Liberalism and the Neutrality Principle

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin has remarked liberal political theory approaches questions of justice from the view that justice must be independent of any idea of human excellence or of the good life.' Although all liberal theorists do not consciously place this premise at the center of their theories, Bruce Ackerman focuses directly on the assumption. He calls this starting point of liberal theory the Neutrality principle. In liberal state all discussion about the legitimacy of power relationships must be constrained by this principle, he thinks; if we carefully adhere to it, it can lead us to the other liberal principles of social justice. The frequently heard accusation liberal theory is bankrupt will be rebutted, according to Ackerman, if he can provide a single example of liberal theory equal to the conceptual task of providing Neutral order to the struggle for power. 2 The Neutrality principle limits the kinds of arguments which are acceptable in liberal dialogue. No reason is good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: (a) his conception of the good is better than asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.3 Ackerman also thinks other principles must guide liberal dialogue. The other two he suggests, however, consistency and rationality, are generally accepted canons of thought and do not distinguish his theory from host of others. Furthermore, Ackerman acknowledges consistency and rationality could lead to illiberal conclusions. Ifthere is anything distinctive about liberalism, it must be in the kinds of reasons liberals rely on to legitimate their claims to scarce resources.4 For Ackerman, only reasons which pass test of