer appropriate to the new environment of international competition in the industries of the second industrial revolution (Chandler 1990). Adherents of this view suggest that the financial system, as it had developed over the previous century, acted as a constraint on the reallocation of resources from the declining staple industries to the newer, high-technology, growth-oriented sector (Best and Humphries 1986; Mowery 1992).

The author analyzes the features of the expert activity of the RAND Corporation at the end of the twentieth century, aimed at studying the colonial experience of counterinsurgency activities of the British Empire during the interwar period. The position of the American analytical center on the possibility of using such experience in modern conditions is considered. A comparison is made of the conclusions of RAND Corporation experts on a similar issue in an earlier historical period - the Cold War era. The reasons for the change in the views of the experts of the analytical center on the question of the potential possibility of applying the colonial experience of the counterinsurgency of the British Empire are revealed. Thus, the characteristic features of the academic examination of US foreign policy decisions at the end of the twentieth century are analyzed. The analysis showed that the RAND Corporation considered this experience useful to the United States, since this analytical center believed that the United States after the end of the Cold War found itself in the same position as the United Kingdom after the First World War. At the same time, the United States repeats the same mistakes that the British Empire authorities made – reducing spending on the army, shifting the emphasis from using infantry in anti-insurgency operations to modern weapons, spreading pacifist ideas and reducing the level of military training. Also, the RAND Corporation for the first time evaluated the colonial experience of the British Empire in a negative way, thereby advocating a return transfer. The United States of the late twentieth century, according to the analytical center, should make decisions not similar to those taken by the British authorities in the interwar period, but opposite to them. This approach is explained by the fact that the RAND Corporation had to provide information support for increasing spending on the US armed forces and maintaining large contingents of troops.

Introduction Chapter 1 Fisher's Navy Chapter 2 WW1 to Jutland Chapter 3 WW1 after Jutland Chapter 4 The interwar period - disarmament Chapter 5 The interwar period - rearmament Chapter 6 WW2 - Home waters and the Atlantic Chapter 7 WW2 - the Mediterranean Chapter 8 WW2 - the Far East Chapter 9 The Cold War 1945-1968 Chapter 10The Cold War and After 1968-2000 Epilogue The War on Terror

Espionage in British Fiction and Film since 1900: The Changing Enemy by Oliver S. Buckton, Espionage and Exile: Fascism and Anti-fascism in British Spy Fiction and Film by Phyllis Lassner

In Asia, and in Southeast Asia in particular, the Cold War was far from cold, witnessing the most deadly conflicts and political massacres of the second half of the twentieth century. Also, the clash of ideologies there did not follow a binary logic but included a third force, nationalism, which was rooted in the anticolonialist movements of the interwar years and played a significant role even in countries that decolonised peacefully after the end of the Second World War. The Cold War thus overlapped with the twin process of decolonisation and nation-building, which had its founding moment at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955, where the non-aligned camp, which advocated a neutral position vis-à-vis the two rival blocs, coalesced (one year ealier, the anticommunist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization had been established). Postcolonial aspirations to national progress that tied socioeconomic development to the civic and cultural elevation of the citizenry were widely shared among newly decolonised countries. By the mid-1960s, however, the utopian ‘Bandung Spirit’ had lost ground to Cold War realpolitik; intra-Asian and communal conflicts fomented by Cold War enmities (the Sino–Indian War of 1962, the Indo–Pakistani War of 1965, Indonesia's anticommunist purges of 1965–66) along with the escalation of the Vietnam War and the consequent exacerbation of regional divisions, belied governments’ earlier commitment to human rights, Third World solidarity and world peace. The authoritarian involution of several Asian countries that were often American allies, redoubled by the opening of their economies to multinational corporations, led many artists and intellectuals to embrace political activism. The conception of art as a revolutionary instrument in the service of the masses had been famously articulated by Mao Zedong at the Yan'an Forum in 1942. In China, Mao's prescriptions on art were sidelined, though never officially repudiated, only in the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the adoption of a socialist market economy, by acknowledging the necessity ‘to respect and guarantee the creativity of individuals’.

Review| April 01 2022 Science and Really Existing Socialism in Maoist China: A Review of Recent Works Mary Augusta Brazelton. Mass Vaccination: Citizens’ Bodies and State Power in Modern China. Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2019. 258 pp., illus., index. ISBN 978-1-5017-3998-9. $47.95Arunabh Ghosh. Making It Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the Early People’s Republic of China. Histories of Economic Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2020. 360 pp., illus., index. ISBN 978-0-6911-7947-6. $45.00Sigrid Schmalzer. Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China. London: University of Chicago Press. 2016. 320 pp., illus., index. ISBN 978-0-2263-3015-0. $45.00. He Bian He Bian History and East Asian Studies, Princeton University. hbian@princeton.edu Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences (2022) 52 (2): 265–275. https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2022.52.2.265 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation He Bian; Science and Really Existing Socialism in Maoist China: A Review of Recent Works. Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 1 April 2022; 52 (2): 265–275. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2022.52.2.265 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentHistorical Studies in the Natural Sciences Search On January 31, 1979, Michel Foucault made an offhand remark during a lecture at the College of France: “I do not think that there is an autonomous socialist governmentality. There is no governmental rationality of socialism.…One can, moreover, reproach it…but it has lived, it has actually functioned, and we have examples of it within and connected up to liberal governmentalities.” In this rare reference to socialism in The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault framed it as “the internal logic of an administrative apparatus” in which the “governmentality of a police state” forms “a fusion, a continuity, the constitution of a sort of massive bloc between governmentality and administration.”1 One can read this remark as dismissive, slotting socialism as a pseudo-ideology subsidiary to an all-encompassing global history of capitalism. And in the three decades since the end of the Cold War, such readings of socialism have only multiplied—not least due... You do not currently have access to this content.

