Libertad de expresión y discurso homofóbico en méxico: ¿es correcta la teoría constitucional de la suprema corte?

Abstract

The article discusses a recent decision by the Mexican Supreme Court whereby damage resulting from the use of discriminatory language may in certain cases appropriately counterweight freedom of speech. The ruling expresses thesis at three different levels, all of them relevant from the viewpoint of constitutional theory. First, it expresses a vision of the kind of exercise the Court should deploy when reviewing sentences in amparo: it is a maximizing vision that the author considers to be fundamentally correct. At a second and third level, with different degrees of specificity, it proposes a particular constitutional reading for the revision of the case at hand. On this count and given the relevant historic-constitutional context, the article celebrates the Court's willingness to counterweight free speech with antidiscrimination-based considerations, though in terms of the sub-rules of decision used to pin down the general reading it identifies both successes and failures.