Introduction: The United States and the West in Asia in the Twentieth Century: The Growth and Limits of Power by Jon Davidann The West Turns to Asia: The United States, Europe, Japan, and China, 1880 to WWII The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes Toward China by Yone Sugita Citadels of Civilization: U.S. and Japanese Visions of World Order in the Interwar Period by Jon Davidann U.S. and German Military and Naval Attaches in Japan, 1931-1939 by William Voss Struggle for National Survival: Eugenics in the Second Sino-Japanese War and Population Policies by Juliette Chung American Entrenchment in Asia: World War II, Occupation, and Neo-Colonialism The Pacific War: An Interpretation by Mark Parillo Japanese and American Images of Koreans: A Tale of Two Occupations by Mark Caprio American Military Bases in the Philippines, 1945-1965: Neo-Colonialism and Its Demise by Julian Madison The Limits of Power: The U.S. in Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand in the Cold War The Korean War: An Interpretive History by Stanley Sandler Victory and Defeat in the Vietnam War by Richard Jensen The Vietnam War, Thailand, and the United States by Arne Kislenko Orbiting the Western Sun: The Western Impact in Japan and China America and the Japanese Miracle: The Economic Nexus, 1945-2000 by Aaron Forsberg China and the Dissipation of Moral Authority: China Looks West after Mao by Jennifer Hubbert

Strategic Arctic science: national interests in building natural knowledge – interwar era through the Cold War

In the interwar period (1919–1939), the Africans who fought against colonial rule, such as the Moroccans, were virtually on their own: they received very little help from abroad. This changed after 1945. Henceforth, the backdrop of decolonization was the Cold War. While the colonial empires crumbled, two superpowers jostled for influence in the world. The United States was sympathetic, in principle, to the gradual progression of colonized people toward independence. The onset of the Cold War added a sense of urgency. Washington feared that the metropoles’ intransigence would open the door to Soviet meddling. The Cold War, however, also pushed US policymakers in the opposite direction. US empathy for the colonized faced two constraints that were most significant when their struggle was violent: the colonial powers were America’s allies against the Soviet Union, and Washington insisted that independence movements be free of the Communist virus. Therefore, US policy on decolonization often clashed with its rhetoric. On the other hand, both ideology and realpolitik led the Soviet Union to support those who fought for independence. Not only did Moscow oppose colonialism in principle, but the insurgents were fighting Washington’s friends. At times, however, realpolitik acted as a brake. For example, after the Algerian revolution began in November 1954, the Soviets hesitated for more than two years before sending weapons to the rebels for fear of antagonizing the French government. Soviets and Americans were not the only outside actors on the stage of decolonization. Two small countries deserve pride of place: Cuba, which sent tens of thousands of soldiers to southern Africa, and Sweden, which gave vital economic assistance to African liberation movements. The list of external actors also includes the other Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, Moscow’s Eastern European clients, Egypt, and the People’s Republic of China. This bibliographical essay focuses on the Cold War crises in Africa. It will not include, therefore, one of Africa’s greatest human dramas, the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970), because the two superpowers supported the federal government in Lagos.

The attitude of the totalitarian states towards the would-be exiles is necessarily ambivalent. They would like to get rid of them – but they are also reluctant to let them go. Paul Tabori The refugee issue cannot be divorced from the political context in which it operates at any one time, and international responses to the ‘refugee problem’ soon became entangled in the Cold War environment. But the changing refugee regime was also indicative of the international system as it developed in the post-war years, affected by a shift to fixed borders, negative sovereignty and individual human rights. The post-war years indicated a reorganisation of the map and a shift in state–citizen relations, but this did not remove the ‘problem’ of the refugee. This chapter first asks how the Cold War period represented a continuation from the decades of international refugee regimentation preceding it, before examining the fundamental changes and differences. It then considers the Berlin Wall as representative of impermeable borders that were erected in this period as a barrier to refugee creation. Fourth, it discusses non-European displacements of persons as inherently contradictory to the Cold War (western) understanding of ‘refugees’. Finally, it analyses what the Cold War normative responses towards refugees meant in terms both of refugee identities and the identity of international society itself. Continuities in the refugee regime If the creation of refugees leading up to the First World War and during the inter-war years saw the start of the ‘modern’ extent of the refugee problem, the mass of refugees created by the Second World War was on an even greater scale.